

the Soviet Union rather than as a guarantee of our security or an incentive for arms control.

Later, John Kennedy bolstered his presidential race by contending that the Republicans had allowed the Soviets to pull ahead in the arms race. Johnson used fears that the Soviets were building an antiballistic missile system to argue for our own ABM. Now a new administration is in town and dares to mention the possibilities of a serious reassessment of our arms control posture and closer looks at the needs for certain other weapons systems. Within days of the election we were able to read that the

Russians had developed a new missile deployment system, that they are developing a deadly beam of charged particles that will incapacitate our ICBMs, and that they are planning a first strike because they are building a civil defense system like the U.S. did in the 1950's. If past behavior is indeed a good predictor of future actions, we are likely to see the Trident deployed and laser weapons more fully developed—all apart from their technical merits and the degree of security they offer.

The Advisors is likely to be a controversial book among government officials and defense experts because it

straightforwardly points fingers at the technological fascination, the secrecy, and the organizational in-fighting that helped produce (and still helps produce) our country's defense policy. Given the nature of the GAC report and the intense confrontation it produced, we can only hope that other such insightful books will come out as additional cold war documents are declassified. Whether the findings of this book and its successors will make an impact on the nature of our country's defense policies as President Carter attempts to "reassert" morality into the whole foreign policy process remains to be seen.

Micronesia: Trust Betrayed by Donald F. McHenry

(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: 260 pp., \$10.00/\$4.95)

William V. O'Brien

Donald McHenry is one of the few real experts on Micronesia, an area about which even most foreign policy experts know very little. During his 1963-73 services in the Department of State, McHenry was known as the foremost authority on trusts, mandates, and other dependent areas. This reputation was earned in Washington, in the United Nations, and in numerous trips to the dependent areas themselves. From 1973 to 1976 McHenry was with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Humanitarian Policy Studies Program, where this book was written. Now McHenry is back in government, serving with U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young.

Both McHenry's scholarly and diplomatic qualities are reflected in his study *Micronesia: Trust Betrayed*. The Micronesian trust question is a nightmare of intractably conflicting and heterogeneous considerations. They range through the fields of international law and organization, strategy, development, and U.S. foreign policy formation. McHenry treads his way briskly through this difficult terrain, pointing up unresolved issues and uncovering failures until now sheltered in the remoteness and confused character of the subject matter.

First, the basic facts about Micronesia:

"Micronesia consists of three island chains in the western Pacific, just above the equator: the Carolines, the Marshalls, and the Marianas. The territory has more than 2,000 islands, fewer than 100 of which are inhabited. They are scattered across an ocean area roughly the size of the continental United States; yet the total land area (roughly 700 square miles) is only about half the size of Rhode Island. The total population is less than 120,000."

"Nine major languages are spoken in the territory, with many dialectical variations from island to island.... Many of the older people speak Japanese. English has rapidly become the common language throughout the island as a result of a 1963 decision making English the language of instruction in schools."

Since 1947, Micronesia, excluding Guam, has been administered by the United States under the United Nations trusteeship system as a strategic trust. It now stands as the last of the U.N. trusts, all others having become independent.

Basically the U.S. has been pledged to provide two things for Micronesia. First, political development "toward self-government or independence"; and second, economic, social, and educational development. It should be noted that such development is to occur in the "trust territory," a geographic product

of colonialism and the mandate/trust system, which is not necessarily the same as a "nation" or "state." Indeed, during most of its history as a mandate or trust, Micronesia (The Territorial Trust of the Pacific Islands) has been thought of as a singular entity—but hardly a "nation." The physical characteristics of the territory mentioned above help explain the problems in speaking of a "nation."

Out of these two obligations emerge four basic issues:

First, has the U.S. met its obligations of political development leading to "self-government or independence"?

Second, has the U.S. met its obligations of economic, social, and educational development?

Third, has the U.S. respected and preserved the unity of the territory?

Fourth, has the U.S. acknowledged the role of the U.N. as the source of the trust and the authority competent to accept or reject U.S. efforts to alter or terminate the trust?

All these issues overlap. To have a real choice concerning self-government and independence Micronesia needs a societal base that is the product of economic, social, educational, as well as political, development. If development is inadequate, the Micronesians have little choice but to accept whatever

terms the U.S. offers. If the unity of the trust territory is disturbed, the chances of the whole for true independence and development may be jeopardized. If the role of the U.N. is minimized in the process of altering or terminating the trust, the other three issues are exacerbated because of the inequality of the trustee and the trust territory.

