

est difficulties is in defining the idea of liberalism itself. Giovanni Sartori of Stanford makes a gallant, if somewhat strained, attempt. Liberalism as a political doctrine, he suggests, should not be confused with the economic doctrines of free trade, free markets, laissez-faire, or survival of the fittest. Liberalism advocates a constitutional state, but not necessarily an inactive state. While liberalism should not be completely identified with capitalism, writes Sartori, it cannot exist in Marxist countries because any concentration of political and economic power, without the existence of independent, countervailing forces, tends to crush the individual and individual liberty. Liberalism requires a "diffusion of

power," and this may reveal its greatest value—it has shown how "absolute and arbitrary power can be curbed."

Perhaps this is the key. Those living under a liberal, democratic system can never fully appreciate it precisely because, in order to possess it, they must use their power to be wary and critical of their institutions. Others, in less fortunate lands, have learned, as Sartori puts it, "that unchecked power is insufferable and disastrous; that justices and courts must be truly independent; that constitutions are not merely whatever structure a state happens to have, but a specific *garantiste* structure that actually restrains and constrains the power wielders.

Garwin), entitled "Reducing Dependence of Nuclear Weapons," is in many respects similar to the First. But, whereas Mandelbaum plays down the burdens imposed by the current state of strategic nuclear policy, Garwin recognizes and seeks to avoid them by restructuring that policy for the 1980's. He would restrict nuclear weapons to one purpose only: deterrence against the use of other nuclear weapons. Thus MAD would remain, as in the First Regime, the keystone of this alternative future; yet it would differ importantly from MAD as conceived by Mandelbaum. To take two points only: *First*, the forces to be used for deterrence would be much smaller than at present, and further increases (to maintain the high force levels Mandelbaum regards as essential to stability) should be avoided. The decision against increases should, if necessary, be made unilaterally by the United States. *Second*, even a greater measure of inequality between the nuclear forces of the superpowers can be tolerated, Garwin argues, at no cost in stability. And again, the U.S. might well move unilaterally, for example by putting into a "strategic reserve" up to three hundred ICBMs and up to 50 per cent of nuclear armed submarines. At the same time, Garwin would have conventional military capacity increased so as to make it unnecessary (as in current NATO strategy) to use nuclear weapons for defense against non-nuclear attacks. Finally, Garwin foresees restricting nuclear proliferation by a worldwide international policy of non-use of nuclear weapons against countries not possessing them. Given such a policy, he argues, a nation would become *less*, not more, secure if it developed its own nuclear force.

These, then, are the two Regimes that Gompert would have readers of this book contemplate most seriously. The familiarity of the First Regime, together with its past success in securing stability, argues strongly for it; the Second Regime too is familiar, and the kinds of changes necessary to bring it fully into being might not, given the right circumstances, be destabilizing. Garwin's familiarity with weapons and weapons systems, both nuclear and conventional, and his use of "hard" analysis based on this knowledge, gives his argument a certain edge over Mandelbaum's. But Mandelbaum's rises above Garwin's in its attention to political

## Nuclear Weapons and World Politics: Alternatives for the Future by David C. Gompert, Michael Mandelbaum, Richard L. Garwin, and John H. Barton

(McGraw-Hill; 370 pp.; \$6.95)

James T. Johnson

This timely book, produced as part of the 1980's Project of the Council on Foreign Relations, presents four "Nuclear Regimes" for the future (one from each of the four authors), along with two additional essays by David C. Gompert. One Gompert essay provides an overview of the four Regimes and sets the parameters for the book's discussions; the other is a piquantly brief critical analysis aimed at clarifying the decision about which Regime to prefer. Gompert's role within the book is thus considerably greater than that of his fellow authors. They define particular regimes, but Gompert gets to state his preferences (for Regimes One and Two). This is no mean advantage, and it gives the book a definite cast; for though the four Regimes might have been left to stand alone as "alternatives for the future" among which policymakers will have to decide, Gompert's final essay argues that only the first two Regimes can be considered seriously as desirable alternative futures for the 1980's. Saying so, he made it so.

The First Regime (Michael Mandel-

baum), "International Stability and Nuclear Order," is essentially the current state of affairs projected into the 1980's, with accompanying analysis aimed at showing how to keep the nuclear umbrella from developing rips. Mandelbaum stresses the benefits of the mutual assured destruction (MAD) capability of the two superpowers, foremost of which are the prevention of nuclear war, the dampening of political conflict, and the prevention of any war within the "industrial circumference" (Europe, North America, and Japan). The current stability is eminently worth retaining and further perfecting, Mandelbaum argues. While no effort should be made to develop and deploy an effective ABM system by either side, the arms race can be tolerated in the 1980's (though it is very expensive) if its purpose is only to keep honed the superpowers' MAD capabilities. This Regime has a certain advantage over the others: It is the familiar one; the rest involve changes that could, in the nuclear context, be disastrous.

