Stalin's wartime policies and the condemnation of whole nations as collaborators only continued the destruction of the 1930s.

After more than half a century of molding a new Soviet man, is the USSR only nominally multinational and federal and actually highly centralized owing to Slavic favoritism in the party, state, and army organizations? Is multinationlism a vital force or merely propaganda for the Third World and tokenism at home? Carrère d'Encausse documents the fact that national diversity and the intensity of national and ethnic loyalties have not faded in the Soviet Union. True, some of the nations fostered in the 1920s have disappeared—their peoples assimilated, acculturated, emigrated. And the intensity may vary from nation to nation. But overall, any assumption that modernization would lessen the force of national community inside the USSR seems to have been mistaken.

The greater ethnicity of Jews, Volga Germans, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Finns is in part a function of diminished numbers. Carrère d'Encausse is not too sanguine about the preservation of Baltic nations. They follow the Western pattern of a declining birth rate with the increase in prosperity and urban living; and, rather than joining one another's efforts, they particularize. Her own evidence, however, leads one to doubt her pessimism.

Bilingualism does not necessarily lead to the extinction of the minority language, as the author points out. In the national republics there has been a strengthening of the language, a de-Russification, even a casting out of hybrids borrowed from the dominant tongue. Germans, Gypsies, Georgians, even brother Slavs seem to maintain their native tongues along with Russian. In the army—the organization that in theory is most likely to produce the new Soviet man—the Asians, whose education in Russian does not always make for mastery, are relegated to the lowest positions. As the experience of other nations with blatant discrimination in the army has shown, this promises future difficulties.

To those who would see the nationalities as forces for disruption of the regime, for "revolt" perhaps, the book is cautious in its conclusions. Even the rapidly increasing Islamic peoples who fringe the southern borders and have geographical access to their revolution-ary co-religionists do not threaten disintegration. But the pressure of population, the economic underdevelopment of their area, and a heightened ethnic consciousness for the future economic and political dislocations.

There is no unity of national ambitions. Some aspire to greater assimilation in the mainstream of socialist progress; others want cultural autonomy; still others emigrate; some perhaps are rebellious. National minorities can oppose one another more than they oppose Russian monopoly of important positions. Nevertheless, while Americans take the measure of the USSR in terms of weapons, oil, and wheat, the Soviets fear an impasse of disaffected nations whose passions and apathies stall the machinery. Economic progress takes second place to national justice.

POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
by Charles R. Beitz
(Princeton University Press, 212 pp.; $16.50/$3.95)

TOWARD A HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY: A PRIMER FOR POLICY
edited by Tom J. Farer
(Columbia University Press, 229 pp.; $15.00)

Ernest H. Schell

Normative principles have sometimes played a role in United States foreign policy, but cold war geopolitics, the bankruptcy of America's misadventures in Southeast Asia, our energy dependency, and the apathy of expediency and pragmatism during the Kissinger years have given the "realists" of the last generation the upper hand. For justice to become a full partner in American foreign policy we must reevaluate the theoretical terms we use to understand international affairs. In Political Theory and International Relations, Charles Beitz takes an impressive step in that direction.

Defending morality as the foundation of foreign policy, Beitz points out that differing cultural norms should not preclude the use of moral standards in policy-making; moral conflicts can occur just as easily within a single culture as among different ones. If we respect morality, we must acknowledge it as a constant in all human affairs, nor is the absence of a supranational regulating force an excuse for amoral policy. In fact, none of the Hobbesian arguments in support of skepticism is valid. Nations are not relatively equal in power, they are not the only actors on the international stage, they are not independent of each other, and there are a variety of international bodies that promote compliance with international norms. States have common interests and therefore a basis for cooperation.

Nations, says Beitz, do not exist to perpetuate themselves but, rather, to preserve the rights and promote the well-being of their citizens. Only through their adherence to justice do they acquire a moral legitimacy. Beitz can thus justify intervention by one state in the affairs of another if such action promotes justice without violating other moral restraints. Self-determination is subordinate to justice, a totalitarian government in a liberated nation is no more legitimate than the colonial government it replaces.

