

garded as tools of Soviet policy" and that "Communist domination of China...would jeopardize the military security of the United States." Also in 1947, in the face of increasing clamor from his political opposition, President Truman inaugurated a Federal Employee Loyalty Program. It was quite logical for the domestic opposition to assume that such a program was needed to combat disloyalty in government.

In January, 1947, Vincent was nominated to be minister to Switzerland. Normally, his approval by the Senate would have followed pro forma, but those were not normal times. Alfred Kohlberg, a moving spirit in the China lobby, inveigled Senator Styles Bridges of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to move to block approval of the Vincent nomination. Senator Bridges informed committee Chairman Arthur Vandenberg that Vincent had "notoriously and harmfully distorted the American position" in the Far East. Although Vincent's appointment as minister to Switzerland was actually confirmed in July, this turned out to be only a brief interlude in what was to become a long ordeal.

The story takes on the bizarre character of a purge fantasy that Americans would have thought possible only in a society governed by ideological orthodoxy. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy entered upon the scene and made Vincent his celebrated "Case No. 2." In November, 1951, the State Department's Loyalty Security Board formally charged Vincent with having been "pro-Communist" in his views and sympathies in the period 1940-47, with having been a member of the Communist party, and with having or having had "contact or association with individuals concerning whom the Board had certain derogatory information"—individuals duly named.

The sequel is a horror of inquisitorial procedure. Vincent had hearings before the Loyalty Security Board, the House Un-American Activities Committee, and the Senate Internal Security Committee. Cleared by the State Department's Board in February, 1952, Vincent was summoned to face the Loyalty Review Board, headed by ex-Senator Hiram Bingham, for a new grilling. In March he was informed that the Loyalty Review Board had found "reasonable doubt" regarding his loyalty to the United States and had recommended his dismissal.

The board had found, for one thing, that Vincent had been critical of the Chiang Kai-shek regime "throughout a period when it was the declared and established policy of the government of the U.S. to support Chiang Kai-shek's Government." May quotes a relevant comment of the *Washington Post*: "The Bingham Board has hoisted a warning to every member of the Foreign Service. He is given to understand that any enterprise on his part to find out, assay, and assess is taboo. He is informed, in short, that honest reporting is *verboten*." Secretary of State Dean Acheson conferred about the matter with his designated successor, John Foster Dulles, and commented: "If disagreements on policy were to be equated with disloyalty, the Foreign Service would be destroyed."

President Truman appointed an independent panel of five distinguished citizens to examine the record and determine whether Vincent should be reinstated or dismissed. But Dulles, on taking up the post of secretary of state under President Eisenhower, arbitrarily ruled that he would personally decide the case without the panel's advice. He ordered Vincent home again. In a meeting with Vincent, Dulles informed him

that he had shown poor judgment and would either retire from the Foreign Service at once or be fired and lose his pension. Vincent retired. His ordeal had lasted for six long years. Gary May gives a summary assessment: "Ironically, Vincent's strengths as a diplomat made him vulnerable to attack from the partisans, the zealots, the extremists who suffered from an excess of emotion—from a passionate attachment to Chiang [Kai-shek], and inveterate antipathy toward Russia. There was no place for John Carter Vincent among the ideologues who made the United States a slave of rabid anticommunism in the 1950s."

The prediction by Secretary of State Acheson and the *Washington Post* was borne out by events: The government's area specialists were effectively silenced, and the cold war was waged by military and civilian ideologues without major bureaucratic opposition. There followed thirty years of American alienation from the Chinese nation, and the Korean and Vietnam wars with their towering costs to the United States. The Gary May account is an important contribution to understanding how equating disagreement with disloyalty distorted our postwar foreign policy. [v v v]

Money Rush by Andrew Duncan

(Doubleday; 373 pp.; \$10.95)

Arabia: A Journey Through the Labyrinth by Jonathan Raban

(Simon & Schuster; 344 pp.; \$11.95)

Raymond Nadeau

These two timely books provide the most accessible, informative, and entertaining picture of modern Arabia and the oil-producing countries to have appeared to date. As sources for our continuing assessment of the predictably dramatic political and cultural developments in the Middle East, they are invaluable.

Of the two, Andrew Duncan's *Money Rush* is the more thoroughly researched. It is a superior work of popu-

lar journalism charged with a vigorous penchant for speculation and underscored by a mordantly British sense of irony. Traveling for over a year in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the OPEC states, Mr. Duncan interviewed many heads of state and spoke to numerous practitioners of "money rush diplomacy," including bankers, businessmen, confidence tricksters, university presidents, salesmen, and planners who "scramble over each other to flatter, bribe, and cajole

the half-dozen men who, it seems, control the world's monetary system." As he states at the beginning, "no hope is too high, no swindle too elaborate, no suggestion too outrageous, and no fantasy too grotesque to remain unfulfilled. It provides today's pile of money. Is it beginning to produce tomorrow's ghost towns?" This intuition of impending crisis sets the tone of *Money Rush* and posits some startling assumptions that cannot be ignored.

