privacy. It is certainly not news, whether the subjects be the disciples of Jesus, Francis of Assisi, or Martin Luther King, Jr., that many followers never get the real point. What is amazing is that some do.

Mehta interviews rather few of these. There is, for example, a brief appearance by one of the most remarkable living Gandhians, Vinoba Bhave: fifteen paragraphs in all. But Vinoba, himself retired and preparing for death, apparently had little time for Mehta, or perhaps little patience. Amazingly, J.P. Narayan doesn’t appear at all—one of the most respected Gandhian survivors and a pivotal force in Indian politics.

Nor does Morarji Desai, now the Indian prime minister. Perhaps they were in jail when Mehta was doing the book, yet one would expect at least some treatment of their work. Lanza del Vasto, “‘Shantidas,’” as Gandhi named him (“servant of peace”), continues in Europe and Latin America with his “‘mission to the West,’” which Gandhi entrusted to him; the impact has been considerable. He isn’t counted among the “apostles” by his fellow Gandhians, Vinoba Bhave: fifteen paragraphs in all. To many, this is a figure whose genius continues to challenge those who doubt it.

Gandhi did not, it must be recalled, see himself as a latter-day Messiah nor view his most able and trusted co-workers as apostles of some new Gandhian church. Nonviolence, he insisted, “is as old as the hills.” He was a very rare sort of nationalist, who refused to see killing as a way toward any liberation worth having and who detested industrialism and saw in it no future, whether for Indians or anyone else, a view that is less curious now than it used to be. He insisted that a religious base was needed. His own Hinduism was of a particularly eclectic, inventive variety, very much influenced by the teachings of Jesus. He was, among many other things, one of history’s towering ecumenical figures, seeing the need for various religious groupings to collaborate in human service, in work for a nonviolent society, even to find ways of living together in community without tossing particular liturgies and theologies into a blender and ending up with a philosophical pablum satisfying to no one. He was interested in recognizing certain truths that transcend religious differences, including the need for discipline as well as faith in day-to-day life—a discipline that isn’t at the mercy of natural energies but rather tries to harness them. He saw nonviolence as meaningless unless it was active and courageous, involving a personal readiness to have little and to live in risk in much the way soldiers do under battlefield conditions. (Gandhi, unlike many pacifists at present, had a great admiration for soldiers, but not for their tools.)

Gandhi was no messiah, no founder of churches, but rather a figure whose genius continues to challenge those with both religious and political concerns. In reckoning with that genius we would do well to reach more deeply than Ved Mehta has. In this connection Gandhi’s own books remain a primary source. Lanza del Vasto’s Pilgrimage to the Source is of great value. Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre’s Freedom at Midnight stands out as the most recent and gripping contribution.

The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller and the Superbomb by Herbert York

(W.H. Freeman and Company; 175 pp.; $6.95)

M. Glenn Newkirk

Good literature on the post-World War II arms race between the superpowers has begun to appear in the past few years. Anatol Rapoport’s The Big Two and Bruce Russett’s What Price Vigilance? are examples of excellent writings on two very different aspects of the cold war’s phenomenal growth in U.S. defense commitments (and defense dollars). As the United States moves into advanced stages of SALT and as additional documents from the early days of the nuclear arms race become available after the twenty-five-year declassification delay, an increasing number of researchers can be expected to turn their attention to various phases of this country’s commitment to massive destructive capability.

One of the early architects of the U.S. nuclear arsenal has written just such an account of the events surrounding the development of the hydrogen bomb, or the superbomb. Contrary to its title, The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller and the Superbomb is not a detailed biography of either Oppenheimer or Teller. Rather, Herbert York has used his firsthand work at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and his close relationship with the principals involved in the debate over superbomb development to focus his book around the activities and the report of the 1949 General Advisory Committee (GAC) to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

After a series of ominous Russian and Chinese thrusts, from 1947 through the first half of 1949, the Soviets detonated their first atomic device in the fall of 1949, and American military strategists set their minds to regaining the style of weapons superiority to which they had grown accustomed. Numerous proposals sprang up about how this advantage could be achieved most rapidly. One proposal gained currency with the backing of Edward Teller: to develop a superbomb based on the untested and hardly understood principle of nuclear fusion. The Atomic Energy Commis-
sion created the GAC to review all of the proposals and to make recommendations about our optimum nuclear alternatives. In a nutshell, the GAC report (declassified in 1974) proposed that the U.S. increase its fissionable material supply, intensify efforts to develop tactical nuclear weapons, increase efforts to produce "freely absorbable neutrons," and delay development of the superbomb.

