and violent times, future historians will see George Ball as one who gave dedicated service to the cause of stability in our national and international life. They will lament only that he could not do more and that there were not many like him to serve the public interest. \(\text{WV!}\)

**TRADE AND AID: EISENHOWER'S FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 1953-61**

by Burton I. Kaufman

(Johns Hopkins University Press; xiv+279 pp.; $25.00)

*Ralph Banken*

Appraisals and reappraisals of the Eisenhower presidency have become a minor industry recently. However, most of these studies focus on the personal attributes of Eisenhower and on the political components of his foreign policy. There has been little significant discussion of his approach to and use of economics as an instrument of diplomacy and as a key element in relations with the Third World.

Professor Kaufman’s book is a major contribution to the understanding of this facet of Eisenhower’s strategies—one which, according to the author, the president himself devised and supervised closely. Through its careful research and effective presentation, *Trade and Aid* reveals far more than the limited specialization suggested by its title.

In eight years as president, Eisenhower faced a rapidly changing world. New nations, cut loose from the chains of empire, were being born in prolific number. Big-power politics now became, in large part, competition for influence in the newly opened regions of the Third World. The principal theme of *Trade and Aid*, beyond the technicalities of data and documents carefully recorded, concerns the American response to this challenge. Secretary of State Dulles and the president’s military-strategic advisors tended to focus on diplomatic ties, on mutual security pacts and military aid. Eisenhower gradually came to opt for a different strategy he had seen work in Europe: longer term economic assistance along Marshall Plan lines.

The president’s thinking evolved in several steps. Initially he was hopeful that private and corporate sources would provide the resources needed for this type of effort; then, disappointed in the response of business, he moved toward the allocation of public funds. At the end of his administration, as U.S. balance of payments problems escalated, he became more interested in multilateral and regional means of financing Third World development.

Eisenhower’s approach was contested by several domestic political interests, and at times he had difficulty prevailing in Congress. At other times, sensing the mood of Congress and not ready to provoke a confrontation on this issue, Eisenhower modified his aid requests. However, it is important to remember that the pattern and policy Eisenhower initiated has been followed by almost every subsequent American administration.

Beyond the conventional goals of helping development, increasing American influence, and blocking Soviet penetration into the Third World, Eisenhower’s policies had a deeper motivation, a kind of hidden expectation. It was the hope of the president and some of his principal advisors that increasing Third World involvement in global economic processes would enhance and establish democratic political ideas and procedures in those nations. As he shifted his emphasis from trade to aid, the president seemed to expect even more positive political fallout. He, and his successors as well, were to be disappointed on this score. The lesson is that economic assistance can and often does operate at levels divorced from internal politics; and frequently the anti-Communist goal of aid collided with the goal of supporting democratic government.

Perhaps the most important point made by Kaufman, as much by inference as by overt comment, concerns Eisenhower’s personal commitment to the economic involvement of the United States in developing regions. He placed America irrevocably at the center of the global system at a time when many Americans were ready to opt for another period of isolationism. “Some people are still stupid enough to believe in the concept of Fortress America,” said Eisenhower, who was working to prevent this.

Among the many other valuable insights provided by *Trade and Aid* are a number relating to oil policy, mutual security concepts, the beginning of several multilateral aid efforts, and the involvement of the U.S. in United Nations economic institutions. Of particular interest today is Kaufman’s analysis of oil policy in the mid-1950s. At that time the administration began to impose restrictions on the import of foreign oil. This and other actions were to have major consequences for the U.S. economy almost twenty years later. In 1957, Eisenhower seemed ready to go to war against the oil producers in the Middle East should there be an oil embargo. Given all this, how surprising it is that the embargo of 1973-74 came as such a shock to Western governments.

Kaufman’s book is also an implicit commentary both on Eisenhower’s presidential style and on the state of American knowledge about development in the 1950s. We see Eisenhower as a flexible and subtle political operator, an activist but not a confrontationist. Much of his time was spent mediating between different groups within his administration and in handling Congress. In each situation he emerges as a fairly skilled manipulator of men.

Sadly, the state of the art of development economics was not much advanced in those days. There was little interest in or awareness of cultural factors, traditional influences, and social heritages. A narrow “economist’s view” of development prevailed. As a result, many of the battles fought for aid allocations were in vain; the investment failed to produce much of value in economic, social, or even political terms. The major question surely must be: Are we better informed now?

Finally, *Trade and Aid* has several lessons for our time. As the Reagan administration embarks on a program in which aid increasingly is being left to the private sector and for which political expectations are high, it is instruct-
ive to have the experiences of another time. Were President Reagan to read this valuable book, he might be saved much unnecessary trauma in the future. [WV]

AH, BUT YOUR LAND IS BEAUTIFUL
by Alan Paton
(Charles Scribner's Sons; 271 pp.; $12.95)

Lewis Nkosi

Thirty-four years after the publication of his first novel, Cry, the Beloved Country, and even eight books later, the appearance of Alan Paton's latest fiction is bound to evoke the tingling memory of that initial event. It was, after all, the first time that the international community was allowed through a work of fiction to peep behind the apartheid curtain at the grim realities of life in South Africa.

