

Greek Cypriots, although initially amounting to a code word for *enosis*, as critics have claimed, was surely directed even more at the above provisions, especially after the desire for *enosis* waned in the mid-1960's.

The treaties also provided for a minority veto, but not for the means to deal with deadlocks such as the one that precipitated the 1963 breakdown in the Cyprus Government. When majority rule is denied, some impartial means for breaking the inevitable deadlocks must be provided. These basic constitutional problems are properly of international concern, since they affect future stability on the island. Although more equitable territorial arrangements and guaran-

tees for human rights are important for a solution, an end to the institutionalized external interference in the affairs of Cyprus is surely essential.

Stern concludes that Kissinger succeeded in purging American foreign policy of Dulles's "Protestant missionary spirit" but failed to understand "the imperatives of change among and within nations: toward government by popular consensus, toward reducing the disparities of wealth and poverty, toward the processes of both reform and revolution." He adds that "an American foreign policy that fails to comprehend these forces may be doomed to sterility and failure." It is a point deserving of serious consideration.

## From Enlightenment to Revolution by Eric Voegelin

(Duke University Press; 307 pp.; \$12.75)

### Joseph Amato

This work composed of twelve essays on Voltaire, Helvétius, Turgot, and Comte, Bakunin and Marx could invite opposite reactions. It could be said to trace the formation of modern secularism, at the highest level of intellectual history, in a most exquisite manner. On the other hand, it could be judged little more than a clever but sterile academic exercise in inquisitional history—a field in which America's Hegelian conservatives excel. Eminent analysis, or conceptualism on a rampage? Conservatism at its deepest, or a highbrow's idea of a witch hunt? What is not debatable is the proposition that it is an expression of an older type of intellectual history, which is characterized by searches for "good" and "bad" traditions and by conclusions that are never at variance with the ideological preferences with which one began.

"The present work," John Hallowell says in his brief and uninstrucive preface, "consists of a portion of an unpublished history of political ideas which Eric Voegelin wrote in the nineteen forties and early fifties. His reluctance to publish the history at the time it was written stemmed in part from a growing conviction that such a history, however well-conceived and executed, could not

penetrate the depths of a consciousness from which such a history emerges." In effect, this means certain disappointment for those who waited for the final volume of Voegelin's multivolume history of Western consciousness, *Order and History: Israel and Revelation; The World of the Polis; Plato and Aristotle; and The Ecumenic Age*. There may be some pleasure in this for those who suspected all along that Voegelin's genius for penetrating the consciousness out of which human notions of order are constituted was reserved for understanding civilizations far less diverse and self-conscious than ours. For the reader who knows the main thrust of *Order and History* and *Science of Politics* the worth of the present work is mainly in the opportunity it affords to see Voegelin at an earlier stage of his practice of intellectual history.

Elements of the mature Voegelin, however, are already present in this work. He is a profound antimodern, he finds nothing redeeming in the modern world. Literally, history for him is all downhill from Plato and Jesus on; the essence of modernity is understood to be a destructive secularism, man suicidally choosing himself—his knowledge, happiness, and order—over all else in

existence. This universal heresy of measuring the true and the good exclusively in reference to the earthly—which Voegelin has already labeled "gnosticism"—became virulent when coupled to the idea of progress. At this point gnostic man presumes that through his own philanthropy, science, and reform—in short, through progress—he can realize his ideal society.

Like Maritain's *Three Reformers* or Camus's *The Rebel*, Voegelin's *From Enlightenment to Revolution* equates history with ideas, and ideas with the logic of the powers of self-destruction. A limited number of abstract ideas are assumed not only to mirror whole historical periods and processes, but they are treated almost as if they are essentially the source, engine, and goal of the powers that direct the course of centuries. This form of doing history—a form of expression that for the past two centuries has qualified intellectuals to serve themselves and their favorite causes—is the central activity of this work. Voegelin seeks to demonstrate that "gnosticism" ("a slow process extending over a thousand years") got hold of modern man's soul entirely in the last two centuries; that "the *corpus mysticum* has given way to the *corpus humanitatis*"; that "the climax of this [project] is the magic dream of creating the Superman, the man-made Being that will succeed the sorry creature of God's making. This is the great dream that first appeared imaginatively in the works of Condorcet, Comte, Marx, and Nietzsche and later pragmatically in the Communist and National Socialist movement."

