

ban's gracefully written book. Though he (like Duncan) spends a good deal of time with fellow Englishmen, expatriates and the like in waiting (read "bored") rooms and exact replicas of British pubs, he frequently refers back to his fascination with the rigidity of Islamic law.

Westerners are always taken by the veiled women of the East, but now everyone seems to speculate on just when the Arab woman will come out of hiding. It is clear that developing nations cannot afford not to utilize the labor power of half a nation, yet most Arab women remain in ancient subjugation. Adultery, sanctified in the Koran for men and mythologized into a kind of epic Arabian debauch, still brings death by stoning to any woman so accused. In only a few places are women moving into the work force, and change is certain to be slow. Men are still heard to say "*Karram Allah*" ("God Forgive Me") before even the mention of a woman in conversation. Arab men may be streaking into the twentieth century, but it is the subservient woman that provides a tenuous link to the past.

Both Duncan and Raban detail the physical and cultural scars already left by the money rush. Both recognize that new money has provided schools, hospitals, housing, and some health care. But it has also bought jet fighters, tanks, a fear of pending cultural dissolution, and enough money to sustain the ever-present conflict with Israel. This issue has forced a rather disagreeable examination of policymaking in the United States: How does one satisfy the pro-Israeli sentiments of hundreds of thousands of Americans when millions of others are more concerned with heating their homes and fueling their cars? The dilemma is an ugly one, morally and politically, and clarifies the effects of greed in this century.

Both of these books are Western in attitude and perspective. Romantic notions about Arabia die hard, especially in Britain, where the English feel the Arabs have betrayed their romance and, as Raban observes, regard the Arabs with a mixture of mockery and envy. Times have certainly changed when an Arab, Mohamed Mahdi al-Tajir, ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to the Court of St. James and one of the richest men in the world, comments on the British financial crisis: "I am confi-

dent Britain will recover because it has the greatest asset of all—its people. They are the same people who built the greatest empire on earth, and they can overcome the crisis. All they need is the will." Indeed.

The definitive study of Arabia is yet to be written but, given the Western influence on Arab hearts and minds, it may be a long time coming. Surely such a study must be done by an Arab, but as Edward W. Said has argued in his angry *Orientalism*: "The Arab and Islamic world remains a second-order power in terms of the production of culture, knowledge, and scholarship. Here one must be completely realistic about using the terminology of power politics to describe the situation that obtains. No Arab or Islamic scholar can afford to ignore what goes on in scholarly journals, institutes, and universities in the United States and Europe; the converse is not true." Mr. Said, a Palestinian Arab teaching at Columbia University, is painfully aware of the role the Arab world has had prescribed for it by the West. It is a modernizing one that fits the Western model and, to Said's dis-

tress, it is very much accepted by the Arab world.

One problem is the Islamic language. Few in the West bother to learn the labyrinthine structure of what Jonathan Raban calls "a language perfectly constructed for saying nothing with exquisite elegance." As Said emphasizes, what is at issue here is representation, and there are many in the West who promote the idea that the Arabs are not capable of representing themselves to the rest of the world. This kind of hemispheric chauvinism makes the game of power politics all the more defeatist. Both Duncan and Raban offer their firsthand insight but, more than that, they clarify the glaring irony of the modern Arab world. We may be playing power politics with the Arabs, each taking advantage of the other, but unless we begin to check our mutual excesses and take seriously our collective responsibilities, we may have to forfeit much more than the limited benefits of a falling oil reserve. We will forfeit knowledge, understanding, compassion, and peace. And, in the end, we will all be sorry. VVV

## Operation Sunrise: The Secret Surrender by Bradley F. Smith and Elena Agarossi (Basic Books; 234 pp.; \$11.95)

### William M. Vatavek

In the spring of 1945 the German armies were besieged on three fronts: In the east they were locked in a bloody struggle with the tenacious Russians, while on the western front the American and British armies—spearheaded by General Patton—had driven them back through France into the Fatherland. The southern front, in Italy, pitted the Anglo-American armies under Field Marshal Alexander against General von Kesselring's Army Group C—crack troops in a cracking Wehrmacht.

Nonetheless, in his Berlin bunker Adolf Hitler harbored the illusion that the war in Europe could still be won. His orders were simple: Everyone must fight to the death. The corollary: Anyone who attempted to negotiate a surrender with the Allies would be executed for treason.

Fortunately, a few Nazis with more foresight made surrender initiatives to the Allies through Allen Dulles, European head of the Office of Strategic Services (and later director of the CIA). Led by Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff, head of Italy's SS and Gestapo forces, the Germans proposed to surrender secretly all their forces in that country. This capitulation, they reasoned, would save lives and property and enable Germany to quit the war "honorably." Historians have dubbed their plan, the covert meetings that resulted from it, and the eventual surrender, "Operation Sunrise."

