

Israel's No. 1 Dove

Lova Eliav Speaks With Mark Bruzonsky After the Sadat Visit

Arie (Lova) Eliav is Israel's number one dove. It is widely agreed he is the most respected figure in Israel calling for a Palestinian state.

From 1970-72 Eliav was secretary-general, the number two position after prime minister, of Israel's then ruling Labor party.

Then he broke with Golda Meir and publicly endorsed creation of a Palestin-



ian state in the West Bank and Gaza if a comprehensive peace settlement could be reached.

Beginning in 1976 Eliav and other dovish Israelis began holding meetings with PLO representatives.

In the May, 1977, Israeli election Eliav headed a new party—Sheli—which now holds two seats in Israel's Knesset.—MB

Bruzonsky: Can you define what you are? What does Sheli mean today?

Eliav: I'm supposed to be the number one Israeli dove. I am the chairman of Sheli. I am one of the leaders of the Israeli realists, moderates who are preaching for the last ten years that Israel should go a different way, an entirely different way on its road to peace.

I am saying in essence two things. Israel should have declared—and this was said ten years ago—that in return for full-fledged peace Israel should return *the* territories, but for minor adjustments agreed on both sides, to all parties concerned. And, two, that Israel should recognize the rights of the Palestinians for self-determination. These are the two basic things we were saying for the last ten years.

And I collided head-on with Golda Meir and the Establishment. I was one of them; in the political hierarchy I was number two to Golda. When she was prime minister she was number one. And secretary-general is number two in the party hierarchy—not in the governmental hierarchy, although I was a minister. I collided with her on these issues the last ten years.

What's changed because Sadat came here?

Israeli society is a drug-addicted society. It's addicted to political drugs, unfortunately. Especially from the Six-Day War on. Even before.

Look, you take three million Jews from a hundred-odd countries with their traumas, with their suspicions, with their two thousand-year-exile mentality, ghetto mentality, you take them and bring them in. You put a hundred million enemies, Arabs, around them. Then you have a society that doesn't behave normally. What Zionism wanted was that they be normal. We are far from it. The founders of Zionism—my teachers, Ben-Gurion's generation—they didn't bring us up on drugs. They brought us up on reality, about things we can do, we cannot do, and not on hatred, and not on illusions. It was a very good upbringing. I brought my generation up to be

good soldiers, good pioneers...not empire builders.

From the Six-Day War on—there were some traces before—but the Six-Day War was a military and then a political LSD trip. Really it was. Both the people and their leaders—headed by Golda and Dayan and company—went on a high trip. The people, after the Six-Day War, were in a euphoria. So were the drunken leaders, drunken with glory. And they thought they got not only a country, a homeland, but an empire. And as Arik Sharon [now minister of agriculture in charge of settlements in the occupied territories for the Begin government] put it in a flamboyant way: "We can take Casablanca, only we'll have to refuel the tanks in Algiers." And Dayan was not far from him.

In *The Land of the Hart* [1972] I tried to call out that the status quo is not good, that time is not working for Israel. Then we had the Yom Kippur War. And from a dose of uppers we went into a dose of downers. Everybody was shocked, again in an exaggerated way, because there was a military victory. Then the body politic—the psychology of the people—needed a shot in the arm. So Entebbe was a dose of heroin.

I wrote to Brzezinski on the first of November, after I visited him in the White House, that the Israelis are so trauma-ridden and their suspicions so deep that only a direct hit in their hard core would maybe shatter their rigidity, which is based on the hard-core suspicion that there is nobody to talk to on the other side. In writing to Brzezinski, by the way, I suggested that Sadat will meet top Israeli people in the open. I quoted the letter I wrote to Brzezinski in the Knesset, saying I urge you that Sadat meet top Israeli spokesmen in the open because I tried to meet PLO and other moderate Arabs in secret and it was no good, people didn't believe us.

Sadat came. He gave the Israelis another trip. His trip was a high. People had again a euphoria. Six-Day War high. Yom Kippur low. Entebbe high. Now people are on a high again. He scored a bull's-eye in hitting the myth that there is nobody to talk to. And patterns of

thinking, clichés, demagoguery that the Likud built on—Golda cemented them and the Likud built on them a second and third story and got the votes—are being shattered now: they are falling apart.

