tainty, with the clash between competing national goals such as order and justice. The national interest is determined less by fixed ideology and more by the necessities of international life; otherwise the United States would not have built a network of relations, including many Communist countries, considerably larger than China's and the Soviet Union's. It may be intellectually satisfying to some to describe the world from the standpoint of inevitable ideological trends, as Kolko does, but the imperatives of foreign policy for West or East, North or South, seldom if ever yield to what the historian Frederick Burkhardt called "the grand simplifiers." In short, ideology is a necessary but insufficient explanation of foreign policy.

On Guilt and Innocence
Essays in Legal Philosophy and Moral Psychology
by Herbert Morris
(University of California Press; 161 pp.; $8.50)

Joseph Amato

As you might expect from a collection of essays, this is not an organically conceived or systematically composed work about guilt and innocence. The essays do, however, express a unity of interest, approach, and style, and that gives the work both unity and integrity.

Morris's writing is lucid, his manner of presentation straightforward, his development of ideas thorough, his tone mild and probing. He is no reductionist: The world of self and the world of action are not compressed into homogenized modes of being. He insists that the meaning of moral realities and human actions invariably exceeds in depth and in diversity our understanding of them. One additional point of unity characterizes his approach and style: Morris—a philosopher of ethics housed in the UCLA law school—consistently turns to the law for those insights and distinctions he considers essential to his subject.

In his first essay, "Punishment for Thoughts," Morris argues at length what seems, at least intuitively, obvious: There is a value to the long-standing distinction that morality deals with thought, and law with conduct. In "Persons and Punishment"—surely one of the most interesting essays—Morris speaks provocatively of the right of punishment. Punishment, according to him, provides an ordeal of suffering upon which a person can rest his claim for readmission into the community. In other terms, community is a "mutuality of benefit and burden"; by wrongdoing a person thus severs himself from this first binding moral assumption of the community. Punishment makes explicit the suffering of his admitted wrong and provides a tangible experience for requesting his right to reenter the community. More simply, punishment is an essential rite of passage.

Morris understands that people do bad things. He disputes the reasoning and fears the results of a community that would make all wrongdoing but a matter of therapy. (Psychological theories do have a nasty potential for totalitarianism.) Conversely, Morris disagrees strongly with those whose desire to defend the place of reason and responsibility in human affairs lead them to deny the existence of any wrongdoing that is separable from reasoned responsibility; for them, every wrong must have a culprit! In his appendices to "Person and Punishment" (book reviews of Szasz's Manufacture of Madness and Fingarette's The Meaning of Criminal Insanity) Morris sets forth a sensible bid for middle territory between warring "mongers of madness" and responsibility.

In "Guilt and Suffering" Morris again seeks out middle ground. This time he tries to find a place between those who praise and those who disparage guilt. On the one hand, guilt is considered to have a positive function in the moral life; it leads a person to recognize the relations he has injured and the need to reorder himself so as to restore these relations. On the other hand, Morris points out, guilt, like punishment, is not in itself sufficient to restore those personal human relations of love that demand of a person far more than "mutual sharing of benefits and burdens." Approaching the threshold of depth psychology, Morris says guilt can be the source of a mental state, self-destructively induced, in which one takes pride.

In the essay "Shared Guilt" Morris starts beautifully by declaring his intention to explore the words of Father Zossima's brother to his mother: "Little heart of mine, my joy, believe me, everyone is really responsible to all men for all men and for everything." Enroute to this end Morris makes some very insightful distinctions between types of complicity and responsibility, desire and intention, and the direct and willful carrying out of a wrong. He weaves in searching observations about how we all might have "the hand that kills tenderly (Nietzsche); how our falterings, weaknesses, and selfishness account for the existence of evil. At the very end of his journey (after dealing with types of complicity, the wrongs of omission, and the commonality of the impulses toward evil) Morris insinuates that Zossima is expressing "a primitive belief that the act of one member of a tribe is the act of each and every member of the tribe".

Here Morris stops, leaving unasked questions about the degree to which all modern men might remain "primitives." How does the doctrine of progress entail a notion of universal and collective guilt? Or again, why did a nineteenth-century Russian intellectual such as Dostoevski choose to idealize such primitive conceptions throughout his major writings?

