


1980s. During that period, new weaponry that could lure one of the superpowers toward attempting a disabling first strike, coinciding with rapid proliferation in the Middle East, will create exceptional peril. But proposals already under negotiation and for which relatively quick agreement is possible, would be extremely valuable in that short term. A ban on deployment of antisatellite systems, currently being negotiated by Britain, Russia, and the U.S., would lessen fears on both sides about a first strike. Acceptance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which bans *all* nuclear test explosions,

will limit the technological advances in nuclear weapons and delivery systems that have become the driving force behind the armaments race. The same reasoning inspires advocacy of an agreement on missile test quotas.

Adoption of these measures might go a long way toward avoiding nuclear war during the crucial mid-1980s. Calder concludes by citing another deterrent—one that lies within the power of all of us to augment. "Do not undervalue moral attitudes: few national leaders want to commit the worst atrocity of all time, and that...may be what has saved us so far." 

that Johansen has missed the point about where the argument really lies; it is that, having set the right ground for the discussion, he then argues *his* case in starkly ideological terms, heavily dependent on analyses more typically associated with the Institute for Policy Studies than the Institute for World Order. The result is such a distortion of the international situation that the book's prescriptions for U.S. policy lose much of their cogency and persuasiveness.

Johansen writes as if the USSR has only aped American misbehavior in the arms race; as if Salvador Allende were the same kind of social democrat as Helmut Schmidt; as if those subnational and transnational centrifugal forces that are now the flash points of world conflict—ethnic irredentism, fundamentalist religion, and so forth—were the results of American policy miscalculations, rather than independent forces in their own right—to which, in many cases, American policy has responded poorly, to be sure.

But the nub of Johansen's argument, and of my disagreement, rests with his view of the character of American society and the goals consequently sought by the U.S. Government. In a summary statement he writes: "The global meaning of U.S. policy was clear: the United States stood firmly and sometimes ruthlessly as a major impediment to the fulfillment of the values of global humanism in a new world order. Officials served a state-centered version of vested interests rather than a new image of order aimed at meeting global human needs."

One need not be an apologist for the past thirty-five years of U.S. foreign policy to find this judgment both historically skewed and strategically unhelpful in creating the kind of "preferred world order" Johansen himself seeks. It is historically skewed because it is based on an analysis that removes other major actors, particularly the USSR, from the international stage in order to affect a "clean" appraisal of the American role in the arms race, the deterioration of human rights, and the like. This may have a certain methodological elegance to it, but it certainly creates a false picture of the world.

The other problem is more critical. What Johansen is after, correctly, is the creation of an international political community sufficiently cohesive to

THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE HUMAN INTEREST: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

by Robert C. Johansen

(Princeton University Press; 517 pp.; \$32.50/\$6.95)

George S. Weigel, Jr.

Robert Johansen, president of the Institute for World Order, has written an exasperating book.

I say "exasperating" because his location of the fundamental problems of U.S. foreign policy is, in the main, correct. Especially in this election year, when discussion of the conundrums of international relations has reached a farcical level, we can be grateful that Johansen has described the problems accurately. They are worth a summary.

First, against the blindly value-free school of *Realpolitik*, Johansen insists that policy choices are always values choices. Our policy, in both its articulation and its execution, will express the character of the American political community, the principles for which it stands, and the standards by which it asks to be judged.

Second, Johansen correctly asserts that the present danger is not fundamentally tactical ("What will work better?"), but strategic ("What goals should we seek?"). Whatever the threat to American values and interests that lies in the worrisome indices of nuclear weapons competition with the USSR, we must also confront our continuing and paralyzing inability to conceive a foreign policy strategy that would address, coherently and in mutually reinforcing ways, the harsh facts of the global arms race, the demand for economic development in the Third World, the requirements of human

rights, and the problems of managing our environment.

To serve the national interest while addressing these dangers requires a new ability to think through to solutions that are transnational in character, and that means facing squarely the problem of creating international political community, and how to create enough of it that progress on meeting these multiple threats can be made without resort to mass violence. Johansen correctly takes American policy-makers to task for neglecting this vital job of strategic rethinking.

Third, Johansen is correct in his call for a public debate on what I would call the "nodes of the argument." Johansen lists "fundamental assumptions about the nature of international relations, the motivation for human behavior, and the possibility of human influence on history" as three such nodes. The list could and should be expanded to include issues like "view of America," "view of the USSR," "extent of the political community to which one is obligated (i.e., national only, or transnational as well)," "legitimacy of violence in adjudicating conflicts," etc. But, again, Johansen has pointed us to the right level of discussion.