But I'm afraid that...that...I'm afraid to say it.

Please say it.

Even this ultra, ultra dramatic visit was not yet strong enough and long-lasting enough to shatter the clichés, the rigidity completely so that people will start rethinking.

Which is, of course, my real question. What do you expect Mr. Begin and the people who run this country to do in response?

I don't know. Now I don't know. I know one thing is sure: Begin didn't give, to my mind, didn't give Sadat enough leeway and didn't meet him halfway.

He didn't meet him at all, did he, in his Knesset speech?

Well, he could have said "Don't come." So he did go some distance.

It looks to me like something is happening in the Labor party regarding the Palestinian problem.

Shimon Peres [leader of the Labor party, who lost to Menachem Begin in the May, 1977, election] came to me after his Knesset talk [the same day Sadat spoke] and said, "Lova"—I was his secretary-general—"you see I even veered from the Labor platform about 'your' problem." [The Palestinians are supposedly *my* problem! Golda said I invented the Palestinians. Eight years ago she said, "Lova invented the Palestinians."]

So the sentences in Peres's speech about the Palestinians were very serious sentences? [Peres had stated: "Let us not hide from it, let us not disregard it, we are aware of the existence of the Palestinian identity. Every people has the right to decide its own identity, and this does not depend on the authorization of another nation."]

They were serious sentences. I think Peres sees that he has to do something, he has to say something. They're not good enough, but they are already something.

Is there a possibility that Labor could return to the Yariv formula of agreeing to recognize and talk with the PLO if the PLO will agree to recognize and talk with Israel?

Actually, this was my formula.

Is there a possibility that somebody in this country—Sheli already does, but Sheli is only two votes—that somebody in this country is going to accept the idea of Palestinian nationalism?

Some in the Labor party do. First of all Mapam does in a weird sort of way, in a weird sort of way....

There are ideological doves, a minority, Sheli. There are ideological hawks, a small minority, not even all of Gush Emunim—zealots who say we are ready for Masada to kill ourselves and our children and our wives on

the rocks of Nablus or Shehem or whatever. There are other zealots who sit in the coffee shops of Tel Aviv and are ready to march once in a while into the West Bank as long as my son is guarding them as a captain of a tank brigade. What kind of hawks are these? They are coffee shop hawks. I don't count them.

In between you've got what I call "hawks by default," hawks out of desperation, pessimism, trauma: "There's nobody to talk to"; "There will never be peace"; "All the Arabs are killers"—all the brainwashing and the clichés and the horrible demagoguery that was poured on them for ten years. All these are hawks by default. Sadat did something to them—not to the ideological hawks, who will never change.

Where does Begin fit in?

I don't know. I don't know. He didn't give Sadat leeway, he didn't give him rope, he didn't meet him halfway, not even a quarter way. He could have made ten different gestures, but he never made one.

If Labor were still in power, what concessions would they have made?

They would still be sitting in their councils and fighting. Peres would fight Rabin, Rabin would fight Peres. And I don't think they would give Sadat any answer of any kind because of their internal rivalries and the big shadow of Golda, which is still dominating.

Nothing happens in Labor without Golda?

Not yet.

Has she changed her views at all on the Palestinians?

No, she insists I invented them. People don't change at my age, and definitely not at her age.

What is it in this country that makes it so difficult for intelligent people to accept in principle the obvious existence of a Palestinian national movement?

I told you. We are a paranoid, schizophrenic society. We've got all the right to be—all the right to be paranoid and schizophrenic. We have to be treated—because of the 2,000 years, because of the traumas, and not less because of the horrible attitude of the PLO. Instead of trying to help people like me....

I think I overcame the traumas. And I don't want people to throw at me the Holocaust. When Abba Eban speaks about the Holocaust, I abhor it. I don't want the Holocaust thrown at me, not at my generation. Maybe you were not born then. But my wife and I, we don't want the Holocaust thrown at us. She was in the death camps and I saved her from the death camps as a soldier. So I saw the Holocaust. And I think I overcame. But many didn't. And I don't blame them. Now the PLO, instead of enhancing my hand, the hand of people in Sheli and the Council [for Israeli-Palestinian Peace]—the Israeli doves—they did us a horrible turn when we started meeting with them. Instead of giving us some rope, they did to us what Begin is doing to Sadat. They didn't give us an inch.

