

bers of the Cabinet, such as C. D. Howe, the ex-American who built a Canadian national economy, or Lester Pearson, who pursued as loyal ally a foreign policy that was based on a different reading of the world scene from the one that obtained in Washington in the '50s, are appropriate in a Canadian history because Canadian administrations have a decisive role in policy that is denied to those in Washington. Although Canadian parliamentary government differs fundamentally from the U.S. "division of powers," the country is certainly not immune to American political influences, as with the winds of Camelot that tempered Canadian politics in the early '60s. The book makes clear that Canadian Liberals fit better under the traditional British and European definition of the term than do the United States liberals. Although neoconservatism is a present force in the Canadian spectrum, Canadian Conservatives always have shared the national attitude toward the role of the state. There is also a Canadian tradition, with which the present leader of the Progressive-Conservative party has been associated, of "Red Tories," who are much like what Americans would call "liberals." Given the stridency with which the terms *liberal* and *conservative* are used in the United States these days, it is just as well that Americans should not misinterpret the Canadian labels. Another fact to be learned is that Americans are unwise to identify any Canadian party as simply pro-American or anti-American.

Foreign readers should be warned that the book has been criticized in Canada from both Right and Left as a defense of the record of the "Grits," the historic appellation for the Liberal party. That is probably because Liberal governments have done most of the governing in the period covered, and these historians, by revealing the infinite complexities of the issues and the differences within the parties, undermine cherished convictions about simple solutions that ought to have been tried. On the other hand the authors do imply that it was unfortunate the short-lived Conservative government of 1979-80 did not have a better chance to see what it could do. The admitted bias of the authors is in favor of strong govern-

ment at the center, but they deal fairly with the grievances of the provinces.

The book has, of course, an Anglophone perspective, but one will find here a sensitive and thorough unraveling of the growth of nationalism and "*indépendantisme*" in Quebec. Reflecting, however, some hardening of attitude on the part of Anglophone liberals in the face of the rejection of proffered goodwill by Quebec intellectuals, the authors are harsh in their judgments of the language policy and other policies of the Parti Québécois government. As for "sovereignty-association," which has been the P.Q. slogan, it is dismissed in the kind of one-liner that enlivens this book: "An adult national existence perhaps, but one might suggest that in this plan the adolescent was leaving home with the keys to the father's house and mother's Mastercharge." But doubtless the greatest disadvantage of sovereignty-association for Quebecers is that it would leave the keys to economic policy and the credit cards in Ottawa, where their own voice would be considerably diminished. That is exactly why Canadians always have been shy of economic unions or "accords" with the United States.

One of the myths this book challenges is that Canadian life and history are dull. Not even his many enemies at home or abroad think Trudeau is dull. Nor is anyone likely to think that of MacKenzie King or John Diefenbaker and the others after reading these absorbing pages. The book flows along, embracing with vivid and amusing detail almost all aspects of the life of the country. It is admittedly opinionated. But the opinions make for good reading, and over the breadth of it, it is remarkably fair because the authors recognize that governments are run by human beings who combine frailty with genius and who are neither conspirators nor prophets. If there is one complaint it is that foreign policy is treated soundly but sketchily, crowded out by domestic politics and culture and acute economic analysis. It is to be hoped that Messrs. Bothwell, Drummond, and English will produce another compilation on that subject, for the enlightenment of readers at home and abroad on the problems of a middling power in the world. [WV]

JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR: A MORAL AND HISTORICAL INQUIRY

by James Turner Johnson
(Princeton University Press; xxv+380 pp.; \$30.00)

Terry Nardin

Readers of *Worldview* may remember James Turner Johnson's review of Michael Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars*, a book with which it is useful to compare Johnson's own. Johnson had written in May, 1978, that Walzer's book should be read not only as an exploration of the moral limits on warfare embodied in the tradition of "the just war," but also as an investigation of the ideas of morality and moral reasoning upon which any theory of the just war must rest. In his own book Johnson provides us with an account of these limits that also must be read on two levels—that is, as a book about morality as well as about war. This complexity is a source of difficulty for both authors. Johnson (and others) criticized Walzer's account for depending on an undeveloped and possibly parochial theory of human rights. The soft spot in Johnson's account is the obscurity of the idea of "tradition" that underlies his essentially historicist conception of morality. Because the idea of a moral tradition and its relation to moral reasoning is not closely analyzed, the reader is left wondering what Johnson's intention in this book really is: Is the book to be read as a work of practical morality or as one of intellectual history?

The ambiguous character of Johnson's inquiry reveals itself in his awkward phrase "just war tradition," which eschews the definite article. To speak of *the* just war tradition presumably would distort the fact that there are a number of different traditions concerned with the limitation of war, even if we confine our attention, as the book does, to Western civilization. Then why not speak of "just war traditions" in the plural? Johnson suggests this is because those who have thought and written about the limitation of war are in considerable agreement. But agreement alone does not make a tradition. Christianity and Confucianism both emphasize the virtue of charity, yet this does not in-

dicating the existence of a common tradition. Johnson fails to provide an explicit analysis of the idea of "tradition," and one is never sure how the various views he considers are related to one another. Despite extensive use of historical materials, Johnson avoids rather than answers questions about historical influence; this suggests his inquiry is not primarily historical.

