

democratic politics or the welfare state. His brief experience of politics, both democratic and Fascist, and his reading of Hegel, Marx, Sorel, and Croce led him to argue that the modern state is able to organize mass movements for the reorganization of society without a complete recasting of society by revolution or other means. He arrived at a doctrine he called "hegemony": A ruling class may dominate a state without dependence on economic or physical force. Clearly the Fascists were able to mobilize consent. Gramsci concluded that political rather than economic or physical force is primary, though its primacy is only relative.

"Hegemony" also encompasses the moment in history when a particular class is conscious of itself as a common culture, having a common intellectual and moral awareness. For change to occur, another class must develop a counterhegemony. The stress in this doctrine of hegemony on culture, ideas, values, and education is so different from our usual experience of proletarian dictatorship that the doctrine has broad appeal, especially to leftist Western intellectuals. The intellectual has a central role in the revolutionary process. He is not merely one of an elite party leading the proletariat, but he participates in the shaping of consciousness and in articulating the ideas of the masses who are involved in such practical matters as management, labor, governing, and raising families. The shaping of consciousness involves not only the criticism of a past culture, but also its preservation; not only the creation of new forms, but also the development or savoring of a popular culture.

Adamson sees the doctrine of hegemony as a monumental theoretical breakthrough, since classical Marxism assigned ideology and culture a distinctly secondary place. It has certainly been received as such by a new generation of the enchanted and has sparked a creative enthusiasm for a more humane Marxism. But the tension Gramsci experienced between action and Party organization continues to test the flexibility of Marxism. Like Gramsci, his followers are highly selective readers of history. Gramsci's Lenin was the Lenin of the soviets against the pro-

visional government, not the creator of the Bolshevik party's democratic centralism; the Lenin who argued that the will of the masses could overcome the uneven economic development of a backward nation; the Lenin who was influenced as much as Gramsci was by syndicalism's call to action. To his followers today, Gramsci is the champion of worker participation, the thinker Mussolini had to silence for twenty years. This Gramsci is cultured and learned, not the polemicist whose attacks on rivals in the Party and in the Comintern were vicious, who thought revisionist works should be cen-

sored, who attacked those whom Stalin attacked — a fact that cannot be ignored even if he happened to die at the hands of Mussolini.

The fragmentary nature of Gramsci's work is another aid to enchantment, but it can disenchant as well. Already there are left and right Gramscians retracing the fundamental arguments that provided both the great divides and the betrayals for earlier Socialists and Communists. At the moment a sense of a revitalized socialism inspires Poles, Frenchmen, Italians, and Englishmen, and the *Prison Notebooks* are widely read. [▼▼▼]

**THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION:
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS BEFORE AND AFTER HIROSHIMA**

by **Michael Mandelbaum**

(Cambridge University Press; xi+283 pp.; \$29.95/\$8.95)

SURVIVAL AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

by **Laurence W. Beilenson**

(Regnery/Gateway, Inc.; ix+169 pp.; \$10.95)

James T. Johnson

The perplexing problem of how to live responsibly with the enormous destructive potential of thermonuclear weaponry receives two quite different responses in these two books. Beilenson advances a wide-ranging critique of U.S. foreign and military posture in the nuclear age. He argues with considerable passion for a retreat from entangling foreign commitments such as NATO in the interest of providing a stronger, more credibly defensible continental United States. Mandelbaum, in contrast, upholds what has become the mainstream in American foreign and strategic policy. He defends NATO, balance-of-power politics, and the strategic nuclear standoff between the superpowers, viewing them as instruments of international stability that provide safety for this country and the rest of the world.

In these terms the two books mirror a larger debate within American society — isolationism vs. internationalism — that began long before the dawn of the nuclear age and has only taken on new particulars as a result of the growth of nuclear armaments. But there is a further difference. Beilenson focuses nar-

rowly on the question of how "to survive as a free people" in the United States. And his answer to this question — end alliances like NATO and SEATO, withdraw American military forces abroad, encourage the building of strong nuclear deterrent forces by nations now under the U.S. "umbrella," embark on a serious new effort at civil defense in this country — concentrates single-mindedly on unilateral steps the United States should take to defend itself against nuclear war. Mandelbaum's book is more internationalist in scope and commitment. Though America's problems in facing the nuclear revolution are at the center of this book too, Mandelbaum makes a thoroughgoing effort to analyze and understand U.S. problems and policies in a global perspective.