Mr. Duncan starts with a recitation of familiar statistics. By 1977, 500,000 Americans owed their jobs directly to Saudi Arabia; indirectly, three times that number. Kuwait, one of the smallest countries in the world, had by 1977 a defense budget of \$310 million and had spent enough money in London to guarantee 25,000 British jobs for two years. The Saudis have over \$60 billion invested in the United States, while the OPEC countries are able to put away about \$115,000 per second in oil revenues.

Such statistics have become so commonplace as to produce yawns among Americans. Stories of Arabs conspicuously consuming in the most extravagant fashion amuse Americans, much like comic book characters. But there is a cunning and defensive shrewdness at work among the Arab oil producers. A recent report in the *New York Times* quotes the Morgan Guarantee Trust Company's estimate that by 1980 the OPEC money surplus could run to \$70 billion, and rumors are spreading that a worldwide depression could ensue if the overloaded recycling process of oil money should break down. As Duncan says, when an area of only 30,000 square miles inhabited by only 600,000 people can exert such global influence, the first casualty is logic.

The situation is indeed a curious reversal of fate. Once in control of an empire larger than Rome's, spreading its influence over Europe for more than five hundred years, the Arabs have in recent centuries been defeated, partitioned, despised, humiliated, and romanticized. Now, by what Duncan calls a "quirk of geological fate," the developed and developing nations of the world are at the mercy of the oil-producing states and we are witnessing the most ignominious hustle for cash the world has ever seen.

Excess often breeds paradox, and paradox, Duncan asserts, is the only real

consistency in the Arab world. Once ignored, Arab embassies have now taken on the look of relief camps. Teheran (a Persian, not Arabian city) under the shah saw unparalleled growth, yet there is no sewer system; with a population of five million there is no phone directory. In Saudi Arabia development proceeds at a furious and unchecked pace, yet there are more foreign workers in the country than there are Saudi nationals. Weapons are bought from high-pressure arms peddlers who readily admit that deployment is impossible because there is no expertise to use them. Jeddah, the world's fastest-growing city, only a few years ago had no water system and no proper roads. Now there are Dior boutiques and Henry Moore sculptures. Oman, not long ago the most backward country in the world, now has a guided missile system but no one to operate it and no one to use it against.

In effect, Arabia and the oil-producing countries have a lopsided satellite relationship with the United States. While America looks east for oil, the Arabs go west for a wide range of goods, including education, which certainly imparts Western ideological influence and creates yet another paradox between a rekindled Islam and Western materialism. Though many an Arab interviewed by Mr. Duncan decries the values of the West, those values are making inroads that, if unchecked, could seriously damage an already strained religious revivalism.

Arab rulers look at Islam, indeed promote it, with the wisdom that their sudden leap into the twentieth century has jeopardized their link to the past. At a time when everything prior to the 1960's is considered ancient history, leaders must be ever mindful of their foothold in history. History moves fast and ruthlessly. Arab leaders are well aware that once the oil runs out (and everyone knows it will) Western interests will pull out fast. The Arabs will be left with mountains of goods rotting in the desert, and some cities will become

empty architectural skeletons. As one Western businessman put it, Arabia is for all intents and purposes the final frontier.

To survive the inevitable plunder, the Arabs have begun to pull the lattice-work of Islam around themselves. Jonathan Raban in his *Arabia: A Journey Through the Labyrinth* has much to say on that subject. His perspective is observational, not scholarly, but his perceptions are of a very high order. On a visit to a Bedu village outside Abu Dhabi, Mr. Raban was struck by the veiled women who "fluttered behind dark screens" while the men talked of agricultural progress and praised Allah and Sheikh Zayed. As he was leaving, Raban looked back at the village, the empty streets, the squat houses, and saw the secrets of Islam: "The family I had met had gone through an extraordinary revolution. They had been suddenly exposed to the full blast of 20th-century manners and things. Other people in other places had simply been smashed by the impact: half of Africa had been devastated by the gale damage. Here, though, it was different. The Bedu family had met the century head on, but they had been able to deal with it in the family, protected by thick walls of cinder block and cement. It seemed much the safest and most graceful way. On the road back to Abu Dhabi, passing the same villages which I had seen before as desolate places, I realized that I wasn't looking at the soul-less bungalowoid developments, dormitory suburbs, the all-too-recognizable international territory of the sleeping pill and the antidepressant. These were decompression chambers. It didn't matter what they looked like from the outside; their bleakness was part of their point. Everything had been focused inward: inside these boxes, the unmanageable century had been reduced in scale so that it could be dealt with at a domestic pace in a domestic space. It *could* be coped with, if it was taken inch by inch."

This passage exemplifies much in Ra-

"...The Bedu family had met the century head on, but they had been able to deal with it in the family, protected by thick walls of cinder block and cement. It seemed much the safest and most graceful way."

