

historical context, this shift in focus tends toward one-sidedness and results in views inferior to those of earlier centuries.

In an effort to be receptive to both the tradition of the universal Church and the recent developments within the Netherlands, Schillebeeckx advocates an understanding of priesthood as a charismatic office of community leadership. Precisely as an "ecclesial function within the community and accepted by the community" such an office is a gift of God. It includes a fourfold task: relating the gospel to the present world both practically and prophetically, Christian criticism of human society, pastoral activity on an individual level, and responsibility for the celebration of the liturgy. Insisting that the local community has a right to the Eucharist, and opposing a disjunction between actual pastoral leadership and presidency at liturgical celebration, Schillebeeckx supports modification of laws concerning the choice of candidates for ordination when and where such regulations impede the fulfillment of the legitimate needs of the local church. He also recognizes, however, the importance of maintaining communion among the local churches. It is from this perspective, and not with an appeal to personal feelings of vocation, that he addresses such controversial topics as sacerdotal celibacy and the ordination of women.

Ministry received quite a bit of publicity in advance of its English translation, and many commentators have predicted renewed investigation of its author's writings from the Roman Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. While public reaction will no doubt largely be determined by varying responses to Schillebeeckx's practical proposals, prescinding from such issues may facilitate more objective evaluation. Though at times more apodictic than the fragmentary information provided by the texts permits, the biblical section offers a useful survey of pertinent material. The treatment of later tradition, however, is very selective. Some aspects of the basic argumentation, such as the idea of the priority of each local community's right to celebrate the Eucharist, require more careful formulation than Schillebeeckx provides and may tend

to exaggerate the theological importance of the local church. While the definition of church office in terms of pastoral leadership of an ecclesial community can claim support from other prominent contemporary theologians and has much to recommend it, more thorough consideration of alternative views, such as the Austrian theologian Karl Rahner's stress on the priest as official minister of the word, would surely have been appropriate. Similarly, the reflections on celibacy might well have profited from weighing the essays on the priesthood of Joseph Ratzinger, the present cardinal archbishop of Munich and Freising and a distinguished dogmatic theologian. There are residual effects of the book's origin from independent essays, most evident in the incorporation of a now rather dated report on the 1971 Synod of Bishops. Overall, while providing serious food for thought, *Ministry* is ultimately disappointing, especially to those accustomed to the high standards of Schillebeeckx's earlier work. **WV**

**THE PRUDENT PEACE:
LAW AS FOREIGN POLICY**

by John A. Perkins
(University of Chicago Press; xvi+239 pp.; \$28.00)

Adda B. Bozeman

The relation of law to foreign policy and the association of these two idea systems with peace are habitually given grave thought in the West, more particularly in the modern USA. This book is one of countless efforts to weave the three strands into a comprehensive, stress-defiant, and protective fabric.

For Mr. Perkins, a practicing attorney, nothing is loftier and more beneficial to mankind than the norms of American law, as he interprets them. Foreign policy does not interest him much, except insofar as it contradicts the law or can be made subservient to it. Peace, in his view, cannot possibly ensue from the first of these eventualities but is bound to evolve naturally from the latter. These truths he considers self-evident and

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incontrovertible. Neither law, foreign policy, nor peace is defined or otherwise analyzed on its own terms. Indeed, the book rests on the startling proposition that law *is* foreign policy.

Equally surprisingly, the book announces — with the support of a quotation from Kingman Brewster — that “American foreign policy should not be self-serving.” The concept of power, especially military power, is not brought into any relationship with the national interest. Perkins admits that a world power equilibrium is the indispensable underpinning for law. Power, however, is not to be used by one nation to advance its own interests.

At a time when lawlessness is the norm in all Communist and most non-Western societies, when the pursuit of national interests by the majority of states in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Soviet bloc is marked by ready resort to aggression, military intervention, or outright warfare (and thereby by wholesale flouting of established international law and provisions of the U.N. Charter), Perkins insists that America’s national interests must be determined exclusively in the context of the law. Obviously uncontaminated by the realities of the global environment, he refrains from judging illegitimate the activities of any other state. What he provides instead is the constant reminder that somehow, somewhere the U.S. is at fault, if only because it has set a bad example.

