

more equitable, more brotherly society that will redress a jumble of wicked things such as economic exploitation, the nuclear threat, unemployment, and bad nutritional habits. All this wickedness, presumably, is the result of the free market and capitalism.

It should be emphasized that we *do* need a national family policy. Families in general do need legislation that works in their support instead of against them. Poor families and the families of handicapped children are in a particularly distressful situation; almost all their actions on behalf of their children are severely curtailed and stifled by allegedly benign government policies and programs. Above all, they are helpless against the supposedly "higher consciousness" of intellectuals, experts, and bureaucrats, who claim to know better than the poor what is good for them and their children. These families are partic-

ularly vulnerable and powerless. I emphatically agree that they need to be empowered to have greater choices and independence. But toward that end one fails to see how most of these ideologically motivated policy proposals by Keniston and the Carnegie Council for Children will be of much help.

One agrees wholeheartedly with the beautiful statement of Albert Camus invoked by the authors of *All Our Children*: "The aim of a life can only be to increase the sum of freedom and responsibility to be found in every [person] and in the world." It is by no means clear, however, that this book and its proposals have much claim to the sentiment invoked. The antifamily bias of the past decade will really have come to an end when the family is appreciated, not as an instrument of social change, but as a primary institution of freedom, meaning, and other essentials of a truly human life.

lives, that directly produced a cold war, and indirectly spawned two hot wars in Korea and Indochina? William James long ago observed that war's horror created a "thrill." During 1941-45, our civilian population could experience the thrill by proxy while living in security and prosperity. Battles were fought on foreign soil, casualties were light compared to those of other belligerents, and the domestic economy boomed. Moreover, this war seemed unusually just. Only forty thousand men refused to fight on grounds of conscience, and more than half of them served as non-combatants.

Since 1945 a handful of writers have argued unconvincingly that entry into the war against Nazi Germany was neither strategically nor morally necessary. Especially during the Vietnam war, more astute revisionists questioned President Roosevelt's tactics during the controversy over intervention in 1940-41. His repeated deception, harassment of critics, and expansion of presidential authority in foreign affairs set dangerous precedents. Furthermore, at least a minority of historians believes that wiser diplomacy could—and should—have avoided the confrontation with Japan. If Hoopes's informal sample is at all reliable, these reservations have hardly affected the population at large. Several men and women regret their initial approval of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Yet almost all assume the righteousness of a two-front war against both Germans and "Japs" (a term still favored in several cases).

Although he professes to admire Studs Terkel's oral history technique, Hoopes lacks Terkel's understanding that recollections are problematical evidence. Overly impressed by memories of national unity, he misconstrues the nature of the wartime consensus. Agreement on winning the war did not necessarily mean agreement on anything else, even on such related matters as strategy, diplomacy, and postwar reconstruction. Consequently Hoopes makes too little of the grumbling and greed that his subjects reveal. Furthermore, he failed to seek—or to include—memoirs of the bitter strikes, racial conflicts, and acrimonious elections that left important legacies for the 1950's and 1960's.

As with most "oral narratives," *Americans Remember the Homefront*

Americans Remember the Homefront: An Oral Narrative by Roy Hoopes

(Hawthorn Books; 393 pp.; \$12.95)

The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945 by Allan M. Winkler

(Yale; 230 pp.; \$11.95)

Leo P. Ribuffo

In *Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph* Geoffrey Perrett wrote that World War II was the "'perfect' war." Most subjects interviewed by Roy Hoopes would apply the phrase without Perrett's ironic quotation marks. Throughout this "oral narrative" famous and obscure persons stress a pervasive wartime mood of "exhilaration," "mission," and "cooperation."

To be sure, *Americans Remember the Homefront* contains some contrary recollections. Representative Norman Mineta recalls that he and 112,000 other Japanese-Americans were forced from their homes and relocated in barracks. An opponent of the war remem-

bers comparably grim camps for conscientious objectors. Blacks recall discriminatory hiring, and several lower-middle-class whites think back on drabness, mental breakdowns, and broken marriages. A single chapter on the "ultimate cost of victory" records the feelings of those who lost relatives or friends in combat. Yet these dissents only highlight a dominant tone of retrospective enthusiasm. Even Carey McWilliams of *The Nation* gets carried away, thanking Japan for the attack that ended the "god damn domestic bickering."

How do we explain nostalgia for a conflict that cost 400,000 American

tells more about current concerns than about past events. The belated horror over Hiroshima and Nagasaki shows that fear of nuclear annihilation lingers into the era of détente. The innovation of wartime cooperation reflects a contemporary yearning for togetherness. Scholars are not immune to celebration of mythic pasts, but this sort of nostalgia flourishes best in a historiographical vacuum. When elderly New Dealers convene, they now must take time to damn the many books that note Roosevelt's failure to end the Depression. Unlike students of the 1930's, however, writers surveying the homefront can build on few monographs and no tradition of historical controversy.