What did they do?

They denied the talks! Whenever I said I met [Issam]

Sartawi—and he's a good man and he's ready to meet me halfway on two states, two peoples, two nations, two national movements—Kaddoumi came and said I don't know who Sartawi is and we'll never meet with Zionists; the talks didn't take place. They discredited us before the election horribly.

But their job wasn't to further your movement.

Their job.... Why did Sartawi start meeting us? He was sent by Arafat to meet us halfway. And then because of internal rivalries, and because they don't have in their midst a consensus, and because they don't have leaders or statesmen—they've got petty politicians—they made our work a Sisyphus kind of work. You push a stone up and it falls back on your head.

You sound quite bitter.

With them? I'm ready to go to Paris and start it all over again. The road to peace will be very long, very tortuous. Out of every ten wells that we'll drill toward peace, like in the desert, nine will be salty and dry. It was a salty hole we found. So we'll start again.

From my point of view I look at the ideological statements and the positions of the PLO and I see tremendous change.

No doubt. No doubt. But you are not working here. You are not traumatized. You are not schizophrenic. You're an onlooker. People here have to have tangible proof. I should have brought a piece of paper, signed, saying O.K. let's call it quits—'67 borders, two peoples, full peace. They never gave me that. They couldn't.

You don't seem very sensitive to their own ideological and political problems.

I'm very sensitive. So what? Out of my sensitivity I got two members of Knesset. So what? The PLO, for their own good, could have changed the political arena in Israel. They didn't, because they are governed by (a) internal rivalries and (b) by extremists. As we are.

So there's symmetry. Every day that Begin puts a settlement on the West Bank it's a field day for Habash and other extremists. Every day there is a Ma'alot or Kiryat Shemona it's a field day for Israeli extremists.

If the PLO had acted in the way you wanted it to, how many votes would your party have gotten?

I don't know. Many.

Would you have gotten ten seats in the Knesset?

Ah, ten people and we would have changed the whole face of Israeli politics!

And you think you would have had that?

Yes!

Sartawi predicted to a friend of mine you would get that many Knesset seats.

But he didn't give me the tools!

And what did he say to you when you told him that?

He wept.

Literally?

Literally.

And said what?

And he said he couldn't, he couldn't deliver. I don't have anything against him personally. On the contrary. He was nearly stoned to death in Cairo [in March at the Palestine National Council meeting] because they said he's a traitor and he's giving Israelis a good name and he's running around with Zionists. But he couldn't deliver.

How do you view the U.S. role in these PLO efforts? Did we encourage them properly?

No you didn't.

What should we have done?

People in the State Department.... It took them—dumb as they were—it took them a long, long period, through the Johnson, Nixon, and part of the Ford administrations—it took them a long time, like a dinosaur, to recognize the importance, the crucialness, the centrality of the Palestinian problem.

But the Palestinians came to the U.S. in November, 1976, shortly after you started meeting with them, and they started opening indirect talks with the United States government. Did we mishandle that opportunity?

Sure you did.

What did we do wrong?

First of all, they mishandled it. They went to the wrong people. You mishandled it because you didn't put it on a very high level. You put it on a very low level. I'm talking about the Ford administration. When Sartawi first came to America, Carter was "Jimmy who?" Then Carter had other things on his mind. Sartawi was mistreated in America by everybody. He came to Cairo with his pants down. Nobody took him seriously in America—neither the Jewish doves....

I think he made many mistakes himself because he was new.

Should we have given them the office they wanted in Washington?

It's not a question of the office. To my mind you should have told—via Saudi or any other way to Arafat, not to Sartawi—should have told them you have to behave differently, you have to spell it out, you have to talk differently. Then maybe, just maybe, via pressure on them, they would have talked differently and then the political arena would have been different. But you didn't do it. You didn't press them, you didn't press us. You used silken gloves.

I think the administration would say they strongly urged the PLO to make the kind of positive gestures that would allow the U.S. to open a dialogue with them.

Not strong enough. Not strong enough.

What should the U.S. do now vis-à-vis the PLO?

Meeting Sadat

Whether or not Mohamed Anwar El Sadat will eventually be judged a great man, he has accepted the responsibility for doing great things.

