Turchin's pride does not allow him to admit. This grand work was written from limited sources, presumably without access to other ambitious works about modern culture and politics, which Turchin tries to emulate. This goes far to explain some of the author's naivety but does not render his book a trivial affair. Much can be gained by reading it in the context of the works of Daniel Bell, Theodore Lowi, John Kenneth Galbraith, Thomas Kuhn, and Harvey Cox, and that is no small praise. One hopes that Turchin himself reads these writers and that he is encouraged to further explicate and clarify his position, for freedom too offers a congenial environment for inertia.

COVER UP: WHAT YOU ARE NOT SUPPOSED TO KNOW ABOUT NUCLEAR POWER
by Karl Grossman
(The Permanent Press [Sagaponack, N.Y.]: 293 pp.; $11.95)

DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FACILITIES IN WAR: THE PROBLEM AND THE IMPLICATIONS
by Bennett Ramberg
(Lexington Books [Lexington, Mass.]: 224 pp.; $19.50)

A VOICE CRYING IN THE WILDERNESS: ESSAYS ON THE PROBLEMS OF SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS
by Bernard T. Feld

Albert L. Huebner

It was inevitable that the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), burdened with the dual role of promoting nuclear energy and also regulating it, would be unable to serve both functions with complete integrity. The built-in conflict of interest led to improprieties that eventually caused Congress to dissolve the AEC and locate its contradictory functions in two separate agencies. The more extreme of these improprieties, many of which could be accurately characterized as "cover ups," have been described in a number of carefully written accounts over the past two decades.

Cover Up could have served the useful purpose of updating that material and making it more accessible. Instead, Grossman seems almost to have gone out of his way to dilute the book's impact. Frequently he presents significant information with about the same emphasis he gives to matters so minor in importance that they might better have been omitted altogether. Facsimiles of documents are threaded into the text in a way that often interrupts his argument rather than supporting it. Additional signs of haste and carelessness permeate the book.

The soundness of Grossman's conclusions is no better. It's all a great pity; he has brought together a good deal of information that is worthy of careful analysis, and just at a time when the public needs to know much more about all aspects of nuclear energy if a wise future course is to be charted. Cover Up's clumsiness keeps it from meeting that need.

Power and Politics in the 1980s

THE PURPOSES OF AMERICAN POWER
An Essay on National Security
Robert W. Tucker,
The Johns Hopkins University

We have reached a major turning point in American foreign policy; a period of withdrawal and of passivity has come to an end. Tucker portrays the visible decline of American power and position as having led to a greater dissatisfaction over policy than we have experienced in a decade. Notes, bibliography.


200 pp. 1981 $12.00

FACE THE FUTURE
David Owen
In the Spring of 1981 the Social Democratic Party, the first new national political party for some eighty years, was launched in Britain. What does the future hold for the country if the SDP forms or participates in the next government? David Owen, a former Foreign Secretary and Minister of Health and now a joint leader of the new Party, offers his own radical strategy in Face the Future, irreverent and challenging, the book provides a coherent, tough-minded, and humane plan for Britain's deep-seated economic, industrial, and social problems.

325 pp. 1981 $24.95

THE INDEPENDENCE OF NATIONS
David Fromkin
Fromkin challenges conventional wisdom with the following conclusions about independent nation-states in the last quarter of the 20th century: international politics are unique in the world of politics; the future will find states as independent as ever; this independence is based on particular patterns of human development; this independence leads to warfare, which is potentially suicidal; the only viable recourse is either radical alteration of this situation, leading to world unity or a space program that enables us to leave this planet; and until one of these goals is achieved the United States will be best served by protecting its own interests and those of the world at large by attempting to maintain a traditional balance of power rather than the crusading and moralistic approach of the post-World War II period. Notes, index.

