tions with parliament and the Liberal party. He himself assumed a lower political profile and shifted from long-term planning to decisive responses to more immediate problems. In the 1974 election he won a clear majority.

Radwanski argues that Trudeau has since squandered the power he had thus gained. His larder of useful, concrete plans was by 1974 nearly barren; he had no coherent program. His new administration got off to a very slow start. He felt compelled to go back on his campaign promises by applying mandatory controls to reduce inflation. The quality of his cabinet deteriorated as he lost key ministers, both francophone and anglophone. Above all, the victory of René Lévesque’s nationalist Parti Québécois raised to top priority the issue of Quebec’s future, and indeed the future of Canada itself. Thus the issue that had initially drawn Trudeau into national politics has become his number one problem.

Radwanski describes Trudeau’s abhorrence of all emotional nationalisms, deriving from his experiences in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy as an adolescent in 1933. He gives due credit to Trudeau’s efforts to bring able Quebec francophones into all levels of federal government, to modify Canadian foreign policy toward more emphasis on relations with French-speaking countries, and to develop French-speaking governmental services across the country comparable to those for anglophones in Quebec. However, Radwanski underestimates the degree to which Trudeau is himself part of the problem, and he overestimates the likelihood of Trudeau’s policies.

Trudeau’s expensive bilingual program has perhaps dampened somewhat the rate of francophone assimilation into anglophone society, especially in the Acadian region of New Brunswick along the Quebec border and in parts of Ontario near Quebec. But the accelerating assimilation of children of francophone and mixed parentage outside Quebec, particularly to the west of Ontario, supports the argument of the Parti Québécois that these minorities will very likely disappear in another generation. Moreover, the bilingual program has alienated many anglophones, a major cause of the weakness of the Liberals outside Quebec, and it has encouraged long-developing demands for greater provincial autonomy from the Prairies westward. Quebec nationalism, on the other hand, is here to stay—it reflects the inescapable linguistic, cultural, and social differences between Quebec and the rest of Canada.

Trudeau’s unwillingness seriously to consider constitutional alternatives other than the current and increasingly centralized federal system has polarized the crisis. The constitutional crisis is by no means limited to Quebec: The West particularly is increasingly determined to extract changes toward provincial autonomy that Trudeau refuses seriously to consider. Trudeau’s personal relations with provincial leaders have also exacerbated the issue. His dealings with the intelligent but emotional René Lévesque have long been strained and stormy. There are no Liberal provincial governments outside the Maritimes, and even there the Tories have experienced recent success. Although Trudeau’s rapport with Liberal leaders outside Ottawa has left a great deal to be desired, his relations with other parties have been either distant or confrontational. Canadian voters may now decide that a different prime minister would be more likely to evolve constitutional changes that would preserve the country while maintaining enough federal power to deal with common problems. They may well be right.

While national unity is in the forefront, Canada faces other, more long-term problems. Radwanski’s analysis is especially disappointing in its failure to note major difficulties in Canada’s international economic relationships. It is unlikely that European countries will greatly liberalize the barriers that seriously inhibit Canadian trade. The possibility of working out mutually advantageous relations leading toward free trade with the United States, acknowledging legitimate Canadian concern about limiting U.S. control of their economy and influence on their culture, is much greater. However, to achieve such arrangements a prime minister must convince Canadians that it is in their long-term interest to reduce their own trade barriers, particularly on manufactured products that could be much less expensively produced in a larger North American economy, and thereby concentrate manufacturing on fewer products.

These and other problems perhaps require a stronger prime minister with wider anglophone appeal and more interest in Canada’s international economic relations. And that of course assumes that Quebec remains within a revised constitutional system. Mr. Trudeau seems unwilling to accept the changes that would make this possible.

Labor and Communism: The Conflict That Shaped American Unions
by Bert Cochran
(Princeton University Press; 394 pp.; $25.00)

Michael Kerper

American communism, like Sisyphus, has endured the ultimate punishment: the crushing frustration of endless, futile work. For the Communists each step forward, each momentary victory in the labor movement, soon proved insignificant and transitory. Just as they seemed poised for certain success, the great rock of trade union resistance rolled back on them, pushing them further and further away from their revolutionary goals.

While it is easy to sympathize with poor Sisyphus, the Communists in Bert Cochran’s Labor and Communism are of a different breed. Whereas Sisyphus suffered for boldly defying the Greek deities, the Communists were doomed for obediently serving their gods, gods that exacted a terrible price from the faithful. Moreover, the ideological gods of the Communists were alien to Americans, even to the supposedly friendly working class.