"Lost Innocence" is a fine closing essay. It centers on the tale of Adam and Eve's fall. Morris leads us back and forth across the meaning of our lost innocence. The loss, according to Morris, lies precisely in the terrifying
recognition that we can do wrong. He fittingly exhorts us not to succumb to the two terrible temptations that afflict the fallen: Do not deny the existence of evil; do not affirm that it controls all. Reason, responsibility, dignity, and love, Morris would have it, are for those who learn to think and to live on this middle ground.

A mature and sensitive realism? A middle-class search for purity in marriage, work, profession, and citizenship? Fine readable philosophy, another example of the useless "limited clarity" of even the best of contemporary ethics? Yes, perhaps, to all these questions. After the din of the 1960’s—that rush of accusations that held All are guilty! None are guilty! Only the guilty are guilty! Only the guiltless are guilty!—Morris's modest but probing work is welcome. While reading it one is provoked to think and to reflect, to ask again basic questions. That is no mean virtue these days.

But in truth, real and irrepressible questions of shared and collective guilt were raised for many Americans during the 1960's. Morris does not speak to them. And as much as his work helps us in our inward probing about responsibility, it does seem an expression of professional quietism (as vice or virtue) when we realize how much of our guilt is an inescapable consequence of twentieth-century experience. That is, in one form or another, guilt forever stalks our consciousness. It is awesomely diffuse. This is so for many reasons: because primary communities have been broken and transformed by revolutions, causing a war over allegiances and loyalties, traditions and innovations; because guilt is used and manipulated by the rhetorics and ideologies of the established and disestablished; because nation-states and corporations destroy and are willing to destroy peoples, nature, and humanity in the name of national responsibility; because expectations and responsibilities for a better world continue to stir in our breasts even though common sense should probably have muffled them long ago. In any case, it is around this mulberry bush we go—and are dragged. And neither Morris nor anyone else gives direction to our confused and angry circlings.

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Briefly Noted

The New Germans: Thirty Years After by John Dornberg

(Macmillan; 293 pp.; $11.95)

The old truism that journalists can rarely resist the temptation to concoct drawn-out columns when they embark on writing books certainly holds true of this new book by onetime Newsweek bureau chief in Bonn, John Dornberg. Indeed, large portions of the book are enlarged and revised editions of articles Dornberg wrote for the International Herald Tribune. The predominantly anecdotal and narrative approach will disappoint readers looking for profound analysis. But Dornberg’s anecdotes are not mere journalistic blather designed to enliven an otherwise ponderous text. On the contrary, they are extraordinarily well-taken snapshots that shed a revealing light on the realities of present-day Germany.

To foreigners the most important question about Germans still seems to be: Have they changed or are they still the same old war hawks and jingoists they used to be? Dornberg gives a discriminating answer to this somewhat superficial question. The long-range outlook he presents is very promising. Germans still show some residue of supernationalism, some racial arrogance, hyperlegalism, inclinations toward deference in the face of authority (as well as an excessive tendency to exercise authority), a certain nostalgia for lost greatness, and a slightly pathological mixture of guilt and paranoia.

Despite all that, says Dornberg, Germany has finally come of age. It is healthy, its democracy and peaceful intentions are secure.

To many observers, and to many Germans, this may appear too optimistic an assessment. But as the author points out, public leaders in Germany tend to be more pessimistic about the future of democracy in their country than outsiders who, like John Dornberg, have been observing it for over two decades.

Dornberg, however, is not really an outsider. Born in the twilight years of the Weimar Republic, in what is now East Germany, the only child of Jewish parents who fled in 1939, Dornberg returned to West Germany as a U.S. soldier in 1955, and after a journalistic stint in the Soviet Union has covered Germany for American papers and magazines, first from Bonn, then from Munich, where he lives today. In earlier books Dornberg judged the prospects for democracy in West Germany much more critically. His newly acquired op-
timism is, by and large, a consequence of the Social Democrats’ ascent to power and the ensuing change of atmosphere.