The Politics of Propaganda is a product of growing scholarly interest in wartime domestic affairs. Allan M. Winkler's concise study of the Office of War Information (OWI) shows both the breadth and shallowness of national unity. Partly because there was little internal opposition to the conflict, but also because he wanted to dominate public relations, President Roosevelt did not establish a version of the Committee on Public Information, which had, as Chairman George Creel recalled, "saturated" the country with "truth" during World War I. At least it had saturated the country with inflammatory nationalism. By comparison, OWI hardly affected internal opinion after its creation in June, 1942. Nevertheless, wary that the agency would promote Roosevelt as well as the war, congressional conservatives sharply curtailed its domestic activities.

Starting in mid-1943, the bulk of OWI funds and energy went to the overseas branch headed by Robert E. Sherwood. Sherwood and other liberal internationalists soon discovered that it was easier to condemn Axis aggression than to explain American war aims. They believed that the United States was fighting to promote worldwide democracy. Yet most citizens subordinated postwar aspirations to quick victory with minimal casualties. The administration agreed. In the cause of military necessity, FDR struck bargains with French collaborators in North Africa and erstwhile Fascists who deposed Mussolini in 1943.

Orders from above usually prevented OWI from criticizing these decisions. After Mussolini's fall, however, an overseas branch broadcast quoted Samuel

Graton's comment that the "moronic little king" now ruled Italy. The resulting uproar produced a crisis that had to be settled in the White House. In 1944 Sherwood resigned under pressure, and OWI Director Elmer Davis agreed further to restrain his subordinates. No longer free to evangelize on behalf of liberal internationalism, OWI now concentrated on what became its major contribution to victory. The Office developed shrewd psychological warfare techniques that convinced thousands of enemy soldiers to surrender.

account is flawed because he chose to write an administrative history of an agency that requires an intellectual history.

Perhaps because Winkler seeks primarily to present facts, his book renders few explicit judgments on the Office of War Information. He seems to defend FDR's deals with Admiral Darlan in Algeria and Marshal Badoglio in Rome. No hesitancy is necessary. In these cases and as a general policy Roosevelt wisely tried to cut American casualties. The military also deserves credit for

"... the Roosevelt administration was no more coherent in the 1940's than it had been in the 1930's."

The failures as well as success of the Office of War Information illustrate the complexity of the years between Pearl Harbor and V.J. Day. Americans did not suddenly forget the experiences that had preceded December 7, 1941. Rather, they fitted prewar notions and worries into a slightly different wartime context. For instance, the wariness of propaganda, itself a legacy from World War I, had moved many writers to adopt a documentary style that was presumably invulnerable to falsification. Elmer Davis and his staff continued to believe that commentators could present "facts" without making value judgments. Moreover, the Roosevelt administration was no more coherent in the 1940's than it had been in the 1930's. Lines of authority remained vague and officials still competed for FDR's fleeting attention.

Winkler effectively unravels the rivalry among OWI, various civilian departments, and the military. Too often, however, he accepts Elmer Davis's premise that facts speak for themselves. Consequently he pays less attention to propaganda themes than to bureaucratic politics. Without discussing them in detail, for example, Winkler writes that OWI films had a "self-explanatory, didactic quality." But "facts"—like memories—are problematical. To consider one instance, the cinematic treatment of women workers, though superficially flattering, betrayed the prevailing fear that they would lose femininity or try to keep their jobs after the war. Winkler's

refusing to sacrifice soldiers to win dubious political objectives.

The Politics of Propaganda is less generous to the agency's Republican and conservative Democratic detractors. As Winkler shows, many "carping criticisms" came from racists who disliked OWI's support of civil rights or partisans who believed that New Dealers were inherently dangerous. On the other hand, Henry Cabot Lodge properly accused OWI of exaggerating the administration's aid to blacks. Carping or not, criticism probably checked incipient partisanship by Sherwood and his allies.

Furthermore, Winkler slights broader issues latent in an official propaganda agency, particularly an agency called an Office of War *Information*. A president commonly confuses the national interest with his own. Under the most placid conditions, he has many ways to stifle or chill criticism. During war there is an added aura to his role as commander-in-chief. The nation's residual recognition that he remains fallible and partisan should not be further undermined by official writers and broadcasters who present administration policy as unbiased "information."