As McHenry sees the record, the United States has failed to live up to its obligations with respect to all four of these issues, hence "trust betrayed." On the first issue, self-determination, there are basically three options: total independence, free associated status, or annexation either as a territory or a commonwealth by the U.S. (A fourth, indefinite continuation of the trust, is a most unlikely alternative.) In negotiations with the status commission that represents the Micronesian Congress, the alternatives of complete independence or annexation for the whole trust area have not been the focus of debate. Rather, both sides seem to agree that some sort of free associated status is preferable. In such a status Micronesia would be sovereign but would delegate its foreign affairs and defense powers to the United States. The U.S. would incur major responsibilities for Micronesia's domestic welfare, but Micronesia would be completely self-governing. Naturally there are unresolved questions on the actual arrangements for assuring U.S. assistance while maintaining true Micronesian independence. The major point in dispute is over control of scarce land. But the critical point of disagreement has been over the duration of the proposed free association. The Micronesians insist on their right to terminate free association unilaterally. The U.S., concerned about the strategic importance of Micronesia and unwilling to invest in a country that might discontinue its special relationship, refuses to accept such a right of termination.

McHenry's book traces the negotiations on these points to an impasse in 1975. The issues remain unresolved. Meanwhile, sentiment in Micronesia drifts toward independence. Yet independence is really a desperate alternative for such a poor and unpromising area. Micronesia has virtually no natural resources except scenery; tourism is its best, if not sole, hope for economic progress. Then, too, U.S. development efforts have been late, sporadic, probably inappropriate in some cases, and, in

sum, inadequate. McHenry does not devote much space to these problems, but he does state:

"United States economic development of Micronesia was a dismal failure. Political, social and educational programs bore no relationship to economic realities and potential. The result is a Micronesia which is considerably beyond a subsistence economy but which is unable to advance further or even to maintain current standards without considerable outside assistance. No pledge of continued United States economic assistance at sufficient levels was made for an independent Micronesia. On the contrary, the United States made it clear that the closeness of the relationship and not Micronesian needs would determine the level of United States economic assistance."

The third issue mentioned above is that of Micronesian unity. Here events have overtaken the issues of self-determination and development for all of the Micronesian trust territory. The Mariana Islands took the initiative of requesting separate treatment in the form of annexation to the United States. There were many reasons for this. For one thing the Marianas were a minority constituency among the six Micronesian districts and its political leaders apparently felt that the Marianas had only a modest future as part of a Micronesian state. Moreover, there clearly was a magnetic pull from Guam, long a U.S. territory and part of the Marianas group. Finally, and this is more speculative, it appears that various actions and attitudes of the U.S. may have encouraged Marianas separatism.

This raises an issue alternately referred to as that of "unity" and of "fragmentation." For most of the period of U.S. governance U.S. policy has rejected fragmentation of the trust territory. The obligations were to the whole trust territory. However, by its rapid reaction to Marianas overtures for separate status, the United States has fragmented the trust. The result, if it stands up, is that the United States has a territory in which to place military bases and assure its presence irrespective of what happens with the rest of the trust territory.

The Covenant of union with the U.S. was signed by the Marianas Political Status Commission and the American president's personal representative, Ambassador F. Haydn Williams, on

February 15, 1975. On February 20, 1975, the Mariana Islands District Legislature unanimously approved the Covenant. In a plebiscite held on June 17 of that year 78.8 per cent of the people of the Northern Mariana Islands voted to accept the Covenant. By March 24, 1976, the U.S. Congress had passed a joint resolution accepting the Covenant.

Under the Covenant the Marianas have local self-government, with the United States in complete control of foreign relations and defense. The 14,500 inhabitants of the Marianas are protected by the U.S. Constitution and are eligible to become U.S. citizens. They will have no congressional representation. Federal taxes are rebated to the area, and the U.S. is to pay a \$14 million annual subsidy. It is widely believed that the Commonwealth relationship will be quite beneficial for the people of the Marianas. Whether it is responsive to the obligations of the U.S. as trust power remains controversial. The Congress of Micronesia opposed the separate arrangement, and one of its committees reported in 1974:

"To deny any possibility of the unit of Micronesia by the administrative separation of a district prior to the time when its people have had the opportunity to vote on the Compact of Free Association is to deny everything which the Trusteeship system stands for, everything good about democracy which the United States purports [to] represent and even the slightest pretense that the United States is in Micronesia for any reason higher than its own base and selfish interests."