Assuming for philosophical purposes that an interdependent world presupposes an international social contract, the states parties to the formulation of that contract could, as John Rawls has argued, meet behind a "veil of ignorance." This veil of ignorance would assure that the parties would not know what their own placement in life might be. They would not know who will be rich and who poor, who gifted and who disadvantaged, who the darling of fate and who life's loser. They would, consequently, try to maximize the chances of each, but also build in some hedging of the bets for the less fortunate. The result of all this would be as close an approximation of justice as there is likely to be. And because the argument applies ultimately to persons, notes Beitz, even intrastate inequalities would have to be minimized to promote international justice.

Beitz's argument, which is more finely honed that a brief summary can indicate, considers traditional notions of statehood anachronistic. While states may be expedient, they are expedient primarily for facilitating the obligations that human beings have to one another as people. It is by no means clear, however, that such a cosmopolitan view can safeguard the full spectrum of human rights. People are not monads; they live in cultures. There must be some mechanism to protect
cultural integrity. By suggesting that a caste system, for example, is inherently unjust and that the international community may take action to eliminate it, Beitz betrays the possibility that his rational view of justice may be unacceptably coercive to many of the world's people. One man's culturally endorsed religious practice is another man's tyrannical oppression.

Though Beitz does not wish to eliminate separate states, he has not satisfactorily defined either what a state is or its relationship to culture and society. His failure here makes a mockery of the Rawlsian "veil of ignorance," for if participants in that fictitious conclave are ignorant of their national affiliation, why should they represent states at all? And if states should not determine representation, what should?

*Toward a Humanitarian Diplomacy* addresses many of the same theoretical issues. Tom Farer's introductory essay and Sandy Vogelgesang's general assessment of the connection between domestic politics and human rights diplomacy are of particular interest. Without a philosophical framework as complex as Beitz's, Farer agrees that the defense of human rights may transcend sovereignty in extreme cases, where intervention remains the only way to save human life on a massive scale. (Intervention on behalf of only a few political prisoners is apparently not worth the risk.) Governments derive their legitimacy from the protection of their citizens' lives and well-being, says Farer. They are therefore morally bound to promote political, civil, social, and economic rights. It is, he argues, in our own best interests to assist those countries that respect the full spectrum of human rights and to press sanctions against those that do not, regardless of their political affiliation. American collaboration with repressive non-Communist regimes in the name of freedom is a sham and does more injury to the capitalist cause than any Communist infiltration. Whether Farer considers our own socioeconomic system to be just, he does not say.

Vogelgesang describes the key role of Congressman Donald Frazer in spearheading the human rights issue in American foreign policy and along the way takes a stand on domestic affairs. Like Beitz, Vogelgesang proclaims that the United States cannot pursue justice abroad unless it seeks justice at home through income redistribution and other economic, and political policies designed to eliminate human rights violations. Only by ending oppression at home based on race, ethnic origin, sex, and age can the U.S. successfully promote human rights anywhere else.

Unfortunately, none of the three case studies that make up the latter half of the book offers much in the way of guidance, and this is only partly due to their having been written more than a year before publication. In his discussion of Iran, Marvin Zonis acknowledges that the preservation of a national culture is a human right, but he supports intervention by a third party to insure civil, political, and socio-economic rights. John de St. Jorre rules out any intervention by the United States to resolve South Africa's problems, including any effort to promote "majority rule." We should instead encourage a dialogue among all racial groups and urge a compromise solution. Ironically, Prime Minister Botha has not had success with recent proposals similar to de St. Jorre's, and there is little to indicate that the economic sanctions called for by de St. Jorre would not hurt the blacks and coloreds more than the whites in South Africa.

Least satisfying is Donald Renard on America's Korean policy. He does provide a thorough assessment of Park Chung Hee's oppressive regime and a convincing argument that North Korea poses little military threat to the South. But Renard is too obsessed with the hypocrisy of American support for its South Korean ally to give any attention to the cultural standards of Korean society and their bearing on human rights issues. Korea's stratified Confucian social ethic allows no recognition of Western-style liberties. An expectation that American sanctions and pressures will induce the Chon government, which came to power after Renard's essay was written, to institute a truly open society is worse than wishful thinking.