Sadat is a relaxed, amiable man, full of Middle Eastern conviviality. My fortune in meeting him resulted from having spent three weeks in Egypt in October. Thus I had the right contacts to return as emissary of the *New Outlook* International Peace Symposium, which brought hundreds of Middle East experts to Tel Aviv for five days—days that overlapped with Sadat's Jerusalem visit.

I came across the Allenby bridge from Jordan into Israel on November 9, the very day Sadat spoke to his parliament proclaiming his willingness to go to Israel's Knesset. That evening Sadat's speech was seen in Israel through Jordanian TV. As Sadat's image (with untranslated Arabic) infrequently caught our attention, Dr. Uzi Arad and I exchanged political perspectives until the early morning—a habit we had picked up together at Princeton a few years ago—unaware of the diplomatic revolution then being born.

The excitement at the *New Outlook* magazine office the next morning made me quickly aware I had missed something spectacular. Within hours I was on my way back to Cairo, letter for Sadat in hand. After a quiet evening in Larnaca, Cyprus, I arrived in Cairo in the early hours of November 12.

"I am writing to you a few hours after your recent speech on peace in the Middle East was reported on Israeli radio and in the Israeli press," Simha Flapan, chairman of the upcoming symposium and long-time editor of the Left-intellectual English-language monthly, wrote Sadat. "Your remark...has already created an enormous stir among the Israeli public," Flapan added. He then detailed the nature of the symposium, the impressive list of participants from Israel, the West Bank, and abroad, and extended Sadat an invitation to designate a representative or send some message.

It was, of course, a wild gamble, but it turned out to present Sadat with an opportunity he desired. With the help of Dr. Morsi Saad Eldin, chairman of the State Information Service, who has since served as Egyptian spokesman for the Cairo conference, Dr. Butros Ghali, then Minister of State, who was soon to become acting foreign minister, and Mrs. Jihan Sadat, I had by midnight an appointment to see the president at his country home outside Cairo on the afternoon of the 14th.

Sadat and I met a few hours before Walter Cronkite brought the Egyptian president and the Israeli prime minister together, hastening Sadat's Jerusalem travel plans. Of course I was elated during our half-hour discussion that Sadat accepted the invitation and would be sending the first commercial telegram from an Arab country to Israel to



PRESIDENT ANWAR EL SADAT with Mr. Marc Bernard, an American Journalist, before he visited yesterday.

the symposium. I was so excited, in fact, that I didn't take the opportunity to query Sadat whether he considered himself a modern Saladin, the Egyptian hero who, in 1192, after defeating the Crusaders and capturing Jerusalem, journeyed to what was then southern Palestine to conclude peace with Richard the Lion-Hearted.

The following day, via Athens, I returned to Israel. That morning the picture of Sadat and me meeting appeared on the front page of most Egyptian newspapers—a tipoff for the coming message. The telegram itself arrived, via Cyprus, at the regular Israeli telegram service the morning the symposium opened. The need for using American embassy or third-party facilities was quickly ending.

Sadat's message was the top news in Israel that day, and the telegram was prominently pictured in all Israeli newspapers the next morning. Later that day (the 17th) the only news was of Sadat's impending arrival just two days in the future. —Mark Bruzonsky

The tragedy is that the PLO are making their own mistake. They are caught in their own Catch 22, as we are, as our government is. All through the Palestinian national movement's history they missed their boats, they missed their planes. The Mufti said all or nothing, and he got nothing. Hussein said all or nothing and got killed. Shukairi said all or nothing, and he was demoted. They cannot come out of it as yet.

But the PLO has offered, behind the scenes, to accept 242 with reservations on the national question, if the U.S. will support a Palestinian state.

But they're not doing what Sadat did. They didn't have a daring man, and they don't—like Sadat—who will spell it out.

What do you want them to say clearly?

I want them to say that for full-fledged peace we are ready and willing to recognize Israel—not its right to exist. Who wants it from them? Recognize Israel, conclude full-fledged peace, and make our state in the West

Bank and Gaza somehow federated with Jordan, and then this is the end of it, the end of the conflict; no more, this is it.

When you say federated with Jordan, if they want to have their own state, passports, flags....

It's their own business.