Voegelin's history of ideas bore the stamp of the cold war. Soviet Russia linked to Nazi Germany and left-wing intellectuals—these were the proponents of the secular heresy. Unaccountably the United States—its myths, nationalism, democracy, and capitalism—were exempted from the indictment of "secular gnosticism." Writing of history as if it were about damning and saving ideas, Voegelin was, in effect, in reference to socialism, making subversion definable, identifiable, and traceable, as it passed from individual thinker to small groups to parties that, in times of chaos, enter on the historical stage with powers far greater than their numbers. Yet Voegelin knows history to be too spontaneous, too complex, and too dialectical to yield to the violent

reductionism that was intrinsic to the very composition of his work. At one point of his work, he wrote revealingly: "In order to secure its successes [in revolution], the idea not only had to rest on a substantially sound analysis of the actual state of Western society; it also had to be a part of the spiritual crisis itself. Only because the idea was the manifestation of a profound spiritual disease, only because it carried the disease to a new extreme, could it fascinate the masses of a diseased society." Perhaps it was just this awareness of the discrepancy between the logic of ideas and realities of historical change that led Voegelin to leave this work unpublished all these years.

When Voegelin wrote his volume, he was already at work on what I consider his important insight: When free, men build their social orders out of their ideals, symbols, and myths of God, nature, and themselves; when they are not free, their images of themselves and existence are reduced to the demands of social order, as established in power and willed in fantasy. For Voegelin the

essence of the choice is between man with or without transcendence, free or unfree in spirit. And, as if that choice implied choosing between the old and the new world, Voegelin forcefully voiced his preference for the ancient Greeks and Jews. For him angels walked on their shores.

In the end it will perhaps be the historian who can most appreciate *From Enlightenment to Revolution*, first, because of its truly keen insights (the essay on Helvétius is remarkable!), and second, for reasons of nostalgia. There was a time, not so long ago, when we professors of Western civilization could survey aeons by teaching great ideas and, at one and the same time, identify ourselves as serious professors, proclaim dramatic truths, do some politics along the way, and locate a few witches to boot. Not everything has changed since then. But the Irish have definitely stopped speaking Greek. Not much Latin is heard. And ever stronger particularities press hard upon us. In this sense *From Enlightenment to Revolution* was written in a less pressing time.

## Briefly Noted

**Nemesis at Potsdam:  
The Anglo-Americans  
and the Expulsion of  
the Germans**  
by Alfred M. de Zayas  
(Routledge & Kegan Paul; 268 +  
xxvii pp.; \$9.95)

One of the great unsung humanitarians of modern times was Victor Gollancz. An English publisher of partly Jewish background, he devoted time, effort, and money in the years immediately following World War II to doing what he could to better the lot of the defeated Germans. Gollancz was one of the few people in Western Europe to see Germans as human beings in need. Through lectures and books he hammered home the fact that people are people regardless of ideology, that a starving child requires succor despite national boundaries. Gollancz's moderately voiced appeals were drowned in the screaming bloodlust of Allied propagandists, whose strident harangues that no quarter be given the German people fell on

receptive ears in the West.

Among those Germans whose fate Gollancz chronicled and endeavored to better were the pathetic millions of expellees brutally ousted from their ancestral lands in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. These *Volksdeutsche* were tragic figures, unfortunate enough to have been located in the wrong areas at precisely the wrong times. The circumstances leading to their abysmal situation are tellingly related by De Zayas in this most important work.

