Those aspects of today's China I consider basic to a proper understanding of that country now, and which I also believe will persist into the foreseeable future—possibly to the end of the century—are the following:

- China is now more "China" than at any time since 1949, but by no means less socialist for that.
- It is embarked on a path that will probably make it the most significant economic and politico-cultural power in the Asia/Pacific Region by the turn of the century.
- In its handling of its foreign relations China is moving away from some recognizable patterns of the past and developing a character that will make it both easier and tougher to deal with as times goes on.

The second two are directly related to the first, the Chineseness of China, which is fundamental.

I believe the Hua Kuo-feng era will see the Chinese finally put behind them the self-conscious rejection of Chineseness developed in the early years of Communist China. This is already happening. In the cultural and intellectual revival, in the discussion of government and institutions, in the unashamed adoption of a new "triple-alliance" between old cadres, old generals, and old scientists, in policy, and even in the commitment to science and technology, there is a very strong sense now that what is Chinese can be compatible with what is new, revolutionary, or Marxist-Leninist. Although the trend may seem particularly striking now, it did not begin with Hua Kuo-feng. Three times now in the last eighteen years there have been major movements in China's self-definition and self-perception that have brought it to its present position.

The first, of course, was in 1960 with the split between China and the USSR. But I think at the time we missed its significance, and probably we have still not fully understood it. Who precipitated the schism is not now so important. The importance for China was its rejection of Russian suzerainty and its departure from the Soviet camp. China was alone, but independent.

This episode seems at first sight to have pushed China in a very different direction from that taken by Hua's China. But look closer and we find that it resulted in some redefinition of China's identity, away from internationalist symbols and toward acceptance of a Chinese position in the world. Slowly at first, and selectively, the Chinese began to set aside the confrontational aspect of communism versus capitalism. This opened the way to easier relationships with some capitalist countries, notably Japan. China was behaving more consciously as China and less as representative of socialism. China still sought international companionship, of course, and this it tended increasingly to find in identification with the Third World. In so doing, it also sought for and found in the idea of underdevelopment a new conceptual model on which to base its economic strategies. Not surprisingly, at the same time, in the early 1960's, there were also strong impulses domestically for a resurgence of traditional Chinese patterns of political behavior and popular custom.

But the China of the early 1960's was still pulling in many directions. Development on Soviet lines and within the Soviet camp had been rejected, and there was now a belief that China could go it alone, a belief that may have slowed economic growth but was of critical psychological importance in moving China toward its present situation. But as we know there was also very serious disagreement about economic policy in this period, and in foreign affairs the Chinese couldn't quite decide where they wanted to belong. Reluctant to let go the idea of a socialist camp, moving to the Third World but proclaiming revolution to newly independent Africans, China had by 1964 also accepted redefinition of the capitalist world (excluding the United States) as a less malevolent Second Intermediate Zone. This latter theory enlarged still further the options for an independent China, moving it away from the old dogmatic prescriptions.

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The second major turning point came after the next great domestic trauma of the Cultural Revolution and the foreign traumas of the Soviet pressure in Czechoslovakia and on China's borders. The results were not simultaneously apparent, partly because of the recurring power struggles in China throughout the period from 1969 to 1976—struggles that, incidentally, were themselves a reflection of the process by which China was finding its own identity. The Cultural Revolution, destructive though it was of traditional ideas, brought China to an ultimate point of introspection and self-recognition, rejecting as it did virtually all things foreign. Soviet behavior shocked China into realizing, not only the ultimate worthlessness of the pursuit of alignment through supposed or hoped-for ideological affinities, but the possible military designs on China of its former ally.

Three developments ensued, and in each of these Mao had a hand, although we may surmise that Chou En-lai was guiding that very unsteady hand toward the end. First, China redefined the world into the now familiar three-tier structure. This was of the greatest significance. In this framework China does not have to worry about ideological alignments. It doesn't even have to worry about identifying itself exclusively with the Third World. It can behave as China and develop its own international personality. Second, China became involved in an active diplomatic offensive, drawing on Chinese techniques in a way with which the rest of the world has had difficulty coping. At first the world was excited by high expectations, and then Second and Third worlds alike were puzzled, frustrated, or disappointed. The reasons vary, but what most did not understand was that China was a far more experienced and sophisticated partner than they had bargained for; in most of these new engagements China was getting the greatest advantage. Third, in January, 1975, Chou En-lai confirmed what had been apparent for several years: that China was moving to establish a policy of commitment to economic growth at a rate that, they hoped, would place it "in the front ranks" of the industrial nations by the year 2000.