As an alien movement in a politically peculiar—and sometimes baffling—nation, the Communists faced several agonizing dilemmas from the very outset.
Would they work with the long-established, nonrevolutionary trade unions, particularly the seemingly staid affiliates of the American Federation of Labor? Would Communists devote their skills and energy to trade union work or independent political activity? And finally, would they function primarily as a movement for radical change in America, or as the chief defenders of "proletarian internationalism" and the Soviet government in Russia?

According to Cochran, the Communists never quite resolved the first two dilemmas. Given the political mood of the Communist International, more commonly known as the Comintern, American Communists willingly switched from independent trade unions to AFL unions and then back again. Similarly, Communists worked independently, loudly condemning socialists and liberals, until suddenly they joined and helped organize "popular fronts."

Although tactics changed over time, the Communist movement had little difficulty resolving the third dilemma. They quickly and almost effortlessly opted for a close identification with the infant Soviet government. With the final triumph of Stalin over his competitors, the American Communist identification with the Soviet Union became even stronger. Thus, in a very real sense, the Communists' unique relationship with the Soviet Union set them apart as a special case in the frequently murky and confused politics of the American Left.

Because of the intimate Communist-Soviet link, trade union policy emanated from the central offices of the Comintern rather than from within the ranks of national Comintern affiliates. Subsequently, the erratic trade union policies of the American Communists closely reflected the twists and turns of Soviet ideology, foreign policy, and internal power struggles. To use Cochran's words: "Communist leaders knowingly accepted every instruction from Russia as Holy Writ, but they thought that the orders of Stalin and the historic interests of the American working class were in mystic harmony."

This is not to say that all Communists were simply unthinking dupes with little or no interest in advancing the cause of American workers. A substantial number of early Communists, particularly those who emerged from the syndicalist Industrial Workers of the World and the left wing of the Socialist party, doubtless had a genuine commitment to the liberation of American workers. Many abandoned the party as it became ossified. Other working-class militants, however, remained loyal Communists. As Cochran points out, these loyalists who became "entangled in the Byzantine intrigues of the Comintern and Cominform, housebroken by Stalinist drill masters, were not the same starry-eyed militants who had earlier embraced the faith. The revolutionary zealot had become the bureaucratic bureaucrat."

Communists easily adapted themselves to the bureaucratic life-style. After a checkered experience with the independent Trade Union Unity League, they soon scored important victories with the rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the movement shaped by John L. Lewis, the "pure and simple" leader of the United Mine-workers. Toward the end of World War II the Communists controlled several CIO affiliates, accounting for 25 per cent of the CIO's total membership. They had powerful, if not decisive, influence in other CIO affiliates comprising another 25 per cent of the membership. And this was supplemented by Communists who held high-ranking staff positions in the national CIO and the CIO's Political Action Committee.

While the Communists controlled a sizable section of the CIO, as well as a few strongholds in AFL unions, their strength was concentrated at the top. Despite popular stereotypes of Communist trade unionists as hard-working, selfless militants, the picture presented by Cochran is quite different. Rather than rank-and-file activists with calloused hands and course accents, many key Communist labor leaders were essentially bureaucrats scarcely distinguishable from the hated "business" unionists of the AFL.

During World War II, for instance, the Communists became the leading proponents of incentive pay schemes, piece work, and no-strike pledges. Additionally, they had few qualms about using the good offices of the War Labor Board. While the Communists, who were once outspoken critics of "labor peace," copied the trade union practices of the AFL, they did not copy the politics of either the AFL or the dominant leadership of the CIO. Because of their political loyalties and viewpoints, the gap between the Communists and trade unionists was unbridgeable. For the Communists, politics inevitably interfered with the "pure and simple" objectives of the rank-and-file.

While Cochran adequately documents the contradictions between bread-and-butter unionism and the political requirements of the Communists, he—and many other historians before him—comes to a rather puzzling conclusion about the demise of Communist influence in the CIO. As Cochran sees it, the CIO leaders expelled their Communist brothers because the postwar labor statesmen cynically craved political orthodoxy and legitimacy. For Cochran, then, the Communists that he himself so strongly criticizes seem to be the pitiful victims of the "cold war" mentality that emphasized conformity and deep suspicion of anything associated with "socialism" or the Soviet Union. Curiously, Cochran gives little consideration to the fact that most Communists, especially those that he describes in his book, were willing to
sacrifice basic trade union objectives at the drop of Stalin's cap.