Thus while Beilenson's argument is often persuasive, and some parts of it (like his recommendation for a revived civil defense effort) deserve careful attention, the overall effect is of discussing one large tree in a forest as if it stood alone on a plain. Mandelbaum, on the other hand, succeeds in dealing with the one large

tree as part of a whole forest that has developed over time. Whichever side one may take in the ideological argument, there is no denying that Mandelbaum's is the work of greater depth and sophistication.

Mandelbaum tells us that the present book is part three of a trilogy on nuclear weapons, following *The Nuclear Question* (1979; reviewed in *Worldview*, March, 1980) and his essay "International Stability and Nuclear Order" in David Gompert's *Nuclear Weapons and World Politics* (1977; reviewed in *Worldview*, September, 1978). This latest work is reminiscent of both, incorporates some of the arguments developed in the earlier works, and is notably better than either. In the 1979 volume Mandelbaum the historian tended to leave unexplained gaps and to ignore certain figures; in the 1977 essay he was functioning as the architect of one of four alternative scenarios for the future of nuclear weaponry, which led to a kind of tunnel vision to enhance the plausibility of the scenario for which he held responsibility. Now neither limitation is in evidence. Mandelbaum proved himself adept at understanding complicated ideas and events by dividing them into intelligible and useful categories of thought; here he adds an instinct for drawing credible and persuasive historical parallels.

Only the times and conditions have changed, Mandelbaum believes, not human nature or the anarchy that characterizes interstate relations. From this perspective he incorporates into his analysis telling references to Thucydides, to the wars of the eighteenth century and the Napoleonic period, to earlier arms races — in short, arguing persuasively for the fact of continuity in human affairs and for a way of thinking about the nuclear era that does not divorce its problems from those of earlier ages. While the nuclear era is indeed different enough to be termed the product of a "revolution," there are enough similarities with past revolutions in military affairs that we can learn about how to live through our own era by reflecting on what followed them. Notable here is the Napoleonic revolution in the composition and use of armies and in the goals of war, and the industrial, or mechanical, revolution

in arms production and military mobility. Similarly, though certain features of the nuclear arms race are unique to today's superpower struggles, there are instructive equivalents with earlier arms races — the one between Athens and Sparta described by Thucydides, for example, or the naval arms race between England and Germany after 1905.

Though the analysis throughout is well conceived and executed, the most constructive and creative chapters of this book are the second and the last. In the former Mandelbaum considers the issue of disarmament and examines why this way of dealing with especially terrible weapons has been successful with chemical and biological weaponry but has failed with nuclear. Similarities and differences between these types of weapons are analyzed thoughtfully; their links with conventional types of weapons are explored; anthropological evidence is summoned to indicate taboos on chemical and biological but not on nuclear weapons; and cultural traditions of restraint are examined in terms of their implication for each type of weapon. While Mandelbaum's reasoning is subtle, it deals a heavy blow to any notion that the threat nuclear weapons pose to mankind can be dealt with responsibly by disarmament.

The final chapter, unlike anything Mandelbaum has done before, attempts to assess the personal impact of nuclear revolution in religious, psychological, and social terms. It is more successful in raising questions than in providing answers, but even here he is exploring relatively new fields. The historical and thematic depth he brings to the rest of his task is much in evidence as Mandelbaum considers examples of apocalypticism and millenarianism of earlier days. (He is probably wrong, though, in his reasoning that, in the last analysis, apocalypticism does not fit the case of nuclear dread.)

All in all Mandelbaum's latest book is a considerable achievement and an important contribution to understanding how to live humanly in the path of the nuclear revolution. Those unfamiliar with his earlier works would do well to begin with this one, consulting the others when necessary to enlarge their understanding of Mandelbaum's per-

spective and his perception of international relations in the nuclear age. Those already familiar with Mandelbaum will find a maturity, sophistication, and depth not yet in evidence in the earlier works.

Beilenson's *Survival and Peace in the Nuclear Age*, narrower in perspective and in focus, is a lawyer's book (the author's profession) in its method of argumentation, its use of historical cases, its single-mindedness. It is hard-nosed and unrelenting — the presentation of one of the sides in a formal debate, not an attempt to weigh the whole and construct a conclusion out of it. For Beilenson the whole has been weighed already, the conclusion reached; now the job is to marshal all available evidence to convince other Americans — the jury after all — to agree to that conclusion and implement it. Still, Beilenson has something important to say, and in a nation that honors a tradition of open public debate on political issues, this position deserves to be stated as forcefully as possible. |WV|

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