There were still contradictions, of course, and what was missing most in this period was a clear line on the acceptance or rejection of Chineseness, that is, on everything that had preceded the Cultural Revolution. Even foreign observers could perceive, though dimly, the disagreements over this issue. It was resolved, of course, after the events of 1976—again, as it happens, following a period of great national trauma.

For Chinese, as well as foreigners, the course on which China is now embarked is perhaps clearer than at any time since the 1950's. Why was the autumn of 1976 so decisive in this respect? First, because Mao's death has unblocked the decisionmaking process, which on any long-term issue had been either jammed or challenged by people who hoped to avoid closing off policy options before they themselves got a chance at them after the Chairman's death.

Second, 1976 was decisive because of the removal of the "Shanghai Four." In my opinion it was not because these people were radicals that they were removed. (I happen to think that they were not, fundamentally, radical at all.) Their legitimacy came from the Cultural Revolution. They wanted to keep its symbols and slogans alive, and to do so exclusively, so as to deny to others alternative symbols of legitimacy. And their influence was great enough to block the resolution of policy questions, and that is why their removal represents a watershed.

What confronts us now in China? Where does Hua Kuo-feng fit into all this? Chineseness: What does it mean? Visitors to China in 1977 remarked on a greater ease of interpersonal relationships than before. I think this is symptomatic of a new climate. It doesn't mean everyone is having a jolly time. Indeed, the pressure is on to work harder; the campaign against the associates of the Four is being pushed with great severity; law and order are in and harsh punishments including executions for law-breakers are announced in the major cities of China. Relaxation would be the wrong word; rather it is just the schizophrenia of almost thirty years coming to an end. An individual can be Marxist-Leninist and Chinese and not feel uncomfortable about being either. This is quite the most significant development so far under Hua. I suppose one might say modern China has finally embraced Marxism-Leninism, not the reverse.

The next few years will see not only a cultural revival but the conscious restoration of institutions, political ideas, and practices that are unmistakably Chinese in origin. We already have some sign of this, including in some areas of policy. The Chinese people have been monument-builders. I expect that the next decade will see the first free, aesthetically great piece of architecture, which will be both modern and Chinese, in post-1949 China. It is, of course, doubly important for us now to understand modern China's origins and heritage. But let us not think that China is not a socialist, revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist society. It is, and it will continue to be.

On the question of the commitment to accelerated economic growth there can now be no doubt. If we guessed it late in 1976, subsequent conferences and the Party Congress itself have confirmed the new leadership's determination to achieve Asia's next "economic miracle." The question is, what chance do they have of succeeding? We must recognize from the outset that the obstacles are formidable (and already the weather has not been kind). But if we look at what has been achieved since 1958, we have a fairly reliable guide to what can happen. In twenty years of economic policies that veered widely from one direction to another, of political disruption that has had a direct influence on production, of natural disasters, and of the total absence of foreign aid, the Chinese economy has survived, and it has even made modest progress. Many believe that the Chinese have basically solved their food problem. They have an unrivaled capacity for organization. They have resources. They have motivation. They have commitment. And perhaps most important they have a society that still enjoys a very great measure of cohesion and acceptance.
of common values. Economists will argue about the indicators. But I believe China will surprise the world.

I said at the beginning that I thought China will become the most significant economic and politico-cultural power in the Asia/Pacific Region. Other economies may be stronger, but in China political and cultural influence will buttress economic strength. "Getting it all together" in the Chinese/Marxist nexus is important to this end. I believe the rest of this century will see the extension of Chinese influence in Asia in a rather traditional sense, by "moral example" and the projection of China's politico-culture—not, I would strongly suggest, by military extension or economic imperialism.