—Arabia: A Journey Through the Labyrinth

ban's gracefully written book. Though he (like Duncan) spends a good deal of time with fellow Englishmen, expatriates and the like in waiting (read "bored") rooms and exact replicas of British pubs, he frequently refers back to his fascination with the rigidity of Islamic law.

Westerners are always taken by the veiled women of the East, but now everyone seems to speculate on just when the Arab woman will come out of hiding. It is clear that developing nations cannot afford not to utilize the labor power of half a nation, yet most Arab women remain in ancient subjugation. Adultery, sanctified in the Koran for men and mythologized into a kind of epic Arabian debauch, still brings death by stoning to any woman so accused. In only a few places are women moving into the work force, and change is certain to be slow. Men are still heard to say "*Karram Allah*" ("God Forgive Me") before even the mention of a woman in conversation. Arab men may be streaking into the twentieth century, but it is the subservient woman that provides a tenuous link to the past.

Both Duncan and Raban detail the physical and cultural scars already left by the money rush. Both recognize that new money has provided schools, hospitals, housing, and some health care. But it has also bought jet fighters, tanks, a fear of pending cultural dissolution, and enough money to sustain the ever-present conflict with Israel. This issue has forced a rather disagreeable examination of policymaking in the United States: How does one satisfy the pro-Israeli sentiments of hundreds of thousands of Americans when millions of others are more concerned with heating their homes and fueling their cars? The dilemma is an ugly one, morally and politically, and clarifies the effects of greed in this century.

Both of these books are Western in attitude and perspective. Romantic notions about Arabia die hard, especially in Britain, where the English feel the Arabs have betrayed their romance and, as Raban observes, regard the Arabs with a mixture of mockery and envy. Times have certainly changed when an Arab, Mohamed Mahdi al-Tajir, ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to the Court of St. James and one of the richest men in the world, comments on the British financial crisis: "I am confi-

dent Britain will recover because it has the greatest asset of all—its people. They are the same people who built the greatest empire on earth, and they can overcome the crisis. All they need is the will." Indeed.

The definitive study of Arabia is yet to be written but, given the Western influence on Arab hearts and minds, it may be a long time coming. Surely such a study must be done by an Arab, but as Edward W. Said has argued in his angry *Orientalism*: "The Arab and Islamic world remains a second-order power in terms of the production of culture, knowledge, and scholarship. Here one must be completely realistic about using the terminology of power politics to describe the situation that obtains. No Arab or Islamic scholar can afford to ignore what goes on in scholarly journals, institutes, and universities in the United States and Europe; the converse is not true." Mr. Said, a Palestinian Arab teaching at Columbia University, is painfully aware of the role the Arab world has had prescribed for it by the West. It is a modernizing one that fits the Western model and, to Said's dis-

tress, it is very much accepted by the Arab world.

One problem is the Islamic language. Few in the West bother to learn the labyrinthine structure of what Jonathan Raban calls "a language perfectly constructed for saying nothing with exquisite elegance." As Said emphasizes, what is at issue here is representation, and there are many in the West who promote the idea that the Arabs are not capable of representing themselves to the rest of the world. This kind of hemispheric chauvinism makes the game of power politics all the more defeatist. Both Duncan and Raban offer their firsthand insight but, more than that, they clarify the glaring irony of the modern Arab world. We may be playing power politics with the Arabs, each taking advantage of the other, but unless we begin to check our mutual excesses and take seriously our collective responsibilities, we may have to forfeit much more than the limited benefits of a falling oil reserve. We will forfeit knowledge, understanding, compassion, and peace. And, in the end, we will all be sorry. VVV

Operation Sunrise: The Secret Surrender by Bradley F. Smith and Elena Agarossi (Basic Books; 234 pp.; \$11.95)

William M. Vatavek

In the spring of 1945 the German armies were besieged on three fronts: In the east they were locked in a bloody struggle with the tenacious Russians, while on the western front the American and British armies—spearheaded by General Patton—had driven them back through France into the Fatherland. The southern front, in Italy, pitted the Anglo-American armies under Field Marshal Alexander against General von Kesselring's Army Group C—crack troops in a cracking Wehrmacht.

Nonetheless, in his Berlin bunker Adolf Hitler harbored the illusion that the war in Europe could still be won. His orders were simple: Everyone must fight to the death. The corollary: Anyone who attempted to negotiate a surrender with the Allies would be executed for treason.

Fortunately, a few Nazis with more foresight made surrender initiatives to the Allies through Allen Dulles, European head of the Office of Strategic Services (and later director of the CIA). Led by Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff, head of Italy's SS and Gestapo forces, the Germans proposed to surrender secretly all their forces in that country. This capitulation, they reasoned, would save lives and property and enable Germany to quit the war "honorably." Historians have dubbed their plan, the covert meetings that resulted from it, and the eventual surrender, "Operation Sunrise."

Bradley Smith, an American professor at Cabrillo College, and fellow historian Elena Agarossi of the University of Pisa, have written the definitive book on this little-known chapter of World