not (at least in the four books of his I have read) challenge any specific psychoanalytical or psychiatric techniques; rather, his concern is with the conditions under which such techniques are employed, that is, with the legal status of mental patients (oddly, he does not discuss the issue of those labeled "criminal insanity," presumably because he feels they should be treated like other criminals). His program for change, beyond concern with the civil rights of mental patients, is to make explicit the moral functions of psychiatry by unmasking its scientific pretensions and religious motives.

Unfortunately the scope of such unmasking is limited by, on the one hand, his view of medicine as a neutral, value-free enterprise—an application of biochemical laws—and, on the other, by his dismissal of "revealed religion" as "patent infantilism." The former makes most of his contrasts of medicine and psychiatry trivial, as with his argument—the principal one of this book—that schizophrenia is not a disease like syphilis. The second view makes his likening of religious and psychiatric practices wildly indiscriminate, as in his theory that modern society has exchanged "arranged marital pairings" between husband and wife for "arranged medical pairings" between psychiatrist and patient. Neither of his comparisons uncovers much in the way of the moral functions of psychiatry; rather, such functions are buried beneath a rationality that is reductive to the extreme.

In contrast to Szasz's narrowness is the wide range of Laing's ideas and, in R.D. Laing: The Philosophy and Politics of Psychotherapy, Andrew Collier rigorously analyzes these ideas from the standpoint of what he calls "the sciences of historical and mental processes"—Marxism and Freudian psychoanalytic theory. Collier, a lecturer in philosophy at University College, North Wales, Bangor, sees his role as an "underlaibourer to science, 'removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge.' " The "rubbish" in Laing's case is his existentialist perspective, and Collier takes great pains throughout his book to argue that such "personalistic ethics" do not necessarily negate—and where they do negate they can be rejected—what he regards as the more valuable aspects of Laing's work, namely, the extension of psychoanalytic theory to socialistic politics at the level of the family.

The problem with such a Freudian-Marxist approach (generally similar to Herbert Marcuse's, which Collier cites approvingly) is only partly that it ignores Laing's antipathy for "deterministic" psychoanalytic theory and "dogmatic" Marxism. Rather, the main problem is that it fails to give sufficient weight to what is the basis for such antipathy—Laing's grounding in Sartrean existentialism and his refusal to embrace any system of thought that does not make the individual the center of all things, free and responsible. Thus Laing derivatively characterizes dialectical materialism as "...the attempt to speak of the world as though it revealed itself to no one," while psychoanalysts are accused of assuming a position of "complete exteriority" in relation to their patients in which "the person disappears."

The limitations of Collier's approach are manifest in his treatment of Laing's "mystical" period, in which Laing envisages schizophrenia as a way of sheding the "egoic" self associated with the social personality and of traveling inward to realize a more fundamental "transcendent" self. Collier feels that such notions are "in sharp contrast" to the earlier Laing, being an "inversion" of his former "personalism" in which the self he once championed against society is now regards as illusory and egoic. In fact, however, the egoic-transcendent self duality is not an "inversion" of Laing's former notions but clearly the heir of similar dualities between "inner" and "outer" selves that he posed as early as his first book, The Divided Self. Collier's interpretation misses the most important point concerning Laing's mysticism: that it is an outgrowth of and departure from his original existentialist position. Thus, throughout most of his writings, Laing followed Sartre and other existentialists when he posed a separation between the inner and outer selves, between the subjective and objective experiences of human-ness; he abandoned Sartre when he gave the inner self autonomy and made the separation complete. For Sartre the freedom of the individual, his transcendence, consists in the act of separating himself from the world—not, as in Laing, with any transcendent self as the end-product of this separation. Laing, in holding out the reward of inner enlightenment—and it is clear he was tending in this direction even before The Politics of Experience—abandoned Sartre's tragic view of the world and took on a mystical one; he relegated the objective world to an illusory status and devalued rationality. And it was precisely this devaluation of rationality that proscribed any dialectical view (common to Sartre as well as Nietzsche) of personal and collective values—or of madness and sanity.