De Zayas is a graduate of the Harvard Law School, presently at the University of Gottingen. He aims to detail the diplomatic maneuverings that resulted in the decision to expel all German minorities from Eastern Europe. He is an advocate of historical truth, and the unhappy truth is that Germans by the millions were the sinned against as well as the sinners during and after World War II. His thesis will not be accepted in all quarters even today, since the idea of German "collective war guilt" still has a strong hold on the

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## CONTRIBUTORS

BRIGITTE BERGER is Professor of Sociology at Long Island University.

LEO P. RIBUFFO is a member of the History Department at George Washington University.

BERNICE WOOD is the pen name of a woman who has considerable personal acquaintance with the Cyprus situation and the events in Athens at the time of the coup.

JOSEPH AMATO teaches history at Southwest State University, Minnesota. He is author of *Mounier and Maritain: A French Catholic Understanding of the Modern World*.

NORMAN LEDERER (Briefly Noted) is Dean of Occupational Studies at Washtenaw Community College, Michigan.

ANTHONY JAMES JOES (Briefly Noted) teaches politics at Saint Joseph's College, Philadelphia. He is author of the recently published *Fascism in the Contemporary World*.

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mass mind. The belief in a mass German guilt was an important factor in the thinking of Allied leaders about the German minorities question. The result was that German women, children, and the aged bore the brunt of vindictiveness, while the *Parteibonzen* actually responsible for the implementation of Nazi policies often got away scot free.

The expulsion of some twelve to sixteen million people from their homes amid the chaos at the end of World War II was, it can be argued, genocidal in intent and, given the two million who died in the process, at least partially so in accomplishment. The millions were brutally expelled, often with little more than the clothes on their backs, and were forced westward under the continual assaults of their ethnic neighbors seeking revenge. Rape, robbery, murder, starvation, and disease afflicted these folk, who had no recourse but to endure. Often after the most harrowing of journeys the expellees reached the lines of Allied occupation zones only to be turned away and compelled once

again to descend into the maelstrom of hatred and vengeance.

De Zayas points out that the principles of the Atlantic Charter were clearly violated in the case of the German minorities, especially the loudly proclaimed principle that territorial aggrandizement not in accord with the wishes of the resident population would not be imposed. Actually the fate of these German minorities had been sealed in the aftermath of World War I, when new national entities were established containing huge numbers of ethnic Germans. In the interwar years these minorities generally fared badly at the hands of their new rulers and therefore looked with considerable longing to the possibilities of being incorporated in some fashion into a rejuvenated Germany, or at least of having a "big brother" at hand in their struggle to attain equal rights. De Zayas emphasizes that these natural feelings had little or nothing to do with the emergence of Nazism in Germany.

De Zayas painstakingly details the manner in which Eastern European emigré governments during World War II prepared the way for Allied approval of the mass expulsion of Germans following the conflict. Their distortions of fact had a decided effect on the thinking of many Western leaders. Ironically it was Winston Churchill, the nemesis depicted in Goebbels's propaganda to the German people, who foresaw most clearly the immense human tragedy that would result from the mass expulsions and who tried to curb the Eastern European countries' desire for territorial expansion at the expense of the German state.

The Russian invasion of East Prussia aided the Eastern European leaders in getting their way. Hundreds of thousands of German civilians hurried west before the terrifying apparition of the shockingly undisciplined Soviet army. Eastern leaders stated that this exodus had cleared out all the Germans, conveniently ignoring the fact that millions remained. These millions were abruptly ousted once formal conflict had ended.

De Zayas's book has its serious weaknesses. He dabbles in too much post-World War II diplomacy having little to do with his main theme, for example. Nonetheless it is an important work on an enormously important but little known aspect of World War II.

—Norman Lederer

## With Nixon by Raymond Price (Viking; 398 pp.; \$12.98)

When the more scholarly revisionists get around to restructuring our memories of Watergate and Richard Nixon's presidency, they will no doubt be grateful for memoirs as comprehensive and, for the most part, candid as this one by Raymond Price. Price was Nixon's chief speechwriter and a close personal friend (he still is the latter). Four years after Nixon's resignation, when there is no threat of his making a comeback, perhaps even the purest Nixon-hater can afford a foray into dispassionate reflection on what it was all about. *With Nixon* is a welcome guide to such reflection.