Ideologically, what you are asking is like Israel being asked to give up the Law of Return. You're asking a movement that has practically been slaughtered and battered around for years to give up everything that it stands for at a time when nobody is offering any return for it. The U.S. offer: only that we'll talk to you. Israel insists they will never, under any circumstances, deal with the PLO. There are a few people like you who talk sense....

But they would give me the influence to be ten and then fifteen and then twenty. They're committing harakiri, that's all. From a military point of view they are null. They are being dragged and pushed by all the Arab

governments like a football. And they cause with their stand another tragedy first of all to themselves.

Will Sadat make a separate peace with Israel?

No, I don't think he will; he can't. Let's say he won't and there'll be another war. If there will be, what will the Palestinians gain? They'll be the first lambs to be slaughtered. You're making speeches to me about their ideology—but they're risking the lives of a million and a half people, the remnants of their own people.

What do I want from them? A Yariv formula, that's all. If Israel will recognize us, we'll recognize Israel. That's all I want from them. What is it? Is it a very big sacrifice? They've got a million people under military rule. If there will be another war, they'll have tens of thousands of killed and hundreds of thousands of refugees.

Did you read the Barbara Walters interview with Arafat? Didn't Arafat speak of a final settlement here?

He never said anything. He's a small, petty man. He should have used the Yariv formula and recognized Israel in return for a state in the West Bank and Gaza. He never said it. Not to Barbara Walters and not to anybody else. If anybody knows it, I know it. They are juggling with words. They are being kicked by all Arab governments and they know it. They are being cheated by all Arab governments, they know it. They are playing with the lives of a million and a half people. The whole thing is a tragedy, a Greek tragedy. It's a double vicious circle. We are to blame... they are to blame.

So I'm small. Because I'm small in number the U.S. government and the PLO don't give enough weight to my political view and then I get smaller. And this is the tragedy. And if I had gotten not 27,000 votes but 270,000 votes—it could have been done by this act that Sadat has now done—then I would change the face of Israeli politics.

Can't you still do it?

Sure, if your government will be daring enough.

To do what?

To help me.

How?

To spell my name. To say this kind of stand of Eliav and his colleagues is good. They should enhance my hand. American Jews like yourself should enhance our hand, the PLO should enhance our hand, then I could change things, especially now after Sadat.

Sadat gave me already credibility here—more than all your government and American Jews combined. Because the people who meet me now in the street, the people who are filling my car tank—people who all voted for Begin—are shaking my hand. They say we looked at television and Sadat was nearly kissing you—which he did. He said two sentences: I am following you with great sympathy, and I admire what you do.

When you come to Washington you have access to the top people, don't you?

I do. But these top people are afraid of the Jewish lobby, who is with the Israeli government, who has got the majority because of the traumas, etc. It's a vicious circle. Nobody comes out of it.

And then one day they will say, oh, the whole thing is a tragedy and the story of human folly. Why didn't we do something?

What's your view of the Carter administration? Does Carter know what he's doing in the Middle East?

I think that the Carter administration—I told this to Hamilton Jordan when I saw him—that what you're doing I'm preaching ten years. He laughed. They've adopted the Sheli platform, which is good. They do it because they think it's good for the U.S. I think it's good for Israel.

I said it ten years ago when Carter was growing peanuts. But they've adopted it.

If for the next few months little progress is made, is it up to the U.S. to gently but firmly tell the parties, especially Israel, that the time has come and there's going to be a settlement?

Yes. They're doing it anyway, but they should do it in a positive way, not in a negative way. They should enhance the hand of the Israeli ideological doves.

How? They already meet with you, they talk to you, they have a position very similar to yours. What more can they do? They can't make a speech and say Sheli is the party they'd like to have ruling Israel.

I can be helped by the American administration, part of the American Jews—not all of them—the Palestinians themselves. Maybe Sadat has given me—not me personally—some leverage for the first time.

Sure, whenever I'm in Washington I can come to the White House. But that's all. With that it's finished.

Don't be that naive. An American administration that thinks that the Middle East is the most explosive area, that the terrible fuse of all the world—is the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, could do more to enhance the hand of these people whom they know think like them—even if for different reasons.

Does the administration really know what it wants in the Middle East?

Generally, I think they think in the right direction. They are doing many, many tactical mistakes, to my mind. But when people do things, they make tactical mistakes. Their general direction is my direction. What can I say more? I did many tactical mistakes, they do many tactical mistakes.