What is the origin and purport of these convictions? A careful reading of the book makes clear that it has been in no way influenced by knowledge of any culture or society but our own. None of its basic propositions is thus buttressed by evidence derived from comparative studies of foreign policy, ideologies, histories, sources of strategic thought, the role of law, or dispositions toward peace, war, and conflict resolution. For the most part even international law is treated as an analogue of this country’s experience with the common law. International law too, Perkins tells us, will evolve gradually and without the benefit of legislation, ultimately providing the *raison d’être* for foreign policy everywhere. In short, all Perkins’s major argu-

ments are carried more or less exclusively by the dynamics of a personal faith, a faith lodged not in providence, religion, or history, but in a virtuous United States led by a virtuous, peace-and-law-loving elite. Perkins, in fact, casts his country in the role of “redeemer nation” — a risky destiny.

In discussing self-determination and nonintervention — the two principles of the “emergent international law” in which he places his highest hopes — Perkins ignores the whole catalog of interventions by the USSR, North Vietnam, China, and India, among others, and rests solely on interventions by the U.S. His treatment of the Vietnam war is equally untidy.

The author is evidently also oblivious to the rich record of peaceful settlement of disputes without recourse either to law or even to legal reasoning. He asserts that law alone can lead to conciliation. While admitting it would be an illusion to assume that the U.S. can make the world safe by committing itself exclusively to this approach, Perkins yet insists that we simply must make such a commitment; “nothing is more likely to destroy our capacity to influence the policies of other nations or developments within them than an attempt to coerce them.”

How, then, are the possibilities of law to be realized? Mr. Perkins’s main admonition here is that the U.S. commitment to “law as an act of foreign policy . . . include a commitment to . . . the principles of emerging law.” This “emerging law” is that which is recognized by a majority vote in the U.N. General Assembly, more particularly General Assembly Resolution 1514 (xv) of December, 1960, which calls for an end to colonialism in all its forms, and Resolution 2625 of October, 1970, a “Declaration on Principles of International Law.”

Critical analyses of these current approaches to self-determination, notably the work of Rupert Emerson, are expressly brushed aside because they antedate the resolutions. Other leading authorities, among them Raymond D. Gastil, are not even mentioned. In fact, the book is ruled by the presumption that every resolution that overturns or contradicts existing international law estab-

lishes a “new law” which is by definition superior to “old doctrines.” And since Perkins believes that the Permanent Court of International Justice has been decisively overtaken by events in the U.N., he proposes that adjudication “in the real world” now be assigned to a new Voluntary Adjudication Tribunal that would give full effect to all new “peremptory norms,” especially those regarding the right to self-determination.

Ultimately, Perkins’s prescription is this: Swing along with the ever-changing political views expressed by chance majorities in the U.N. and forget about law, foreign policy, and the prudent peace. [W.V.]

HEGEMONY AND REVOLUTION: A STUDY OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI'S POLITICAL AND CULTURAL THEORY

by **Walter L. Adamson**

(University of California Press; 304 pp.; \$22.50)

Myrna Chase

It seems that each generation of revolutionaries faces a betrayal, some more than one. Conflicts of ordinary politics come to seem like mere fissures next to the great political earthquakes. And as one generation becomes disenchanted, another finds enchantment. Survivors of the older generation regard the newly bewitched and the newly disenchanted as naifs.

Faced with what Stalin did in the name of Marx, a generation of Western Marxists has tried to find an alternate Marxist tradition — an early Marx; a humanist, Hegelian Marx instead of an economic determinist one; a Marx of culture as well as of production, distribution, and organization. All the great dissenters in the revolutionary tradition have been lionized: Luxemburg and her pleas for revolutionary spontaneity, Trotsky and his struggle against Stalin’s bureaucratic revolution, Mao and a fantasy China, Castro and the Latin claim to a humane socialism. Still others, less confined to a specifically Communist legacy, urge a return to Hegel. Among these are the would-be heirs of Antonio Gramsci