Price makes too much of a point of his not fitting the stereotype of the right-wing partisan. "I happen to be pro-abortion, anti-censorship, and pro-gun control . . ." It is as though, beneath his persuasive polemic against the liberal opposition, he still subscribes to the liberal definition of a good guy and wants to be counted as one. Then, too, he embarks upon lengthy and simplistic explanations of his newly discovered knowledge of the left brain (analytic)-right brain (synthetic) distinction in order to understand the "dark side" and "bright side" of his president. These are relatively minor faults, however, in a book that succeeds splendidly in telling it like it was—from the vantage point of those on the inside of the tragedy.

Predictably Price comes back again and again to the double standards, hypocrisies, and viciously distorted partisanship of those who were out to "get" Nixon under the guise of protecting the Republic. His citations of chapter and verse build an impressive case against the "lords spiritual" of the news media. House majority leader O'Neill declared in the very month of Nixon's second inauguration, following the landslide victory over McGovern, that Nixon would be impeached before his term was up. This and many similar statements, says Price, make it evident that the Watergate investigation was hardly a disinterested search for justice. Price is outraged also by the fact—and there are few would dispute it—that all presidents since Roosevelt had (with the apparent exception of Eisenhower) engaged in illegal and extralegal activities

far beyond anything even alleged in connection with Watergate. Nixon's bad fortune was that he got caught by a hostile Congress and press that were out for blood. Here, too, Price is careful to back up his claims with impressive, if not conclusive, evidence.

For Price, the chief villains in the Nixon entourage were Charles Colson and John Dean. His critique of Archibald Cox as an unmitigated tool of the Kennedy political machine puts a quite different light on the notorious "Saturday night massacre." In Price's version, Elliot Richardson appears as a man of considerable honor and restraint who was trapped by Cox into playing a role he did not want in the scenario written by Nixon's enemies.

On Nixon himself there are intriguing vignettes. Not of the kind that will convict or acquit him in anyone's mind, but of the kind that reveal the nature of the man himself. At several points Price offers almost verbatim accounts of Nixon's conversations with cabinet and staff, and one is appalled by Nixon's unsureness about himself and his part in

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history; he is obsessed with comparing himself to other figures and other times in order to determine whether he is measuring up to some vague notions of greatness and manliness. One fixed idea of Nixon's that comes through at several points, and it is a rather winsome idea, is that Europe is but "an older version of America"; that the future lies with Asia. This obviously helps to explain something of Nixon's commitment with respect to the war in Indochina. An irony that Price illuminates well is that this president who was so excoriated for wanting to be a dictator had in fact followed a rather consistent course in trying to impose restraints and restrictions on government, especially the federal government. In this connection the acute reader will readily recognize in the Nixon presidency the prelude to many of the "Carter themes" that are now often given an odd anti-Nixon twist.

Price has come as close as anyone to making a believable case for the proposition that Richard Nixon was hounded from office. The unfairness and viciousness of much of his opposition cannot be denied. His book does not explain, however, the mendacity and incompetence on Nixon's part that resulted in his defeat. It still seems more than possible that, as late as the summer of 1973, Nixon could have burned the tapes, made a grand gesture of remorse, promised to amend his life, and the hunters would have been disarmed. Price's account confirms rather than challenges the cliché that Nixon was his own worst enemy. Price quotes one Washington observer's summary of Watergate: "It doesn't vindicate the process to know that a lynch mob lynched the right guy." It would not be surprising if, within the next decade or two, that becomes the more conventional wisdom about Watergate.