Bureaucratism, elitism, the growth of technocracy, the problem of traditional inequalities between town and country and between mental and manual workers, regionalism, the absorption of the aspirations of youth—all these are all major headaches. But so they have been since 1949, and if my theory is correct, the confidence arising from the ultimate sinification or assimilation of Marxism will bring to the socialist techniques for handling these problems an enhanced capacity for resolving them. I don't believe the passage will be smooth. Indeed, I tend to think that the 1980's will produce a crisis of government in China. But I also guess that it will be successfully surmounted. I cannot prove it.

China's handling of foreign relations will also reflect this same confidence. The problem for us is to recognize that we are dealing with China, and to understand the wellsprings of China's approaches to the world. In some respects, future dealings with China will be easier. China wants, indeed needs, a peaceful environment. It wants harmonious relations with its neighbors. As its foreign economic policies develop, it will behave in patterns familiar elsewhere in the world. Businessmen will come and go, signing contracts with less difficulty. Academics and research workers will be exchanged. China will be more accessible, more open. China will cooperate in international arrangements. There will come a time when it is even prepared to talk about weapons control, nonproliferation, and disarmament.

But the more we become involved with China in these matters the more we will find ourselves in difficulty. First, there is a constant element of shadow play in China's foreign relations, which parallels its more overt or recognizable behavior. The Japanese understand this. Other Asian governments have a capacity to understand, except where the sensitivity of policymakers has been blunted by Western education and unquestioning belief in Western approaches to the handling of international relations. Second, traditional Chinese ideas will figure in Chinese foreign policy. One hesitates to use the "tributary" concept, but in terms of moral/cultural influence and mutual obligations it is not inappropriate to China's approaches to Southeast Asia.

Third, the present generation of Chinese leaders is Chinese to the core. Teng, of course, is Paris-educated. But his style, his speech, and his mind are, above all, uncompromisingly Chinese. He confronted the Russians almost two decades ago. He confronted the "Shanghai Four." He is now prepared to confront the United States. This will be very difficult for Western nations, but they will have to live with it.

Dr. Kissinger saw the confrontation coming after Chou En-lai became ill, and seems not to have been able to handle it. Mr. Vance seems not to have done much better. The idea of China manipulating us rather than us manipulating China is certainly going to take some getting used to, particularly without a Chou En-lai to make it seem this is not the case. In sum, I think our difficulty will lie in dealing with a power that has a major influence on us but is not governed in its international relations by ideas deriving from the "Western international order."

Which brings me, finally, to the role of Hua Kuo-feng. I do not share the negative opinion about his capability that some visitors to China have expressed. I think that for the time being it is Teng who sets the pace in the Chinese capital. He has submitted himself to Hua's authority, and that is accepted by all. But Teng is working on the long term, past and present. He is Hua's tutor, and I believe Hua is content with that. Hua would be a fool indeed if he did not draw heavily on the experience of Teng, as well as Yeh Chien-ying, Li Hsien-nien, and the others. In a sense, therefore, Hua is still being groomed. But we should take careful note of who is doing the grooming and of Hua's own credentials.

Hua represents a generation that is neither Long March (although he does have pre-1949 revolutionary and wartime anti-Japanese credentials) nor Cultural Revolution (although he was in the thick of one of the most complicated cultural revolutions in China). His generation is that which has had to build socialism from the grass roots up in post-1949 peacetime China, to implement the basic reforms, to oversee the political campaigns, to supervise the establishment of the industrial base, to raise the efficiency of agriculture and industry, to mobilize and socialize a rural populace, reconciling the socialist policies with the Chinese base. I think his experience is to China's present problems what the Long March and Yenan were to China in 1949. The Long March and Yenan will remain as symbols of history, of human qualities to be admired, of general principles. But China's problems are no longer those of 1935 or 1940.

Hua belongs to China's new generation. He has the endorsement of the power-brokers. He has been able so far to capture the popular mood. He is depicted in the Chinese media as "wise." I believe he has some of the style (but not the awesome ability) of a Chou En-lai: patience, a capacity to listen to others and engage them publicly in important policies, care in planning political confrontations.

Hua is really a man for his time. It remains to be seen how he performs over the longer term. But what is important for us is that he comes straight out of the postrevolutionary Chinese tradition. He is likely to be as committed as his mentors to the acceleration in China's growth. He is also likely to prove as uncompromisingly Chinese.