In large measure Cochran's ambivalence about rejecting the Communists as undeniable and generally opportunistic allies of the labor movement is rooted in a wavering, confused, and frequently contradictory attitude toward Communists. He is not alone in this. Some of the most politically astute leaders of the CIO, men like John L. Lewis, Philip Murray, and Sidney Hillman, also had generally mixed feelings and nagging uncertainties about their Communist colleagues. For some trade unionists a break with Communists seemed to be an act of disloyalty to old friends. For others the Communists were valuable technicians, seemingly indispensable in the operation of particular unions. Nothing has been more debilitating to the American Left than this inability to decide, finally, whether Communists should be regarded as overzealous working-class militants or, to use the colorful words of James Carey of the old United Electrical Workers, "political acrobats in pink tights."

Because of this apparent confusion about Communists, Cochran asserts that the CIO abandoned its idealism and militancy by expelling Communist-led unions in 1949. The expulsion, according to Cochran, "signalled that the CIO's crusading days were over, and that its constituent unions were hardening into quasi-conservative enterprises." But such an assertion ignores several important realities about the CIO: the important differences between the prewar and postwar economy, the natural tendency toward stabilization and normalcy in mass organizations such as unions, and the changed political environment after the death of Roosevelt. Perhaps most important, Cochran stubbornly avoids the fact that by 1949 the Communist movement had forfeited any claim to radicalism.

With the CIO expulsions the Communist movement was once again reduced to the status of an outsider looking in at the trade unions. Years later Len De Caux, the ousted Communist editor of the CIO News, began his autobiography with a statement that sums up the Communist position after 1949.

"I hated being an outsider," De Caux wrote. "I envied the comradeship of those who, sharing a common lot, were joined in common struggle."

The Structure and Form of the French Enlightenment

by Ira O. Wade

(Princeton University Press; 2 Vols.; 1146 pp.; $60.00 [set])

Charles W. Kegley

It is a pleasure to study great and creative periods in the often dismal history of mankind. The Periclean Age in Greece, the Renaissance-Reformation, and the Enlightenment are paradigm cases. The present study is marked by the erudition and sympathetic yet critical writing of a top-flight scholar at the peak of his long career, Princeton's Professor Emeritus Ira Wade, in his massive—here it is the proper word—two-volume, 1,146-page analysis of what he chooses to call The Structure and Form of the French Enlightenment.

The title is important because, as the French are wont to say, the adjective often rules the noun. One wonders if the author would not have been well advised to call his analysis "the Spirit of the French Enlightenment," and this for two reasons. One is that the terms "structure" and "form" connote, in ordinary language as well as by dictionary definition, the static and fixed rather than the dynamic and living. (Wade does not make clear, by the way, what significant difference he sees, if any, between "structure" and "form.") The second reason why an accurate description of this endeavor is so important is that Wade correctly and repeatedly emphasizes the need to identify the spirit of the French Enlightenment. In this effort—in his case a successful one—he is in agreement with and has the support of other major interpreters of the Enlightenment—Tillich, Cassirer, Crocker, Gay, Berlin, et al., in stressing that a distinctive attitude, a blick, a style, characterizes (the leaders of) the Enlightenment. One of the author's valuable contributions is his discerning analysis of the lives and the development of the outstanding minds of the French Enlightenment. With enormous care for detail he labors with the question "How did the beliefs and life styles of these men originate, change, and develop in response to their total environment?" For example, Wade unerringly probes the effort of Rousseau, not only "to understand his time, but to understand himself in his time." In this as in other respects these volumes have much to tell us about the mentality of the present as well as of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Not only students of history and of the history of ideas, but general readers as well, will look for a short descriptive definition of the Enlightenment. One recalls John Addington Symonds's superlative statement, at the end of his four volumes, that the Renaissance can be characterized as the discovery of the world and the rediscovery of man. Crocker, in The Age of the Enlightenment, reproduces one of the standard descriptions of the Enlightenment as the development of "the unlimited confidence in man and his future." What of Ira Wade? Perhaps wisely, he declines to attempt such a definition, but he is brilliant in making clear the two simultaneous drives of the leaders of the Enlightenment. One was what Tillich, following Kant, stressed: "man's release from his self-imposed tutelage." The other, from Tillich's A History of Christian Thought, was the affirmation, "Have confidence in your own reason!" As Wade makes clear, these were joint efforts—violent rejection and vigorous affirmation. The autonomy of man is argued in the passionate rejection of the dominance, even the tyranny, of the Roman Catholic Church and its theological and political control of thought and life. One of the glories of the Enlightenment was what Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, and others not only rejected but also affirmed in trying to demonstrate what man using his reason can accomplish. Thus the French Enlightenment represented a combination of pure intellectual inquiry with passionate practical zeal. Its leaders went all out to show what man, once he appropriates the empirical (they did not yet call it "scientific") method, could do to create a better social and political