The Second Regime (Richard L.

factors that will bear on the choice of a Regime for the future. Gompert's concluding essay is chiefly devoted to examining what is desirable and what is undesirable in each of these Regimes.

But the other two Regimes cannot be ignored. The Fourth Regime (Gompert) could be no one's favorite: It is the present state of affairs gone bad. By contrast to Mandelbaum, who presents the continuation of the status quo almost as inevitable and downplays all threats to it, Gompert's Fourth Regime "anticipates a number of plausible developments in technology and politics over the next 10 to 15 years that could undermine strategic stability, shake world politics, and perhaps increase the chances of nuclear conflict."

Among such developments are "extensive nuclear proliferation, technological disequilibria, and nuclear imbalance" between the U.S. and the USSR. This Fourth Regime thus presents a negative alternative future—one that is to be avoided if possible and lived with as well as possible in case it comes about. Given such a possible future, Gompert takes it as his task to erect a floor below which the world can be kept from falling. Such worst-case analysis is very much in order and equally worthwhile in the nuclear context; yet it is a strange bedfellow with the other three Regimes in this book.

The Third Regime (John H. Barton) is entitled "The Proscription of Nuclear Weapons" and presents a denuclearized alternative future. Indeed, Barton's method is to provide two such futures: an "incremental" model, which would keep intact the nation-state system and make only changes needed to help nations eliminate nuclear weapons; and an "internationalized" model, which would substitute an international order for the present one "and transform politics in a way that leaves nuclear weapons essentially irrelevant to the conflicts that might arise." Like the Fourth Regime, the Third stresses what can go wrong with the current state of affairs, but it goes further: The potential for havoc is so great that it outweighs any dangers that might be introduced by changes toward a world without nuclears.

Thinking about alternative futures effectively requires thinking about possible futures as blades on a folding fan, all radiating from a common source, and that source is the present. The kind of theorist usually called a "futurist" at-

tempts to forecast which blade (that is, which alternative future) most clearly represents what will actually come to pass. The theorists in the present book are not futurists in this sense; they are concerned rather to conceptualize and describe several of the most important alternatives that policy might aim to achieve in reality. This is the way a great deal of decisionmaking is being pursued just now in our society, and it is as characteristic of American government, business, and even academia as "muddling through" was of Britain a generation ago. But there are numerous problems with approaching policy decisions in such a fashion.

In the first place, what the alternative futures look like depends on how the present is conceived; and the present can never be conceived with total objectivity. One outstanding difference, for example, between the First and Third or Fourth Regimes is the extent to which the current status quo is seen as being susceptible to breakdown. Agreement on other significant factors may make for similar policies in the end; for example, the First and Fourth Regimes give first priority to maintaining and strengthening the status quo. But lacking such agreement to offset widely diverse perceptions of the present, conflicting policy alternatives are inevitable. With no objective way of describing the present state of affairs, there is no logical way to choose between alternatives that are equally well defined and equally well based in quite different perceptions of the present.

Then too, if defining an alternative future is not to degenerate into utopian fantasizing, there has to be careful step-by-step analysis of how to get to the desired state from where we are now. The essays in this book all fall short in this respect; though each author sketches the steps that would be necessary to lead to his Regime, details are not provided. These are position papers, talking papers for further discussion, not carefully delineated policy options. Because of this general lack of detail, I question the appropriateness of Gompert's concluding essay, "On the Choice of a Nuclear Future." Like him, I tend to believe that the most workable options are set forth in the First and Second Regimes (my own preference being best represented by the Second). Yet there is simply not enough hard argument in this book to give me suffi-

cient reason to choose these over the Third, or to accept the optimistic First Regime as more likely than the pessimistic Fourth. Gompert's choices, like mine, are in part dictated by what he brings to the subject from elsewhere; they do not directly follow from weighing the Regimes as here presented.

Finally, since the number of alternative futures at any moment is infinite, any decision to focus on a few must be, in the final analysis, a leap of judgment. If the choice is made randomly, then there is no good reason why other alternatives could not have been used; if the choice follows from particular values, then these values should be acknowledged, so as to avoid the impression of a false objectivity. It is unclear why, in this collection of Regimes, the Third Regime is what it is. More than the other Regimes, it functions as a representative for a broad spectrum of positions. The two models used to explicate it are but one way of slicing up the options and are, in any case, too general to be of much use for reflection on policy. One suspects the Third Regime was not to be taken as seriously as the others.