"There is no such thing as different human rights for different nations," Mihajlo Mihajlov has written, "and there never will be." If his words are taken as condemning a human rights policy that is applied selectively, they ring true. If they are taken to mean that there are no legitimate differences in human patterns of life, they are false. Neither of these two books adequately resolves the fundamental tension between promoting human rights and
respecting the cultural integrity of the world's varied peoples. To dismiss arbitrarily certain culturally honored practices as inhumane is to cast in a new mold the old imperial bias of "civilization" against "the barbarians." [\(\text{\textcopyright\textregistered}\)]

**DIARY OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION**

by Carlos Franqui

(Viking Press; 546 pp.; $25.00/$16.95)

**THE WINDS OF DECEMBER**

by John Dorschner and Roberto Fabricio

(Coward, McCann & Geoghegan; 552 pp.; $15.95)

Jorge I. Domínguez

The Cuban Revolution of the 1950s remains one of the dramatic historical events of the past quarter-century. Its long-range consequence—the coming to power of a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist regime in the Caribbean, active and influential the world over—has made Cuba important for our understanding of world affairs. These two books represent rather different but complementary ways of assisting our understanding of Cuban political life in the '50s.

Carlos Franqui was a direct participant in those events and for most of the 1960s served as editor of the official Cuban Government newspaper, Revolución. During the revolutionary struggle Franqui was director of propaganda for the guerrilla forces, with direct access to many guerrilla leaders as well as to leaders of the urban underground. Their interviews, collected letters, dispatches, and other statements—all of which form this book—are a record of what many who were fighting the Batista regime actually thought and wrote during the struggle itself.

Dorschner and Fabricio have taken a rather different path. Their book relies principally on interviews with participants in the Revolution, with special attention to the closing weeks of 1958 and the early days of victory in 1959. But the interviews were conducted in the late '70s, and the authors have chosen a novelistic writing style. They make extensive use of the interview material, which appears in quotation marks, to give a vivid and dramatic portrayal of a regime's collapse and a revolution's reach for power.

An obvious consequence of these alternative approaches is that Winds is far more likely to reach a broad audience than is Diary. Yet Diary is the more significant and reliable of the two because it makes public one of the major, heretofore unavailable archives of a revolutionary leadership at the point of rule. This is not to say that Winds is trivial or inaccurate. On the contrary, it is a remarkably fair and balanced account of an extraordinarily complex period, and ably written too. The issue is the credibility of the interviews that are the heart of the book.

Dorschner and Fabricio went through the standard and necessary collection of existing materials (newspapers, books, cables, and so forth), augmented by the acquisition of U.S. Government documents available through the Freedom of Information Act. Second, they tried to check information by cross-referencing documentary and interview material. Third, and most crucially, as they put it:

"...people's memories have proved to be remarkably accurate. Perhaps that is understandable because, for all those involved, the events are etched indelibly in their minds, much the way Americans remember exactly what they were doing when they heard John Kennedy had been shot. But for the people of this story, the outcome was far more personal and pervasive. Almost all saw their lives directly and inalterably changed, for better or for worse."

Yes, memories can be remarkable. Yes, many people I myself have interviewed about those events have been extraordinarily lucid, and probably for the reasons the authors suggest. But, no, they could not remember the very words they used, the subtle nuances, or the responses of their interlocutors at the time. It is on this crucial point that the precision of Winds is somewhat illusory. It is a book to be enjoyed rather than relied upon.

Both books stand out for their rather high standards of objectivity, but they are not entirely free of certain understandable biases. Dorschner and Fabricio provide the opportunity to hear the late General Eulogio Cantillo for the first, and last, time; Franqui allows us to read the thoughts of the late René Ramos Latour, once a leader of the urban underground. Both are significant figures, and no one before has given them the attention they have deserved. That their views lend these books a certain bias is a price worth paying.

Cantillo gave much thought to the role he might play in the Revolution but chose, in the end, to obey Batista, despite his contempt for the president, for his immediate military superiors, and for the regime they led as it rotted. Loyalty, discipline, military honor—these are values difficult to understand and to live by, and Eulogio Cantillo made his choice under the most difficult of circumstances.

Ramos Latour thought of himself as being engaged in "a revolutionary force comprised of Cubans of diverse origins, who are firmly united in a common ideal." Thus, in writing to Ernesto (Ché) Guevara about their ideological differences, Ramos Latour could commit himself to "a force that is neither yours nor mine, but is the Cuban revolution." He said he wanted "an America that can stand up proudly to the United States, Russia, China, or any