The supposition that Americans were so united that they neither needed nor wanted debate is especially misleading because World War II nurtured conflicts that would divide the country during the following three decades. The war years produced visions of an

"American century" and contrary hopes for a "century of the common man," a military establishment and a band of activists who would campaign against nuclear testing in the 1950's and the Indochina war in the 1960's, increased assertiveness among blacks and

racist retrenchment among whites, employment opportunities for women and bombastic attacks on "momism." The homefront was not a benevolent world we have lost. Rather, even more than the Depression, the early 1940's created the world in which we live.

invasion. He offers without comment Kissinger's later private explanation to newsmen that Kissinger feared that "public proclamations against the Cypriot puppet president would be used by the Turks to justify intervention." This explanation is not convincing in view of the Turkish demands for the return of Makarios before the invasion.

Stern has limited his examination to events as seen from an American perspective, in effect beating U.S. policymakers on their own ground. He deals only briefly with a few specifics of the 1960 treaties of London and Zurich granting Cyprus its independence at the price of giving the 18 per cent Turkish minority 30 per cent of the government and a veto on legislation. The book concentrates on the flaws in American foreign policy and does not attempt to sort out the basic causes of instability on Cyprus.

These basic causes must be the concern of policymakers who would repair the damage to NATO and find a lasting solution to the Cyprus problem. Some have argued that there have been enough wrongs on both sides to make a fresh start and a clean slate the best approach. Yet if basic causes are not examined, Cypriots may be condemned to repeat their past. U.S. officials have asserted that Cyprus must *remain* sovereign and independent—but the problem is that Cyprus was denied full sovereignty and independence by certain provisions in the 1960 treaties between Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey. The signatories gave themselves the right to intervene under certain circumstances and they stationed Greek and Turkish troops on the island. (It was Greek troops that precipitated the 1967 crisis by attacking a Turkish village and led to the overthrow of the Cyprus Government in 1974.) Nor are the two communities, even if a majority in both agree, able to change any of the basic provisions in the Cyprus constitution without the consent of these three governments. Intercommunal talks, begun in 1968 to revise the constitution, had produced agreement on all issues but one. A negotiating breakthrough on this final point had occurred in early 1974, but the talks broke down in April, 1974, after Prime Minister Ecevit's statement that his goal for Cyprus was federation, which seemed to indicate his intent to veto the agreement. The "self-determination" called for in the past by

The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy by Laurence Stern

(Times Books; 170 pp.; \$10.00)

Bernice Wood

The Turkish arms embargo was imposed in 1975 because of the misuse of American arms in northern Cyprus. Those who favor lifting the embargo prior to real progress toward a settlement on Cyprus admit that it will strain relations with Greece, but they hope that these relations will eventually improve as a result of a solution on Cyprus. They also believe that an end to the embargo would make a solution possible. They contend that neither Greece nor Turkey is secure by itself within the Alliance, and that the fact that each needs the other will make compromise more likely once the current deadlock is broken.

Some of those who favor lifting the embargo seem to underestimate the internal pressures that could force Greece to "go neutral." They also underestimate the relative ease with which Greece could slip into neutrality as a result of its moves, since the 1974 crisis, to normalize relations with its Balkan neighbors. If the embargo is lifted, the burden will be on the administration to convince Turkey of its need for Greece and not to regard the end of the embargo as one more "new reality" for the Greek Cypriots to accept.

The recent Turkish proposals have not strengthened the administration's case. It looks as if the most the administration can hope for, if the embargo is lifted, is a settlement considered less than adequate by Greece and unacceptable to Cyprus. It is hoped that both could be pressured into accepting, leav-

ing NATO with a sort of low-grade infection and the Cyprus problem only temporarily solved.

Laurence Stern, national editor of the *Washington Post*, outlines U.S. responsibility for the current situation. His thesis is that a foreign policy that sacrifices democratic principles to military expediency is self-defeating in the long run. He argues this convincingly, using American policy toward Greece and Cyprus as a case history. Interviews with numerous American, Greek, and Cypriot officials have enabled him to assemble a considerable amount of detail concerning the events surrounding the Greek junta coup against Archbishop Makarios, which provided the pretext for the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The book is somewhat flawed by a few factual errors and unlikely worst-possible interpretations; nevertheless, Stern's thesis does not depend on the validity of these minor assertions but on the publicly acknowledged facts of our foreign policy in the area.

After dealing at length with the events leading up to the coup, including the CIA warning of junta plans and the ineffective efforts to discourage them, Stern writes: "If there had ever been a time for strong and imaginative intervention, specifically for stronger U. S. pressure on Athens, it was before the coup and not afterward." Forestalling the coup was certainly the wiser course. Stern fails to emphasize enough the point that a strong U.S. reaction to the coup could have forestalled the Turkish