—Richard Neuhaus

## The Modernization of Japan and Russia by Cyril E. Black et al. (Free Press; 386 pp. \$15.95)

Although it is a collaboration among several distinguished scholars, this book is structured as if written by one person. It is hardly bedside reading, but it is worth the effort to extract the various

messages it contains. Modernization is defined as the transformation of a traditional society under the impact of science and technological change. Economic modernization appears as increased per capita productivity; social modernization involves new patterns of settlement and family life (and often alienation). Political modernization means the mobilization of new groups into the political process, subjecting order and legitimacy to severe stress. The modernization process started in Western Europe, and Japan and Russia are among the few societies to catch up with the leaders. Roughly, the authors equate Japan with capitalism and Russia with socialism, but the modernization experience is homogenizing to a degree. The authors reject, however, any sort of "convergence" theory; modernized societies differ from one another in substantial, often decisive, ways. Japanese and Russia modernization fall into three phases: Premodern Foundation; Transition (1860-1940); and High Modernization. The Revolution of 1917 is not treated as a beginning of anything, but as part of an ongoing phase. The Leninists built on a czarist foundation that, in many ways, was not a bad one.

Russia and Japan in the premodern period were similar in crucial aspects: Their governments warded off imperialism and preserved independence; an effective value system stressed the common good, respect for political authority, sacrifice in the national interest. Both societies were cheerful borrowers of culture, from Byzantium and China. Japan emerges, however, as clearly the more appropriate model for the Third World: Poorer and smaller than Russia, its rapid development was less traumatic and less coercive. The Soviets' gargantuan failures in agriculture further underline the attractiveness of the Japanese path.

Japan's record of modernization is stunning. "Opened" to Western penetration only in the 1850's, it had become the dominant power in East Asia by the turn of the century and a major world actor by 1918. Japan was saddled with no bitter Church-State controversy, there were no troublesome ethnic minorities. Its relative insularity meant more manageable defense problems, and its premodern society was more urbanized. Above all the authors place greatest emphasis on the strategic im-

portance of enlightened and stable political leadership. The Samurai modernizers (nearly 7 per cent of the total population) skillfully exploited the divine prestige of the Emperor Meiji to legitimize profound innovations. Intelligent political direction overcame the absence of natural wealth; the Meiji "superstructure" created a new economic "base."

Thus launched, Japan made further impressive strides after 1945 despite enormous wartime losses. Another political variable—the very small expenditure on defenses—has contributed to this forward movement to a decisive degree.

Three fundamental conclusions of the authors come through: (1) modernization depends primarily on human, not material, resources; (2) the heritage of the past (the premodern period) weighs heavily in a society's drive to modernization; (3) latecomers to the process must build up an effective state, a government that can mobilize human and material resources. Clearly, then, modernization is going to be slow, very slow, in most of the world. One recalls also that in Russia and Japan, the two outstanding examples of modernization by non-Westerners, the effort produced Stalinism in one case and fascism in the other. Nonetheless the modernization struggle is the central theme and question of the contemporary human drama. Black and his collaborators provide a richly informative discussion of many of its most fundamental aspects.

—Anthony James Joes

## God, History, and Historians ed. by C.T. McIntire (Oxford; 477 pp.; \$19.95)

As the editor notes, the biblical understanding of the purposefulness of history has been badly battered by rationalism, positivism, and, more recently, Marxism. Often overlooked, however, is the enormous revival of Christian reflection on historical meaning during the past thirty years or more. This volume is useful in bringing together some of the best of that reflection, including essays by Christopher Dawson, C.W. Lewis, Reinhold Niebuhr, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Paul Tillich, Herbert Butterfield, Arthur Link, and others.

## Kolyma: The Arctic Death Camps

by Robert Conquest

(Viking; 254 pp.; \$10.00)

Drawing from interviews and published reports, plus his own research into shipping and population movements, Conquest, the author of *The Great Terror*, describes and documents life in the slave labor mining camps, in which, he conservatively estimates, three million people died from 1933 to 1954. Conquest notes that the Soviet leaders who are the heirs of Stalin still have not acknowledged their guilt for what happened then and what continues on a lesser scale in the Soviet Union. He also comes to the defense of Solzhenitsyn's estimates of the number of deaths under czarist rule compared with Stalin's terror (fourteen thousand during the last half century of czarism, a minimum of twelve million in the labor camps alone under Stalin).