I said when I first read the Brookings Report, * "This is my platform." This was two years ago. They are generally going along with the Brookings Report.

What do you think about the American Jewish community?

*The Brookings Report (1975), drawn up by a list of influential people, outlined the elements they regarded as leading to a fair and enduring settlement in the Mideast.

There are many closet doves, many realists. When I came, I talked my head off from Boston to Los Angeles.

But you're doing yourself a terrible harm, and the Israeli hawkish stand is doing you a terrible thing. A by-product of the Israeli hawkish stand is that it's the first time in a hundred years that American Jews are facing the very grave risk of going out of the American national consensus. And it's a very grave risk that the Israeli government is taking and American Jews. For no good reason.

You're suggesting anti-Semitism?

No, no. American Jews were within the limit of the national consensus most of the time of the Zionist enterprise—the last eighty years—until maybe a few years ago. Now we are pushing you to the edge of an abyss for no good reason.

We are playing on the guilt feelings of American Jews, filling them with horrible equations that PLO are Nazis, Arafat is Hitler, the Covenant is *Mein Kampf*, the whole thing is annihilation. So if PLO are Nazis and all Palestinians, or most, say they are PLO, then the whole syndrome in American Jews creates terrible guilt feelings.

We in Israel are playing on the annihilation syndrome.

And so American Jews are saying, What the hell, we are sitting in the nice villas, the suburbs of New York or Connecticut and these people are going to be annihilated.

But this is not true! We are not going to be annihilated. We are the strongest military power in the whole Middle East and getting stronger, military-wise.

Isn't there a fear that should there be a peace settlement, should Israel have to recast its claim on Jewish sympathies in a different way, that American support and American money would be called into question?

It's another horror what you are saying now: Because if Israel is basing all its sympathy on pictures of wounded soldiers....

Only Israel living in peace, or on the road to peace, will gain a new magnetism for young Jews like yourself—not only to sympathize and love it, but even some of them to come and live there.

You don't expect too many to come and live in Israel?

Not in this kind of Israel, but in my kind of Israel that I wrote about in *Land of the Hart*—sure, I do, and many.

When Israel will be the kind of Israel I want it to be—the most modern, service society in the neighborhood, serving and helping and integrating on the crossroads of Asia, Africa, and Europe—it may be much more interesting to many.

I don't know how many. If our magnetism is determined by the helmets we wear or the tanks we use or the guns we have, it's not magnetism.

Where did your 27,000 votes come from?

They are intellectuals, elite. Among the 27,000 we have maybe 3,000 university professors and lecturers. People in kibbutzim, some very good soldiers. Our dovish stand is nothing comparable to the Vietnam analogy, because in every tank you'll find doves, hawks; it's not draft dodgers. Elite!

What's the practical program of your party for gaining greater support?

If we'll have Sadat and the PLO helping us and the American administration helping us and reality helping us, we'll make a breakthrough.

Then we can join hands with Labor. I don't want to remain as a small party of two. We can close hands, eventually, with others who will come to say more or less the things I do.

But that will take another Sadat, and maybe Arafat, and then the American administration, and a change of the arena. It can be done. I don't know if I'll see it, or my young colleagues will see it, but some will.

Why won't you, like Nahum Goldmann [former president of the World Jewish Congress] and George Ball say clearly that the U.S. should impose a settlement in the Middle East?

I don't want it! I want to come myself as a proud man.

But you're not coming yourself. Your country, some think, is moving in the wrong direction with Begin.

So what do you want me to do? Plead with Carter that he'll come and press us? No!

If you were not Israeli. If you....

But I'm Israeli!

But if you were not Israeli, were just an intellectual, a politician....

But I'm not an intellectual! You're not listening. I fought more years for this country than the years in all your life—forty years! What are you talking about? No! I will not come to Carter to plead that he press us! I want to do it from my own free will!

But this country is not doing it.

So you do it! You go and have people talking like you. And Goldmann's people. They'll help us. But not me. I want to be a proud man and a proud Zionist. And I think me, and people like me, are the proudest Zionists. To come and plead to Carter, "Please press us. Please don't send us money. Please don't send us arms...."