Most scientists and knowledgeable government officials agreed with the first few recommendations, but the final suggestion to shelve the hydrogen bomb project caused many observers to balk. Upon circulation of the report inside classified decisionmaking circles, a great bureaucratic and personal battle erupted between the pro- and anti-superbomb factions. When the dust settled, the GAC report was largely ignored, and President Truman ordered the development of the most powerful line of destruction on the weapons market. Several years later the chairman of the GAC, a strong defender of its report, Robert Oppenheimer, was banished from high-level defense positions when his security clearance was lifted. Edward Teller, the most adamant opponent of the report, has maintained strong informal and informal support for his heavy-armsnems view inside scientific, academic, and government circles. The irony of this tale of two researchers, according to York, lies in the basic accuracy and soundness of the GAC report that Teller spared no effort to discredit.

It would be easy to wander into this book, after having read this review so far, and think that the story line evolves around hawks and doves in combat. However, remember that the GAC report called for increased production of fissionable material and tactical nuclear weapon development. Among other not-so-dovish recommendations, the GAC report presented an econometric argument against the development of the superbomb by stating that "[if] one uses the strict criteria of damage area per dollar and if one accepts the limitations on air carrier capacity likely to obtain in the years immediately ahead, it appears uncertain to us whether the super will be cheaper or more expensive than the fission bomb." This argument hardly represents the thrust of pacifist thought. More realistically, as York points out, the debate was between hawks and superhawks. Doves did not have security clearances.

All of this technical and economic discussion is not to suggest that concerns for morality and ethics played no role in the superbomb debate. In a note appended to the GAC report, six committee members, including Oppenheimer, felt strongly enough about the moral impact of superbomb development to write about the weapon's potentially extreme dangers to mankind, about a potential decision to slaughter a vast number of civilians, and about the bomb becoming a weapon of genocide. A second appended statement, written by Enrico Fermi and I.I. Rabi, went further to declare that the use of a superbomb could not be justified "on any ethical ground" and that the use of the superbomb would place the U.S. in a "bad moral position relative to the peoples of the world." They concluded that it was "wrong on fundamental ethical principles" to develop the hydrogen bomb. The ethical principles that prevailed, however, were more at home with "national security" and "mutual assured destruction" than with arms control and weapons limitation talks.

Apart from the wealth of technical information about the U.S. and Soviet hydrogen weapons programs, York's book contains another illuminating perspective that might well be more timely than we realize. In York's narrative history of the technical questions at the core of the superbomb argument a fascinating story unfolds about the bureaucratic component of national security politics and defense budgeting. At the beginning of the superbomb debate the odds were seemingly stacked in Oppenheimer's favor. He was highly regarded by his colleagues at Los Alamos and by the power structure of the AEC. However, Teller, who had less formal stature inside the atomic energy community, commanded a different audience—Congress and the Department of Defense. The Advisors presents an intriguing account of the organizational in-fighting that eventually led to the victory of Teller's forces over Oppenheimer and the GAC report. Given the array of "inside" defense forces against Oppenheimer, the hysteria of the McCarthy purges, and the intense personalization of the Teller-Oppenheimer disagreement, it is little wonder that Oppenheimer lost his professional debate over the superbomb and his personal attempt to remain inside the defense planning establishment.

The Advisors brings up two important themes that run through the duration of the nuclear arms race. York hits upon the first theme in the preface when he argues that a major thrust behind the development of the superbomb was "a sort of technological exuberance," which convinces many defense planners that more expensive and newer weapons are indeed beautiful. Today the discussions of the B-1 bomber, the cruise missile, the Trident weapons system, and the use of charged-particle weapons all carry with them this element of technological exuberance. The possibility that increased spending on more technically sophisticated weapons actually intensifies the arms spiral seems to escape the technologically exuberant defense establishment. Since this intensification of the arms race serves to decrease our national security, we find ourselves in the awkward position of spending ourselves into insecurity.