Paton's deliberate mingling of a weighty moral tone with the unrestrained biblical lyricism of a latter-day Isaiah gave the novel its characteristic resonance. If, on reflection, the moral dilemmas seemed not always the most pressing ones; and if the hero seemed exasperatingly to have been created in the mold of another emollient figure we have come to know by the pejorative eponym "Uncle Tom," few critics were inclined to judge Paton's essentially paternalistic view of African life too severely on either score.

There was, after all, something more than a lofty moral tone in that first novel that compelled attention. Its breadth of social description and characterization, its evocation of rural and urban settings, above all its orchestration across the color line of two bewildered patriarchal families, one white and one black, gave the novel a certain quality of epic grandeur and an almost atavistic appeal. Tragedy coupled with high-minded moralism has a fatal attraction for many Western readers.

All the same, Paton's first work had flaws; its great success was the way it concealed them behind a sense of urgent moral purpose. Sometimes gushily sentimental, with characters whose uniform language was a synthetic compound of native accents and the Old Testament, Cry, the Beloved Country could only slide past our critical intelligence by facing us out morally. Paton's second novel, Too Late the Phalarope (1953), though smaller in scope, was a more consistent work, very exact in tone, texture, and modulation. The same was true of the stories in Tales From a Troubled Land (1961), many of them not much more than character sketches, composed nonetheless in a tautly controlled style, be-speaking a realism always commensurate with the bleak lives they annotated.

In spite of the almost unanimous chorus of approval from international critics that has greeted Ah, But Your Land Is Beautiful, this novel does not show Paton to be "writing at the height of his powers," as one publicist would have us believe; nor is it "as eloquent and moving as his Cry, the Beloved Country." On the contrary, in language alone this is a much feebler work, almost embarrassing in its failure to match in words the high deeds it tries to narrate. Cliché works like a toxicant in the bloodstream of this novel: "Out of his bluest of blue eyes shot flames that consumed any cruelty or cant within burning distance." This refers to the late Patrick Duncan, son of a former governor-general and a fellow member with Paton of the Liberal party. In this novel social history is thinly disguised by many other actual historical figures, among them Chief Albert Luthuli, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate.

In the past decade or so we have all grown accustomed to the noisily bruted rumor from France that the author is dead or vanishing. Of course certain texts enable us to consent more readily than others to such a patently absurd idea. Persistently and insistently, Alan Paton's latest novel affirms the existence of the author. Multiple narrative voices speak ventriloquially to us, but we are not fooled. Behind the scenes is the author, deftly pulling the carpet from under the feet of his political enemies, the Marxist Left in the Congress Alliance, and extolling not very subtly the virtues of Paton's own now moribund Liberal party. As one character unsniffconsciously describes the Liberal party after it sponsors an all-race barbecue: "The braaiwies proved again that the Liberal Party is a gigantic tour de force." Well, if it takes a barbecue?

This sounds as silly as the anguished appeal by an unidentified character in the novel: "You must hurry up, Patrick Duncan, if you are going to save South Africa." The real Duncan, who bravely participated in the Defiance Campaign of 1952, was sentenced to a fine of a hundred pounds or a hundred days in jail. It had been agreed that resisters should not pay the fines but should elect to go to jail instead. After twenty days Duncan decided to pay the fine and, as Van Onselen, the most garburous voice in the novel, wryly comments in a letter to his aunt: "He told the London Observer that his book business was falling to pieces, and that he and his wife and children depended on it. He should surely have thought of that before deciding to break the law."

Is this Paton, once again through Van Onselen's acid pen, taking sly digs at a fellow Liberal? Possibly. For at one time the stature and reputation of the late Patrick Duncan rivalled that of Paton himself among the blue-chip Liberals, which leads us to conclude that what we have here is a novel that, although constructed with intense ideological cunning, fails to craft a suitable structure to support the weight of all that ideological timber. Not only is it difficult to know whether this book is fiction or social history, it is often difficult to know for certain who among the babel of voices actually is speaking. An even more pressing ethical issue is the appropriateness of Paton's putting into the mouths of actual historical figures like the late Chief Luthuli words that serve only to justify his own known political positions. A reviewer finds himself compelled to ask: Did these people actually hold such opinions?

The example of Solzhenitsyn and his "Gulag" weighs heavily on Paton. Both writers are deeply committed Christians with a solemn hatred of communism. Both have given of their best only in a short novel. For Solzhenitsyn it is A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich. For...