Finally, Johansen is right in claiming that action on a new foreign policy agenda will not begin in government but the private and voluntary sectors.

The book's tragic flaw, then, is not

support progress toward his linked goals of disarmament, human rights, economic development, and environmental protection. Such a political community will be multiethnic, multiracial, and religiously plural; it will have solved the problem of conflict-adjudication through legal and political processes; and it will have sustained those processes over time, in such a way that human rights were consistently protected and economic well-being regularly advanced.

Only one diverse, mass-population society has accomplished that on a significant scale in human history, and that is the United States. Despite our undoubted failings, America is the model, in microcosm, of the systemic change required to achieve the kind of world order Johansen defends.

Furthermore, creating a humane world order today requires more than a global social movement modeled on the Abolitionists. Whatever such a movement accomplishes will be mediated through the structures of existing state power centers. Their power can be a positive force for humane politics when it is linked to that sense of moral obligation that will sustain the effort over the long haul.

Such a sense of moral obligation has been drastically weakened in the United States over the past fifteen years; but where else is the national center capable of putting the Johansen goals on its agenda and rooting them in a new sense of its national purpose, one that resonates with its ethical and philosophical foundations?

In his study *Insight*, the Canadian theologian Bernard Lonergan coined the term *scotosis* to refer to the distortion of new data by fixed perspectives in such a way that one's picture of reality is badly awry. Robert Johansen's view of the possibilities of the American role in leadership toward a more humane world order suffers from a kind of ideological *scotosis*—despite the fact that the author himself seems to recognize the one-eyedness of the picture he presents. Time and again qualifying phrases try to give a fuller, more adequate accounting of the realities. Yet in his conclusions Johansen regularly returns to the prescriptions favored by the ideologues.

And that judgment is all the more painful to make because, unlike so many other foreign policy *illuminati*, he has gotten the questions right. [WV]

THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING: MASS MEDIA IN THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE NEW LEFT

by Todd Gitlin

(University of California Press, 340 pp, \$12.95)

Raymond A. Schroth

In November, 1969, the Nixon administration used the stern, scolding mug and manfully gesturing fists of Vice-President Agnew for launching a campaign to stifle free criticism of its policies and convince the American people that the news media were unworthy of their trust. This year Todd Gitlin, poet, critic, assistant professor of sociology, and director of the mass communications program at the University of California, Berkeley, has produced an impressive and aggravating doctoral dissertation-made-book in which he comes to a paradoxically similar conclusion.

The Agnew argument—shared to a degree by Lyndon Johnson, who suspected that CBS-TV correspondent Morley Safer was a Communist because he reported the story of U.S. Marines torching a Vietnamese village—was that TV news and the press were somehow in league with radicals to undermine established authority and the American way of life. The Gitlin thesis, however, picks up and develops part of an opposing theme in contemporary media criticism. This theme was partly expressed in Timothy Crouse's journalistic study of the 1972 presidential campaign, *The Boys on the Bus*: that news men mislead us not because they are radicals but because they are unprofessional, too co-opted and too lazy to pursue the truth with a vengeance.

In Gitlin's version the media mislead us not because they are subversive or lazy but because they are necessary to the ruling class's domination, the "systemic (but not necessarily or even usually deliberate) engineering of mass consent to the established order." Just as liberal capitalist ideology has been able to survive the injustice of the economic system by systematically absorbing and domesticating criticism, the media, controlled by a corporate and political elite, maintain their claim to objectivity and legitimacy and at the same time tame the opposition by reporting it in "frames" or categories that neutralize its force.

Gitlin's book is initially a case study

Basic Rights

Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy
Henry Shue

Which human rights ought to be the first honored and the last sacrificed? In the first systematic attempt by an American philosopher to address this issue as it relates to U.S. foreign policy,

Henry Shue proposes an original conception of basic rights that illuminates both the nature of moral rights generally and the determination of which specific rights are the basic ones.

Dr. Shue argues that subsistence rights are of equal priority with rights to security and to liberty and that these three are basic rights that should be promoted, or at least not violated, by U.S. foreign policy. In conclusion, he recommends an effective official acknowledgment that subsistence rights are basic rights, the cessation of both economic and security assistance to all governments engaged in essential and systematic deprivation of basic rights, and the prevention of the thwarting of U.S. policies toward basic rights by U.S. based corporations.

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