The second theme is even more disconcerting than the first, because it points to the very structure of the national security debate. York points out that in the period of the superbomb development the proponents of the H-bomb used the threat that if the Russians were first to develop the new line of fusion weapons, the U.S. would find itself in an irreparably damaged strategic position. When the proponents won the policy debate, the U.S. proceeded to build the H-bomb based upon the flimsiest evidence concerning Soviet nuclear capability. In fact, the Soviets were considerably behind the U.S. in atomic bomb mass production and delivery systems. (The GAC report was astonishingly accurate in its assessment of Soviet capabilities and production schedules.) Even if they had exploded the H-bomb first, the decisive U.S. superiority in these two categories would have left us far from vulnerable. So we had little to lose in the way of superiority by accepting the recommendations of the GAC report and delaying the production and deployment of the superbomb. In the events of the arms race dynamic, however, we find the superbomb episode to be a clear case of the U.S. attempting to maintain a vast weapon superiority—a superiority that served as a weapons production goal for
Micronesia: Trust Betrayed
by Donald F. McHenry
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: 260 pp., $10.00/$4.95)

William V. O'Brien

Donald McHenry is one of the few real experts on Micronesia, an area about which even most foreign policy experts know very little. During his 1963-73 services in the Department of State, McHenry was known as the foremost authority on trusts, mandates, and other dependent areas. This reputation was earned in Washington, in the United Nations, and in numerous trips to the dependent areas themselves. From 1973 to 1976 McHenry was with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Humanitarian Policy Studies Program, where this book was written. Now McHenry is back in government, serving with U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young.

Both McHenry's scholarly and diplomatic qualities are reflected in his study Micronesia: Trust Betrayed. The Micronesian trust question is a nightmare of intractably conflicting and heterogeneous considerations. They range through the fields of international law and organization, strategy, development, and U.S. foreign policy formation. McHenry treads his way briskly through this difficult terrain, pointing up unresolved issues and uncovering failures until now sheltered in the remoteness and confused character of the subject matter.

First, the basic facts about Micronesia:

"Micronesia consists of three island chains in the western Pacific, just above the equator: the Carolines, the Marshalls, and the Marianas. The territory has more than 2,000 islands, fewer than 100 of which are inhabited. They are scattered across an ocean area roughly the size of the continental United States; yet the total land area (roughly 700 square miles) is only about half the size of Rhode Island. The total population is less than 120,000."

"Nine major languages are spoken in the territory, with many dialectical variations from island to island....Many of the older people speak Japanese. English has rapidly become the common language throughout the island as a result of a 1963 decision making English the language of instruction in schools."

Since 1947, Micronesia, excluding Guam, has been administered by the United States under the United Nations trusteeship system as a strategic trust. It now stands as the last of the U.N. trusts, all others having become independent.

Basically the U.S. has been pledged to provide two things for Micronesia. First, political development "toward self-government or independence"; and second, economic, social, and educational development. It should be noted that such development is to occur in the "trust territory," a geographic product of colonialism and the mandate/trust system, which is not necessarily the same as a "nation" or "state." Indeed, during most of its history as a mandate or trust, Micronesia (The Territorial Trust of the Pacific Islands) has been thought of as a singular entity—but hardly a "nation." The physical characteristics of the territory mentioned above help explain the problems in speaking of a "nation."

Out of these two obligations emerge four basic issues:

First, has the U.S. met its obligations of political development leading to "self-government or independence"?

Second, has the U.S. met its obligations of economic, social, and educational development?

Third, has the U.S. respected and preserved the unity of the territory?

Fourth, has the U.S. acknowledged the role of the U.N. as the source of the trust and the authority competent to accept or reject U.S. efforts to alter or terminate the trust?

All these issues overlap. To have a real choice concerning self-government and independence Micronesia needs a societal base that is the product of economic, social, educational, as well as political, development. If development is inadequate, the Micronesians have little choice but to accept whatever