at least a possibility. But no British government yet has had the temerity to call the bluff.

Jack Holland does not speculate. He presents the record of events, many of them familiar to him since childhood, with a sympathy large enough to comprehend Protestant fears, Catholic frustration, and the British dilemma in the face of both. Violence and the threat of violence can only forestall a solution that, all reasonable men agree, depends on and demands political courage and flexibility—especially on the part of the British and Irish governments. A negotiated settlement, however arrived at, must, Holland suggests, entail a gradual devolution of union with the United Kingdom and the eventual reunification of the whole island of Ireland. The suggestion may not be unappealing in some quarters not traditionally disposed to an impartial view of troubles in Ireland. In a tone far less restrained than Holland's, an English colleague, Paul Johnson, editor of The Spectator and a strong supporter of Mrs. Thatcher, has written: "In Ireland over the centuries we have tried every possible formula: direct rule, indirect rule, genocide, apartheid, puppet parliaments, real parliaments, martial law, civil law, colonization, land reform, partition. Nothing has worked. The only solution we have not tried is absolute and unconditional withdrawal."

Nothing in Holland's informed and balanced account of life and death in Northern Ireland contradicts that blunt English assessment of the matter.

THE INERTIA OF FEAR AND THE SCIENTIFIC WORLDVIEW
by Valentin Turchin
translated by Guy Daniels
(Columbia University Press; xviii + 300 pp.; $19.95)

David Paul Rebovich

As with the proverbial royal messenger, the fortune and fame of Soviet dissidents and defectors hinge on the news they bring. Often the effect is to dampen the celebration of freedom and trivialize the experience of persecution. Nonetheless, victimization by tyrannical regimes can be ennobling, and Americans have high regard for those who endure in the name of dignity, truth, and freedom. We are particularly

attracted to Soviet dissidents who represent literature, the arts, and science—those universal forms of expression and understanding that transcend national boundaries and that all civil people can claim as their own. Thus, Solzhenitsyn seems to belong in the West, the Soviets undervaluing of his insights into the human spirit and passions. Baryshnikov and his dance, too, take on a new vitality here, his art freed from the constraints of an official national culture. Still, Solzhenitsyn's religious sentiment and Baryshnikov's "nouveau" lifestyle are both revealing and disappointing.

Valentin Turchin will not escape similar criticism. "In America, you will be a dissident, too," a friend tells him, a pointed comment he cites to warn readers that his book may discomfort as well as enlighten. Turchin, a Russian physicist, computer scientist, student of cybernetics, and human rights activist, left the Soviet Union in 1977 following the publication and underground dissemination of this scathing attack on the Soviet Union. The Inertia of Fear and the Scientific Worldview, however, is about much more, and Turchin's ambitious scope is the most attractive and controversial aspect of this book. Turchin does more than give arms to anti-Soviet rhetoric. He
endeavors to understand the philosophical roots of Soviet totalitarianism in order to provide an alternative to it. This alternative, he claims, is relevant to all modern industrialized societies that take advantage of and counsel from modern philosophy and science. In short, Turchin wants to be understood as a normative social and political theorist who desires not only to liberate the intellectually incarcerated but to found a good society. He makes the daring assumption that a "universal social science and theory" is possible, and does so at a time when the academic community, much less the general public, is not particularly receptive to either.

Turchin's social science is neither unfamiliar nor value free. It is akin to the structural functionalism popularized in political science by Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba, and Lucien Pye, and finds its roots in the cybernetics theories of Norbert Weiner and Karl Deutsch. But Turchin's values are "socialist," not "middle class," and his discussion of the conceptual affinity between modern positivist philosophy and the socialist notion of integration adds an intriguing twist to a rather conventional argument about social and political development. Moreover, it enables him to criticize the Soviet Union from a socialist perspective and to associate modern science with intellectual liberation, creativity, freedom, and a moral society. This book is as much about the virtues of socialism and science as it is about the evils of the Soviet system, for Turchin knows he must dissociate the Soviet example from his own claims for socialism and science.

The author argues that the Soviet Union suffers from a horrendous error in self-definition, mistakenly calling its socialism a scientific doctrine when it actually functions as a dogmatic religion. This confusion is detrimental to the understanding of both science and religion as philosophical and social activities. Soviet ideology refines the notion that "social being determines consciousness," which in practice generates an intellectual totalitarianism that dehacks scientific, philosophical, and social creativity and trivializes values. Turchin speaks of physical oppression in the Soviet Union, but he is more concerned that the Soviet Union perpetuates itself through "the inertia of fear" and so assures a "steady-state totalitarianism" that bears no resemblance to Turchin's sense of the true socialist vision.

The first step to understanding and effecting a socialist society is admitting that socialism is a religious vision, a value system that espouses human freedom and dignity, social integration, interdependence, collective purpose, and creativity. To this definition Turchin's historical idealism allows him to add the notions of intellectual and social evolution as desirable possibilities for man. He finds support for these views in a philosophy of science that assumes no ontological picture of the world and emphasizes man's need to posit concepts and purpose to understand the universe and give it meaning. Science itself is essentially humanistic and progressive in that it depends on a free flow of information—freedom of speech—and, over time, integrates more phenomena into its explanatory framework.