In any event, final implementation of the Marianas Covenant will occur when the final status of the rest of the trust territory is resolved, supposedly by 1981. At that point the United States will have to come to terms with the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, with whom the 1947 agreement was made. McHenry repeatedly emphasizes the unwillingness of the U.S. Government to face its ultimate task of obtaining U.N. agreement to U.S. disposition of the trust.

McHenry concludes *Micronesia: Trust Betrayed* with a balance sheet of the U.S. record. He believes that "The basic assumption of United States policy—that Micronesia is 'essential to the United States for security reasons'—is highly questionable."

Further. "Resolution of Micronesia's status was needlessly delayed by the failure of the executive branch to reconcile conflicts between Interior, State and Defense." And, "The Micronesians have not been presented with a free choice on their future status."

Finally, "It is too late to give Micronesia's future political status the kind of systematic planning it deserves. However, Congress, the Micronesians and the United Nations should consider both the Marianas question and Micronesia at the same time" (original emphasis). McHenry is not optimistic.

"However, there is no reason to expect that Congress will suddenly begin to take seriously its responsibilities toward Micronesia" (original emphasis).

On the whole, McHenry accepts the current Marianas Commonwealth but predicts that its people will soon find that they require either greater independence or a better status as an American territory. The Commonwealth compact does seem to be a *bona fide* product of self-determination, and the Trust agreement does not require "independence" as the sole result. Says McHenry, "Given political and eco-

nomie realities, free association with the United States may best serve Micronesian interests." Looking back, McHenry observes, "no one comes out of this phase of Micronesia's history looking good, not the Congress, not the executive, not the United Nations, not even the Micronesians, who too frequently seem to be concerned more about money than about the principles involved." This book stands as the most authoritative and useful monograph on the Micronesian trust and as an invaluable "slice of life" in the U.S. foreign policy community.

Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century by Constantine FitzGibbon

(Stein and Day; 350 pp.; \$10.00)

The CIA's Secret Operations by Harry Rositzke

(Readers Digest Press; 273 pp.; \$12.95)

Paul Blackstock

These two volumes are recent additions to a series of books that seeks to rehabilitate the tarnished image of "intelligence" following the disastrous revelations of Watergate and the extended congressional investigations of 1976, which Rositzke refers to as "the Year of Intelligence." Other than this implicit underlying purpose, the two books have little in common. Both authors were engaged in intelligence operations, but Rositzke's work takes on the format of a personal memoir, whereas FitzGibbon has written a popular and often grossly oversimplified account of the role that strategic intelligence played in World War I, in the interwar period, and in World War II.

Starting with the premise that intelligence is a "pitting of wits... which can vary from the competition between friendly gamblers or sportsmen to lethal hostility between states, religions or ideologies," FitzGibbon attempts to evaluate the effect that strategic intelligence (or the lack of it) had on high-level political and military decision-making during two world wars. He served as an intelligence officer at-

tached to General Omar Bradley's staff during World War II and was privy to *Ultra-Secret*, the code word for intelligence that the British came by as a result of having broken the top-secret German communications enciphered by their Enigma machine—communications the German high command mistakenly regarded as unbreakable throughout the war. FitzGibbon properly notes that "the breaking of German ciphers was, for the British and almost equally for the Americans, the war-winning intelligence weapon." For this reason his account is a useful supplement to the authoritative study by Major General Sir Kenneth Strong, *Men of Intelligence: A Study of the Roles and Decisions of Chiefs of Intelligence From World War I to the Present Day* (1971), which was written while the contribution to the Allied victory of *Ultra-Secret* was still guarded under the highest security wraps.

FitzGibbon touches superficially on strategic deception, the cover plans, and massive Allied operations that deceived the German high command during the spring and summer of 1944 and were

thus a major factor behind the successful invasion of Normandy and subsequent German defeat in the West. His deprecating, highly subjective evaluation of the operations contrasts sharply with the glowing, heavily documented account of them by the British journalist Anthony Cave Brown in his best-selling *Bodyguard of Lies* (1976). FitzGibbon ends his survey with a section entitled "The Third World War" (a phrase borrowed from Solzhenitsyn) that is an ill-disguised cold war propaganda tract. It includes a chapter on Soviet espionage and propaganda, "The Early KGB," and another entitled "Some Comments on the CIA."

The author's harsh anti-Russian and anti-Soviet antipathies run like a red thread throughout *Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century*. In an early chapter on "The Okhrana" FitzGibbon betrays gross ignorance of the historic Russian scene when he writes: "The Russian masses, illiterate in the last century, live the life of illiterates in this... Even an avowed foreign Communist, such as Pablo Picasso, may not be allowed to show his works to the