## The Samizdat Register

ed. by Roy A. Medvedev

(Norton; 313 pp.; \$10.95)

Manuscripts circulated in typewritten form within the Soviet Union are here collected for the "outside" reader. Of greatest interest are the several attacks on Solzhenitsyn's "mysticism" and on the analysis offered in *From Under the Rubble*, which he edited. At issue in this debate are many matters of moment: Is the horror Marxism gone wrong or is Marxism the horror? How much weight should be given the religious and cultural explanation of Russia, or to what extent is it now a modern secularized society? Such arguments do not lend themselves to easy resolution, but Solzhenitsyn's is in most respects the far more compelling vision.

## The Public and American Foreign Policy 1918-1978

by Ralph B. Levering

(Morrow; 192 pp.; \$7.95)

Sponsored by the Foreign Policy Association, this once-over-lightly survey is offered in support of the proposition that public opinion has not been a

significant hindrance to effective U.S. foreign policy. To the contrary, public opinion has been readily "educated" by political leadership, and, when it did effectively resist such "education," it was usually because the public was right and the leadership wrong, or at least inept. This upbeat view of democratic common sense is endorsed also by George Gallup in his brief foreword. Levering concludes that the 10 to 20 per cent of the population that is the "attentive public" on international questions will be increasingly important in the future. This will no doubt be welcomed by the Foreign Policy Association and by the readers of *Worldview*, all of whom, it may be assumed, belong to that "attentive public."

## China and America: The Search for a New Relationship

ed. by William J. Barnds

(New York University; 254 pp.; \$15.00)

This very helpful book is sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and offers prognostications comprehensive enough to include the rapid changes in China since the death of Mao. Editor Barnds puts Chinese-American relations into a broad historical context and invites the reader to think through some of the hard choices posed by the possible futures of Moscow-Peking-Washington interaction. Ralph Clough of the Brookings Institution writes on our relations to Taiwan and tries to spell out the ways in which Taiwan's security can survive a shift of diplomatic recognition to Peking. There are no startling departures, but this judicious and thorough survey of relevant factors will be of assistance to anyone who wants to understand what is at stake in our relationship with China.

## The Politics of South Africa: Democracy and Racial Diversity

by Howard Brotz

(Oxford; 159 pp.; \$11.95)

A fresh look by a Canadian sociologist who has given years of thought to what could and should happen in South Africa. The freshness is in the careful

distinction between democracy and representative government, as the latter is generally understood in the West. Brotz contends that, in fact, South African political history contains alternatives both to apartheid and to the representative majoritarianism that is so threatening to white South Africans. It is a book that should be taken seriously by people who want to move beyond the now highly polarized debates over the future of South Africa.

## Dulles by Leonard Mosley

(Dial Press; 518 pp.; \$12.95)

Eleanor Dulles, sister of the late John Foster and Allen, has charged that this account contains hundreds of errors, and there is talk about lawsuits and other unpleasanties. It is really much to do about very little. The book is in fact a rather chatty and anecdotal affair and is not likely to be taken as a definitive reference by serious historians. The hyperbole about the Dulles control of U.S. and global fortunes is clearly hyperbole; although, to be sure, the influence of the two brothers should not be underestimated. While Allen, director of the CIA, comes across as something of a lightweight, John Foster is portrayed in impressive and sometimes heroic proportions. The Dulles legacy is not threatened by this account. Relax and enjoy.

## Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity

by Karl Rahner

(Seabury; 470 pp.; \$19.50)

Rahner, one of the most productive theologians of the twentieth century, here offers a summary of his decades of reflection on the meaning of religion generally and of Christianity more particularly. It is in many respects a more difficult book than Hans Küng's best-selling *On Being a Christian*, with which this summation inevitably will be compared. But it is also a far deeper and more rewarding treatment of contemporary Christian faith. Warmly recommended.