But the reality of your arguments seems that, emotionally, you can't say that but, objectively, you're arguing for that.

But who stops you from saying it! Go ahead and say it!

But I want to understand what you are thinking.

I'm telling you that the whole essence of Zionism was not to crawl before the courts. By the way, the hawks do it. They crawl on all fours. And they'll start retreating to the '67 borders on all fours.

This is the most horrible thing that can happen to us as a national liberation movement, a renaissance movement. I don't want it! I want to say this is good for Jews and for Zionism, and when we come and share our land with them—that it's also their land—and from then on we'll start a new era that will be the most glorious era of Zionism.

That's the way I want to speak! Not to crawl before the goyim and say, "Please press us," or "Please make us go there." No, I won't say it!

The New Outlook 20th Anniversary Symposium

New Outlook is an English-language magazine published eight times yearly in Tel Aviv, which consistently presents some of the most informed and literate opinion on Arab-Israeli affairs. Reputation: dovish intellectual. Leadership: more widespread and influential in Europe and the U.S. than in Israel. Slant: mutual recognition between Zionist nationalism and Palestinian nationalism. Quality: excellent.

This magazine is both a cause and an institution. As a tribute to the publication's twentieth anniversary, the decision was made to sponsor an international peace symposium. The theme, "Can the Guns Fall Silent?" was motivated by Egyptian writer Mohamed Sid Ahmed's book, which a few years ago electrified intellectual thought through one of the early discussions of the nature of Middle East peace, *When the Guns Fall Silent*.

This was *New Outlook's* fifth symposium, though it will surely be the most remembered. For during the five days of meetings that brought together hundreds of Israel's and the world's most knowledgeable Middle East experts, Anwar Sadat first cabled a message to the gathering—the first such telegram ever sent from an Arab country to Israel—and then arrived in Jerusalem in one of history's most fantastic happenings.

The symposium actually outgrew the *New Outlook* staff's ability to organize properly the ever-escalating affair. There were, consequently, more than the usual frustrations. As the list of participants mushroomed in the final weeks it became evident this conference had come to serve as an international convention for much of the dovish Jewish criticism—in and out of Israel—against the new Begin government's attitude. Then, with the arrival of the Sadat telegram on the opening day, the symposium instantly was awarded a notoriety that had been totally unforeseen. Most Israelis, in fact, had never heard of *New Outlook* magazine until these events.

The journal grew out of the frustrations that arose within Israel as a result of the 1956 Israeli campaign in Sinai. The founders agreed that "unless a radical change occurred in Israeli policy, the situation would deteriorate into a series of wars, culminating in total involvement of the great powers." It

was a prophecy tragically fulfilled.

Initially, with some in-government encouragement and money, but for many years now totally independently, *New Outlook* has provided commentary, analysis, and prescriptive judgment on how to reach an Arab-Israeli reconciliation. The fostering of contact and understanding between Jews and Arabs, especially Israeli Arabs, has been the magazine's primary goal. In the most recent years *New Outlook* has been a unique forum for discussion of the Palestinian problem and the PLO. It has been the only major publication in Israel where moderate PLO spokesmen have found a forum and where the concept of a Palestinian state has been promoted. The participation for the first time of numerous West Bank Arabs in an Israeli conference was a statement in itself of *New Outlook's* importance.

The great diversity of speeches and papers prepared with pre-Sadat-visit policies in mind, of course, will still be a unique historical record of thought

when *New Outlook* soon makes them available in book form. Nahum Goldmann's keynote opening address, for instance, in which he candidly reflected on Israel's failures and on the need for an imposed settlement, served as a chilling reminder that Sadat's journey would leave the outstanding territorial and conceptual disagreements only slightly modified. Lord Caradon's passionate plea for Palestinian self-determination was also a provoking reminder to all that Zionism will remain morally scarred until a way is found to fulfill the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians, a people also seeking some road to a national existence.

New Outlook has come of age with recent events. And it now faces the challenge of building its influence in an Israel that is undergoing much soul-searching about what may finally be a real path to a lasting and just peace.

American readers may subscribe to *New Outlook* by sending \$24 airmail, or \$20 surface mail, to *New Outlook* magazine, Dept. W, 8 Karl Netter Street, Tel Aviv, Israel.

—Mark Bruzonsky