In fairness to Collier it should be noted that he largely recognizes the limitations of his approach to Laing, and his decision to write a book unraveling the slender threads connecting Laing with Freud and Marx, rather than the stronger ones between Laing and Sartre, reflects more his own interests (and his antipathy to Sartre) than a failure to recognize the central role of existentialism in Laing's thought. Collier is a careful, discriminating thinker, and his analysis should be of great value to those readers also committed to "the sciences of historical and mental processes." For those desiring a more general exegesis of Laing's thought, however, his book will be of lesser interest.

The Relevance of Liberalism edited by Zbigniew Brzezinski
(Westview; 229 pp.; $15.00)

Barry Rubin

This book of six essays and much cross-discussion comes out of a conference sponsored by the Columbia University Research Institute on International Change. Such volumes can range from the perfumy reportage of academic pot-boilers to sources of timely new ideas and perspectives. Fortunately, this
collection falls into the latter category.

On the face of things the outlook for liberalism is not good. While the domestic radical challenge of the Sixties has faded, the world scene is hardly bright from the point of view of liberalism. True, there is the example of India's rejection of Indira Gandhi's authoritarianism and there is the growth of dissident movements in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the continued spread of communism (albeit of the polycentric variety) and the growing, self-righteous authoritarian populism of much of the Third World cannot be ignored either.

Indeed, for the first time since the Thirties the very ideas of limits on government power and of individual rights are on the defensive. These ideas have been defined by an international plurality (though in the U.N. it often seems a consensus) as "enemies of the people."

Within America itself there are rumors (though little proof) of a broad turn to the right, involving both traditional conservatives and the "new conservatives," who together perceive big government, not big social problems, as the primary enemy of the day. All this does not shake Professor Charles Frankel, however. In his article "Does Liberalism Have a Future?" he documents the historical pessimism of liberalism. After all, Frankel writes, Socrates, the paradigmatic liberal, delivered his profession of faith in the shadow of the executioner. Over a century ago John Stuart Mill's "On Liberty" was written in an elegiac tone. The moderation of liberalism, he continues, has always had its detractors, who saw it as being "for the middling people, the mediocre, the men who, in the contemptuous phrase of...John Knox are 'neither hot nor cold.'" Yet Frankel demonstrates that as a philosophy liberalism is not merely the product of a "privileged class for a hundred years or so in the North Atlantic corner of the planet."

In a masterful discussion Frankel summarizes the problems facing liberal democracies today. A key area of difficulty is the issue of "social discipline": Can great collectivities (corporations, trade unions, bureaucracies) be controlled without repressive measures or constant concessions? Can ascending demands for social benefits and government services be met, particularly when the expectations press institutions so hard that they may become less effective? Frankel concludes that no other system has done a better job dealing with these paradoxes.

Irving Howe and Edward Shils assemble, respectively, the socialist and conservative critiques of liberalism. The articles are both useful, though neither is convincing. Howe attempts to both join and distinguish liberal and social democracy. Shils tries to do the same with liberalism and conservatism. If anything, this proves the dominance of liberalism in Western political philosophy.

Shils claims that there are two types of liberalism—a "collectivist liberalism" that has a tendency to slide into radicalism and an "autonomist liberalism" usually labeled conservatism. This is the difference, Shils says, between Democrats and Republicans here, or between the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats in European party systems. This is useful only in the broadest sense that Louis Hartz tried to demonstrate in the Fifties. In practical application, however, it is more misleading than revealing.

As one might guess, one of the great-
est difficulties is in defining the idea of liberalism itself. Giovanni Sartori of Stanford makes a gallant, if somewhat strained, attempt. Liberalism as a political doctrine, he suggests, should not be confused with the economic doctrines of free trade, free markets, laissez-faire, or survival of the fittest. Liberalism advocates a constitutional state, but not necessarily an inactive state. While liberalism should not be completely identified with capitalism, writes Sartori, it cannot exist in Marxist countries because any concentration of political and economic power, without the existence of independent, countervailing forces, tends to crush the individual and individual liberty. Liberalism requires a “diffusion of power,” and this may reveal its greatest value—it has shown how “absolute and arbitrary power can be curbed.”