144 pp. 1981 $9.95

PRAEGER PUBLISHERS
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10175
bomiting of Iraqi nuclear facilities by Iranian aircraft, a reporter for Science observed that “reactors present no special risk in the context of war among the superpowers. These nations presumably defend themselves with nuclear weapons, and a belligerent using nuclear weapons hardly adds anything to the radioactive damage already inflicted by striking at nuclear targets.” This assessment is statistically correct, against a projection of 100 to 120 million immediate fatalities in the U.S. alone from weapons effects; yet it is sobering to realize what is being dismissed here as negligible. Ramberg quotes estimates saying that added fallout from targeting nuclear facilities would cause in the U.S. “a few hundred thousand cancer cases each year, starting a decade or more after the attack.”

Relatively speaking, nuclear reactors are of greater potential importance in conflicts among nations that are limited to conventional weapons. Ramberg suggests the possibility of a nuclear facility becoming the decisive “weapon” against the nation that owns it. The scenario requires (1) a large reactor located near population centers or vital agricultural areas, (2) defending forces whose emplacements near the reactor can be penetrated, and (3) attacking forces that have the weaponry to cause release of radioactive material. Under these conditions, a carefully planned conventional weapon attack could spread radioactivity over a large enough area to devastate a small country.

Until recently the bright spot in this picture was the fact that countries least able to defend against such an attack didn’t possess the reactors that would need defending. The Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor last June demonstrated that the situation is changing. Nuclear facilities are proliferating throughout the developing world and at the very time that more powerful and accurate conventional weapons are being introduced.

The Israeli attack, carried out on a Sunday, was timed to minimize casualties. The facility was not densely occupied, and, presumably, little radioactivity was broadcast because the reactor was not yet fueled. The next time such an attack is launched, if there is a next time, changed circumstances may force different results—or maximizing casualties may be the very objective of the attack.

A Voice Crying in the Wilderness leaves no doubt that there will be more attacks—and far worse ones, if future progress in arms control mirrors that of the past. Feld cites estimates that by the year 2000 reactors in the developing nations alone will be producing enough plutonium to make thousands of bombs each year, and much of it to that purpose. This is only a small fraction of what the Superpowers, with their enormous overkill capacity, will turn out. There is far less to show for more than thirty years of arms-control negotiations.

Despite its frank assessment of the rapidly escalating danger, Feld’s book manages to stir hope that the future of disarmament will reverse the failures of the past. During the two decades spanned by his essays, Feld was a driving force behind the important Pugwash conferences, he conducted summer seminars in arms control, he edited Disarmament and Arms Control and The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and he held key posts with the Council for a Livable World and the Federation of American Scientists—all while functioning and publishing as a theoretical physicist. The record is one to inspire in the rest of us a greater commitment to the cause of disarmament.

Equally important, the depth and soundness of Feld’s essays make them a definitive guide to the subject and convincing testimony that nuclear catastrophe can be averted, if we have the will to do so. There remains the hope that the very spread of nuclear capabilities may help to forge that will, promoting the realization, in Feld’s words, that if “it has been futile to engage the military technicians in arguments over technical details...perhaps we could have more success by bringing the argument back to matters of principle, to questions of economics, of ethics...and, quite simply, of survival.”

by Gregg Herken
(Alfred A. Knopf, 425 pp., $15.00)
John O’Sullivan

At a White House meeting on the thirty-sixth anniversary of the atomic devastation of Hiroshima, President Reagan decided to go ahead with the production and stockpiling of the neutron bomb. These “enhanced radiation” devices would be added to the estimated fifty thousand nuclear weapons already held around the world. As the arms race again picks up momentum, the need to understand the roots of this nuclear madness takes on greater urgency. Gregg Herken’s study, drawing upon recently declassified documents and newly available personal papers, provides a subtle, insightful analysis of the development of American nuclear policy in the first half-decade of the atomic age.

The Winning Weapon depicts compellingly the failed hopes, persistent illusions, and false assumptions about Soviet and U.S. nuclear capabilities during those years in which the cold war grew ever more intractable. The awesome new power available to the United States in 1945 evoked differing responses from the nation’s leaders. After the Japanese surrender, when Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was about to leave government service, he petitioned President Truman to make an early, direct approach to the Soviet Union on control of the bomb. The alternative, he warned, was “a secret armament race of a rather desperate character.” Secretary of State James Byrnes, initially committed to using the bomb as a major diplomatic bargaining chip with the Russians, soon came to realize its limitations as a