Nor is the book primarily a work of practical morality. Johnson does reach a number of moral conclusions—for example, that it would be wrong to use tactical nuclear weapons and that the strategy of nuclear deterrence should be abandoned. But the precise derivation of these judgments is not clear. Morality, Johnson suggests, must be understood historically as a set of values perpetuated within a community, implying the moral irrelevance of the rational search for fundamental principles. From this it would seem to follow for Johnson that those (like Walzer) who have sought to locate the morality of war within a theory of natural law or human rights have no greater claim to moral truth than do those for whom restraints in war are a matter of prudence or humanitarianism. Johnson argues that both of these orientations are firmly rooted in the just war tradition. But if ahistorical tradition is the source of moral principles limiting war, what are the grounds for choosing among competing principles and for engaging in criticism of inadequacies within the tradition? Johnson tacitly acknowledges that his account gives rise to difficulties, for he mentions that he hopes to write another book devoted to the conception of morality as a form of historical consciousness upon which his account of war depends.

As a scholarly investigation of ideas concerning the limitation of war, Johnson's book continues the work begun in his *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War*, correcting the historical distortion that arises when certain periods of styles of just war thinking are ignored. In his first book Johnson was concerned to distinguish the different strands of medieval just war thinking—those of scholastic theology, canon law, civil law, and the chivalric code—and to show how both religious and secular ideas contributed to the emergence

during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the modern international law doctrine of the just war, with its emphasis on expediential constraints on the conduct of hostilities and its indifference to the question of the ends for which wars might be justly waged. In his new book Johnson takes the story down to our own time and examines an even wider range of views. The result is a series of imaginative and useful explorations of certain theological, legal, and military ideas essential to understanding the limitation of war as a moral and practical problem.

In one of the most interesting parts of the book Johnson discusses how moral principles regulating war within the boundaries of particular communities differ from those that arise when war takes place across communal boundaries. Within the Christian realm, he argues, the idea of natural law served to express and reinforce shared principles of restraint in war. Applied to relations with those outside Christendom, however, natural law arguments were most often used to justify European domination of other peoples. At this point Johnson the moralist takes over from Johnson the historian. He argues that the idea of natural law is abused when it is used to claim absolute validity for the values of a particular community and is thereby transformed into an ideology that justifies the imposition of those values on outsiders. The proper use of natural law arguments, Johnson suggests, is to articulate what is morally required by our common human nature while taking fully into account the actual diversity of human cultures and values.

After reconsidering certain themes treated in his first book, Johnson turns to the ideas of total and limited war as they have been treated in strategic as well as legal and moral writings from the eighteenth century to the present. One of his chief concerns is to rectify the neglect of strategic thinking by historians of the just war tradition and to affirm the moral relevance of strategic ideas and principles. The strategic concept of limited war is particularly important for morality; for although the strategic and the moral approaches to restraining war are dissimilar in many ways, there is, Johnson argues, con-

siderable common ground. Both strategy and morality are concerned with minimizing collateral damage and with protecting noncombatants. Therefore each is in its own way concerned with the fundamental ideas of proportionality and discrimination that crop up again and again within the just war tradition.

The tradition, then, is a plural one in which "absolutist" and "relativist" principles are equally important. To be sure, the idea of discrimination has received greater emphasis among theologians and moralists, that of proportionality among statesmen and military leaders. According to the author, what is needed is a new synthesis in which these two orientations are fully integrated and properly balanced. It is worth noting that the achievement of such a synthesis is precisely what Walzer was attempting when he presented the principle of noncombatant immunity as a limit to calculations of proportionality, developed standards for sharing the risks of war between soldiers and civilians, and suggested that the principle of noncombatant immunity might be overridden in extreme situations, where absolute fidelity could have catastrophic consequences. It is surprising that Johnson concludes without explicitly considering these proposals.

The book is long and difficult and, if I am right, methodologically incoherent. Yet even these drawbacks do not deprive it of value as a consistently illuminating and thought-provoking exploration of the intellectual heritage that has shaped the way Westerners at least now think about the morality of war. [VVV]

**LITERACY AND REVOLUTION:
THE PEDAGOGY OF PAULO
FREIRE**

edited by Robert Mackle
(Continuum Publishing Co.; ix+166
pp.; \$7.95 [paper])

Henry C. Johnson, Jr.

In principio erat Verbum is an appropriate epigraph for this small volume of essays on the historical and philosophical/theological foundations of the pedagogy of Paulo Freire. (Its purpose is also to correct misin-