Perhaps this is the key. Those living under a liberal, democratic system can never fully appreciate it precisely because, in order to possess it, they must use their power to be wary and critical of their institutions. Others, in less fortunate lands, have learned, as Sartori puts it, “that unchecked power is insufferable and disastrous; that justices and courts must be truly independent; that constitutions are not merely whatever structure a state happens to have, but a specific garantiste structure that actually restrains and constrains the power wielders.

Nuclear Weapons and World Politics: Alternatives for the Future by David C. Gompert, Michael Mandelbaum, Richard L. Garwin, and John H. Barton

(McGraw-Hill; 370 pp.; $6.95)

James T. Johnson

This timely book, produced as part of the 1980’s Project of the Council on Foreign Relations, presents four “Nuclear Regimes” for the future (one from each of the four authors), along with two additional essays by David C. Gompert. One Gompert essay provides an overview of the four Regimes and sets the parameters for the book’s discussions; the other is a piquantly brief critical analysis aimed at clarifying the decision about which Regime to prefer. Gompert’s role within the book is thus considerably greater than that of his fellow authors. They define particular regimes, but Gompert gets to state his preferences (for Regimes One and Two). This is no mean advantage, and it gives the book a definite cast; for though the four Regimes might have been left to stand alone as “alternatives for the future” among which policymakers will have to decide, Gompert’s final essay argues that only the first two Regimes can be considered seriously as desirable alternative futures for the 1980’s. Saying so, he made it so.

The First Regime (Michael Mandelbaum), “International Stability and Nuclear Order,” is essentially the current state of affairs projected into the 1980’s, with accompanying analysis aimed at showing how to keep the nuclear umbrella from developing rips. Mandelbaum stresses the benefits of the mutual assured destruction (MAD) capability of the two superpowers, foremost of which are the prevention of nuclear war, the dampening of political conflict, and the prevention of any war within the “industrial circumference” (Europe, North America, and Japan). The current stability is eminently worth retaining and further perfecting. Mandelbaum argues. While no effort should be made to develop and deploy an effective ABM system by either side, the arms race can be tolerated in the 1980’s (though it is very expensive) if its purpose is only to keep honed the superpowers’ MAD capabilities. This Regime has a certain advantage over the others: It is the familiar one; the rest involve changes that could, in the nuclear context, be disastrous.

The Second Regime (Richard L. Garwin), entitled “Reducing Dependence of Nuclear Weapons,” is in many respects similar to the First. But, whereas Mandelbaum plays down the burdens imposed by the current state of strategic nuclear policy, Garwin recognizes and seeks to avoid them by restructuring that policy for the 1980’s. He would restrict nuclear weapons to one purpose only: deterrence against the use of other nuclear weapons. Thus MAD would remain, as in the First Regime, the keystone of this alternative future; yet it would differ importantly from MAD as conceived by Mandelbaum. To take two points only: First, the forces to be used for deterrence would be much smaller than at present, and further increases (to maintain the high force levels Mandelbaum regards as essential to stability) should be avoided. The decision against increases should, if necessary, be made unilaterally by the United States. Second, even a greater measure of inequality between the nuclear forces of the superpowers can be tolerated, Garwin argues, at no cost in stability. And again, the U.S. might well move unilaterally, for example by putting into a “strategic reserve” up to three hundred ICBMs and up to 50 per cent of nuclear armed submarines. At the same time, Garwin would have conventional military capacity increased so as to make it unnecessary (as in current NATO strategy) to use nuclear weapons for defense against non-nuclear attacks. Finally, Garwin foresees restricting nuclear proliferation by a worldwide international policy of non-use of nuclear weapons against countries not possessing them. Given such a policy, he argues, a nation would become less, not more, secure if it developed its own nuclear force.

These, then, are the two Regimes that Gompert would have readers of this book contemplate most seriously. The familiarity of the First Regime, together with its past success in securing stability, argues strongly for it; the Second Regime too is familiar, and the kinds of changes necessary to bring it fully into being might not, given the right circumstances, be unstabilizing. Garwin’s familiarity with weapons and weapons systems, both nuclear and conventional, and his use of “hard” analysis based on this knowledge, gives his argument a certain edge over Mandelbaum’s. But Mandelbaum’s rises above Garwin’s in its attention to political