Alternative futures-thinking needs to become far more sophisticated in understanding the impact of values on deci-

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sions. The futurist who ignores the likely impact of values and value changes will produce a distorted model of the future that may well be worse than no model. The policy analyst who projects alternative futures and then decides among them would do better to present the values involved with each alternative

as sympathetically as possible. Otherwise he will, under the guise of "value-free inquiry," simply project his own hidden values into the analysis. When authors fail to make their value decisions explicit, the reader has the extra task to read—and read critically—what is behind the lines.

was illegitimate."

Zeldin claims that adultery attained a level of near inevitability in a society in which the majority of men "made love to their wives only when they wanted a child." Encouraged by the Church's campaign against masturbation (some church schools were said to periodically bleed pupils who revealed excessive sexuality), many of France's boys made precocious and frequent pilgrimages to the abounding brothels of Paris. ("The numbers of these official brothels in Paris was 180 in 1810, 200 in 1840, but they gradually fell to 145 in 1870, 125 in 1881 and 59 in 1892. The reason was the growth of clandestine brothels, which the police estimated contained some 15,000 prostitutes in 1888.)

In the second volume we get a closer view of the various French nations which, for the most part, treasured their private lives above public life. Public life was a topic more fit for idle discussion than serious concern. Here we meet people eating and drinking, thinking about themselves and others, trying to look beautiful, have a good time and not fall prey to envy; people lying, feeling guilty, getting old, not wanting to die, dying anyhow. Suggestive of the contents of the volume are chapter titles such as "Education and Hope," "Privilege and Culture," "Good and Bad Taste," "Conformity and Superstition," "Happiness and Humor," "Worry, Boredom and Hysteria," "Gerontocracy," and "Hypocrisy."

## France, 1848-1945 by Theodore Zeldin

**Vol. I: Ambition, Love and Politics**  
(Oxford University Press; 823 pp.; \$19.50)  
**Vol. II: Intellect, Taste and Anxiety**  
(Oxford University Press; 1,202 pp.; \$29.95)

### Joseph Amato

The publication of the second volume now makes it safe to say that this work, by the measures of breadth, imagination, and brilliance, is a classic. At least for the next several decades no one will do the history of modern France without reference to this work. And most serious historians in the English world will judge all new national histories by the measure of Zeldin's two volumes.

Outside the pale of the official France that politicians and intellectuals have taught us to know there are many French nations. Zeldin, mentor and practitioner of the new serial history, dedicates his work to introducing us to some of these nations he considers the most important and significant.

In Volume I we meet them at length and in intimacy in eminently readable chapters composed of fascinating mosaics of anecdote, data, and comparison. Among those we meet are the rich, the workers, the peasants (an especially good chapter), the industrialists, the bankers, the bureaucrats, and the notaries. We understand them in their powers and weaknesses, their functions and ambitions, and even in their secret lives.

Zeldin does not mind undoing a myth or two along the way. Of France's "twenty million unchanging French peasants, who for a hundred years have provided France with stability and the power of a democratic republic," he suggests that on all counts—by nature of wealth, land, voting, religious prac-

tice, customs, and so on—they form many different groups which, owing to turmoil, rivalry, and sheer confusion, are being pushed and are scrambling their way into the modern world. Regarding Napoleon III's successful social policy, Zeldin prefers explanations of successful manipulation of differing interests to theories about the totalitarian nature of mass society. Napoleon's policy succeeded because it meant "careers open to talent, fusion of classes, the ending of privileges except those based on merit, prosperity for all but not at the expense of rich, employment and social benefits for the working class, cheap credit and less taxation for the mortgaged peasantry, property ultimately for all men, great public works and improved communications which would be self financing because they would increase the national wealth, peace, but also glory."

Zeldin also probes the private quarters of French life. He tells us just how unstable French marriages were: "A large proportion of France's children did not have a full family life. Around 1900 for every fifteen families which had both father and mother alive, there were six families incomplete (four of them having a father dead and two a mother dead). Only 54 percent of marriages lasted longer than 15 years...45 percent of the children were orphans in their teens....Of the children born in the year 1875, 93,000 were abandoned by their parents. One out of every fourteen

*"Outside the pale of official France...there are many French nations."*

The theme that joins these inquiries is how much French people and their ways eluded the best efforts of schools, bureaucrats, and official ideologies to make them into one nation. If Zeldin is correct, De Tocqueville's worry about one mass society was, at least in the case of France, unnecessary.

As France's great literature is only a tiny portion of what is written, and what is written is only a smaller portion of what is said and done, so the official France of high culture is only the surface of many nations. In 1951 only