Bradley Smith, an American professor at Cabrillo College, and fellow historian Elena Agarossi of the University of Pisa, have written the definitive book on this little-known chapter of World

War II. "Based almost completely on documents until now classified," their book carefully recreates the events leading up to the surrender, clearly delineates the parties involved in it, and, most important, shades in the political overtones, especially the growing conflict between the Allies and the USSR.

As they note, Operation Sunrise, far from being a symbol of German defeat, was relatively inconsequential to the outcome of the war. Days after Sunrise, Hitler committed suicide, and immediately thereafter the Germans capitulated on all other fronts. Few lives and little property were saved by Sunrise, but the Nazis involved, especially Wolff and his subordinates, benefitted immensely. Their roles in helping to bring about peace saved them from the war crimes trials, thus quite possibly saving their lives. On the other hand, the operation contributed more to the cold war hostilities than any other World War II event: "...it is fair to say that Operation Sunrise and its offshoot in Trieste played a circumscribed part in speeding Dulles and other American leaders on their journey to that confined state of mind where the world was made up of 'us' (the West) and 'them' (the East), and where there were few reservations about what it was permissible to do to 'them.' This development not only necessitated a shift in the American image of the Soviet Union, it also required...a shift from the picture of Germany as an evil and aggressor nation to that of a comrade in the struggle against Communism."

In other words, it is asserted that Sunrise marked *the* turning point in East-West relations. This is not supported by the facts. As even the authors admit, the Allied-Soviet alliance was merely one of military necessity, one to be maintained only until the Third Reich was defeated. Lest we forget, Stalin and Hitler signed a nonaggression pact in 1939—short-lived, to be sure, but certainly indicative of the nature of Soviet constancy. So the Soviet protests against being excluded from the Sunrise talks and their antics at Trieste (through Tito's armies) were due less to the Allies' covert activities than to characteristic Communist posturing.

Also annoying is the portrayal of Allen Dulles as a crafty, scheming "super spy" who was more concerned about furthering his own career than about

ending the war. No doubt Dulles was an ambitious man, but to imply that he was somehow disloyal because he employed covert methods is not unlike labeling an infantryman a traitor because he fires his rifle at people. Everyone has a duty to fulfill, and he must use whatever tools he is issued. The ones to judge the propriety of these tools are moralists, not historians.

Aside from these departures from objectivity, the scholarship and impact of the book are marred by stiff writing, a minuscule type face, and an occasional tendency to overdocument the trivial (e.g., the exact time and duration of a minor conference) while glossing over important events, such as the April 22 meeting between Ambassador Rahn and Nazi officials concerning Axis surrender plans. In sum, this is the best-documented account of Sunrise, and its glaring biases of interpretation are therefore the more regrettable.

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### Correspondence [from p. 2]

different from that of President Park, who advocated that "the citizens ought to be patient because better things are coming to them." He had been dictating for eighteen years, but the vast majority of the citizens have not benefited from his policy.

It is about time the policymakers in Washington be aware of who really are the friends of democracy in South Korea. In order to avoid another tragic war in Korea, the American public should be informed and analyze the situation rationally and wisely. We don't want another "Vietnam" in Asia.

Harold Hakwon Sunoo

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### Edward A. Olsen Responds:

I am afraid that Professor Sunoo missed the central point of my article. I certainly did not suggest all was well in South Korea, either economically or politically. I am thoroughly aware of the many problems he mentions, some of which occurred after the October piece was submitted for publication. What I did suggest was that the social changes being brought about by ongoing economic growth—and, despite problems, it is *still* ongoing—have the potential for moving South Korea toward a hierarchical faction-based form of democracy, akin to that of Japan, which would incorporate a broad spectrum of society. I believe there were signs of such a system under Park. I stand by that contention. Economic continuity is today even more crucial to the future peace and prosperity of South Korea.

I suggested in the article that the most idealistic critics of the government[s] in Seoul are unlikely to be satisfied with anything short of a complete overhaul of the South Korean political system. It may surprise Professor Sunoo, but I too am a supporter of democratic reform in South Korea. Let me make one thing abundantly clear: I am not an apologist for Park's excesses and resent any intimation that I am.

In my years as the State Department's intelligence analyst for South Korea (1976-79) I strived diligently to give senior officials an objective and accurate picture of the legitimate aspirations of democratic forces in that country. Though my audience was not always ready to hear such analyses and I was the subject of some criticism for my zealotry in reporting human rights violations, on balance I think I succeeded in transmitting the unvarnished facts. I have many Korean friends (and in-laws) and hope a government will emerge in Seoul that will enable them to enjoy the benefits of democracy. However, I also am a pragmatist and am prepared to see Korea adapt Western democratic ideals to indigenous values and traditions.

I do not expect Professor Sunoo to agree with all that I have said. It may surprise him to hear that I expect him and other reformers to keep up their pressures on Seoul. For, without their ideals, South Korea could quickly succumb to another Park. However, I do hope he and his fellow advocates of