—Wolfgang J. Koschnick

The New Religious Consciousness
edited by Charles Y. Glock and Robert N. Bellah
(University of California Press; 391 pp.; $14.95)

One suspects that in editing these sixteen chapters Glock and Bellah frequently switched the present tense to the past. That is, in the late 1960’s—when much of this research was done—it was perhaps possible, at least in the San Francisco area, to believe in the dawning of the countercultural revolutions this book describes. Since such credibility is now embarrassing, the volume is edited into a “what might have been” nostalgia trip, although still limping toward the conclusion that the processes manifest in the sixties are continuing, albeit perhaps unseen. The selection of subject matter is curious in the extreme. The essays, many of which emerge from class assignments with the editors, leave one to infer that the charismatic movement among Roman Catholics, involving hundreds of thousands of people, is somehow on a par with the Church of Satan or the Healthy-Happy-Holy Organization when it comes to understanding “the new religious consciousness.” The result is disjointed and unconvincing; indeed, it is not clear of what the authors would convince us, except that the times they are a’changing. To judge from this book, in the last ten years they have changed less in the Bay Area than out here in the America of the 1970’s.

A History of Christianity
by Paul Johnson
(Atheneum; 556 pp.; $13.95)

In attempting a volume history of two thousand years of Christianity the chances of success are slim indeed. Paul Johnson, a British editor and historian, has succeeded. The literate reader will groan from time to time at what seem outrageous omissions. Johnson’s scheme, which pits Augustine as the heavy against Erasmus as the hero (with Saint Paul on the side of Erasmus) seems a bit simplistic, but perhaps that is the price paid for a device that holds the story together. The uncomplimentary portrayal of Judaism, especially in the first centuries, will no doubt offend some sensibilities. But, then, Johnson is extremely chary when it comes to compliments. His confidence is that, if Christianity is right, the truth should be followed where ever it leads—even when it leads to a rigorous critique of Christianity. Throughout, the style is eminently engaging, which, together with its other virtues, makes this about the best brief introduction to Christian history available today.

The Enlightenment in America
by Henry F. May
(Oxford: 419 pp.; $15.00)

Professor May of the University of California, Berkeley, has produced an original and graciously written argument for making some important distinctions when speaking of “The Enlightenment.” One can, he contends, actually distinguish at least four Enlightenments and their quite different influences in American politics and thought. Of course the strands overlap, but “The Moderate Enlightenment” (1688-1787) neatly put together reason and revelation, nature and grace in a way that was thoroughly implausible to “The Skeptical Enlightenment” (1750-89). And both those Enlightenments seemed much too pale and diluted by security for “The Revolutionary Enlightenment” (1776-1800), which reached its bloody climax in France, but also influenced more than a few Americans in their understanding of the New World’s version of revolution. Finally, there is “The Didactic Enlightenment” (1800-15), which is, May says, the distinctive form American culture took in the nineteenth century. This last Enlightenment—much influenced by the Scottish philosophers such as Thomas Reid—is also the most elusive of May’s four ideal types. Toward the end of his tale May notes that American intellectuals have almost always subscribed to some kind of Enlightenment. They have not, however, always been very discriminating in this subscription and have seldom tried to understand those who opposed the several Enlightenments. May concludes on the note that “Neither the Enlightenment nor any other set of ideas has much of a future unless it can find its place in mass society, among human beings as they are.”

The Day Is Born of Darkness
by Mikhail Dyomin
(Knopf; 368 pp.; $10.95)

In recent times books such as those by Hedrick Smith and Robert Kaiser have told us a great deal about the underworlds of criminality in the Soviet Union. Here the tale is told by a veteran of fifteen years as a professional thief, and of six years in Siberian prison camps. Smugglers, prostitutes, nationalist terrorists, and thoroughly corrupted officials all come alive in this extraordinary story narrated with very little bitterness and an abundance of humor and irony. Dyomin (the real name is Georgy Trifonov) notes the organizational parallels between the thieves’ guild and the Communist Party, but his point is not essentially political. His aim would seem to be to illuminate the humanity of a very large number of people who live on the wrong side of the law in the worker’s paradise. At that he succeeds admirably. After release from prison camp Dyomin became a published writer in the Soviet Union and then, in 1971, quietly defected while on a visit to Paris, where he now lives.

(from p. 2)

rich oil states, whose command of financial resources requires giving them a greater voice in international monetary affairs.

Yet given its preponderant size, this slow process of coordinating decisions in Western Europe, the even slower process of reaching a consensus in Japan, and the diversity within the Third World, it is far simpler for the United States to act first and then to inform other countries—even though the United States wants to be consulted before other countries make decisions that affect it.