Turchin ultimately desires to effect a synthesis of science, religion, and politics much like the Marxist thinkers he criticizes. The important difference in his vision, however, is its insistence that science, religion, and politics are independent as well as interdependent activities that might exist in dynamic tension as well as reinforce one another. Thus at times he sounds something like Daniel Bell who, in The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, offers a tripartite, interdependent conception of modern society. Like Bell, Turchin underlines the importance of culture in effecting social change. Indeed, Turchin's socialist evolution is, in an important sense, a cultural matter, a voluntary occurrence, whereby people intellectually and spiritually gravitate to prescient socialist principles. The inertia of fear and bourgeois conformity are overcome through cultural reform, a gradual awakening of socialist consciousness.

While this is occurring in society, politics—the state—ought to be taken on a new form. Here Turchin is surprisingly and admittedly Soviet in his perspective. While he advocates democratic rights, he has little affection for Western-style liberalism. Democratic politics, without a culturally united and scientifically minded public, exaggerates self-interest at the expense of social evolution and progress. To prevent this eventuality, Turchin espouses a politics of ideas, not of interest—a more likely occurrence in a one-party system with government planning for the collective good. The primary tool for government organization and planning ought to be cybernetics. Thus, Turchin's politics resemble a democracy of information and knowledge in which political leaders make policy and take corrective action based on "feedback" from the various interdependent components of society. Rational policy, based on scientific analyses, results in social evolution, socialist progress, and vindication of the scientific worldview—"scientific socialism."

Turchin frequently hints that he is a realist and a practical man, suggesting that life in the USSR teaches about the limitations of men and ideas. But there is an obvious and troublesome optimism about this book that his numerous qualifying statements neither hide nor mute. So much of his argument depends on the idea of a unified, deeply internalized culture; mere conformity will not do. Turchin then must assume that free men are rational men who will agree about fundamental socialist values. This kind of democratic idealism allows him to ignore the limitations and dangers inherent in homogeneous cultures, something we would expect him to know. Catch-words like "gradualism," "voluntarism," and a developmental as opposed to a doctrinal religious socialism do not mask what resembles a General Will. Turchin is not as optimistic about man as he is about "systems," cybernetic systems that presumably provide the means for man to approach excellence and approximate justice. Turchin's system and his one-party politics are, however, elitist. The self-serving democratic representative and the befuddled bureaucrat are replaced by the social scientist, the engineer, and the cyberneticist. The democratic town meeting is replaced by the cybernetic cell, whose ultimate allegiance is to, and whose counsel comes from, a powerful central state and political party.

Nonetheless there is much to recommend this book, and social scientists and philosophers of science and religion will find it provocative and frequently insightful. The Inertia of Fear and the Scientific Worldview is, above all else, a tribute to the human spirit and intellect, which even the monstrous Soviet system cannot easily destroy. But it also reveals a tragic consequence of totalitarianism, something
Turchin's pride does not allow him to admit. This grand work was written from limited sources, presumably without access to other ambitious works about modern culture and politics, which Turchin tries to emulate. This goes far to explain some of the author's naivety but does not render his book a trivial affair. Much can be gained by reading it in the context of the works of Daniel Bell, Theodore Lowi, John Kenneth Galbraith, Thomas Kuhn, and Harvey Cox, and that is no small praise. One hopes that Turchin himself reads these writers and that he is encouraged to further explicate and clarify his position, for freedom too offers a congenial environment for inertia.

COVER UP: WHAT YOU ARE NOT SUPPOSED TO KNOW ABOUT NUCLEAR POWER
by Karl Grossman
(The Permanent Press [Sagaponeck, N.Y.]; 293 pp.; $11.95)

DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FACILITIES IN WAR:
THE PROBLEM AND THE IMPLICATIONS
by Bennett Ramberg
(Lexington Books [Lexington, Mass.], 224 pp.; $19.50)

A VOICE CRYING IN THE WILDERNESS: ESSAYS ON THE PROBLEMS OF SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS
by Bernard T. Feld

Albert L. Huebner

It was inevitable that the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), burdened with the dual role of promoting nuclear energy and also regulating it, would be unable to serve both functions with complete integrity. The built-in conflict of interest led to improprieties that eventually caused Congress to dissolve the AEC and locate its contradictory functions in two separate agencies. The more extreme of these improprieties, many of which could be accurately characterized as "cover ups," have been described in a number of carefully written accounts over the past two decades.

Cover Up could have served the useful purpose of updating that material and making it more accessible. Instead, Grossman seems almost to have gone out of his way to dilute the book's impact. Frequently he presents significant information with about the same emphasis he gives to matters so minor in importance that they might better have been omitted altogether. Facsimiles of documents are threaded into the text in a way that often interrupts his argument rather than supporting it. Additional signs of haste and carelessness permeate the book.

The soundness of Grossman's conclusions is no better. It's all a great pity; he has brought together a good deal of information that is worthy of careful analysis, and just at a time when the public needs to know much more about all aspects of nuclear energy if a wise future course is to be charted. Cover Up's clumsiness keeps it from meeting that need.

Power and Politics in the 1980s
by Karl Grossman

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An Essay on National Security
Robert W. Tucker,
The Johns Hopkins University

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