immune: witness Acheampong in Ghana.

The performance criteria are more interesting than the typology. Only a handful of non-oil-producing African countries have achieved regular economic growth since 1960. The problem has been that most governments of each ideology have given short shrift to agriculture in which some 80 to 90 per cent of the population is engaged. Income distribution is also mostly pro-urban. Autonomy, participation, and human dignity are hard to find under any of the ideologies. Power is mostly too fragile to be shared willingly. Young credits Kenya with expanding its societal capacity in terms of improved ability to deliver education and health services to rural people. One could say the same about few other countries.

Ideology is one of several variables helping to explain the mess that most of Africa is in. It is far from the most important. This book does a good job of explaining why.

**RUSSIAN ROULETTE: THE SUPERPOWER GAME**
*by Arthur Macy Cox*
(Times Books; 256 pp.; $14.95)

**IDEOLOGY OF A SUPERPOWER: CONTEMPORARY SOVIET DOCTRINE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**
*by R. Judson Mitchell*
(Hoover Institution Press; 159 pp.; $10.95)

Thomas M. Magstadt

Russian Roulette will very likely attract a good deal of attention. The topic, nuclear arms reduction, is timely; the prose is at least palatable; and the thesis is thought-provoking. Yet for all its surface appeal, the book is seriously flawed.

Cox begins with a chilling description of the dangers of accidental war due to computer error. He particularly assails Jimmy Carter's "P.D. 59": the presidential directive that consecrated "a new strategic concept." By accepting the idea that it is possible to fight and win a nuclear war, this doctrine "reduced the credibility of strategic deterrence, increased the possibility of accidental war, and undercut the prospects for strategic arms control." In Chapter 2—"The Soviet Blunder"—we find a recapitulation of various Soviet "military adventures" in Africa and Asia during the 1970s. Cox views this interventionism in support of national liberation movements a Soviet "blunder"—a series of foreign policy moves that, in their failure to take into account the effect on U.S. domestic policy, led to "victory for the American hawks" (the title of Chapter 3) and the demise of detente. In my opinion, such a view fails to take account of the central role that these interventions play in Soviet policy. Surely, though, it grossly oversimplifies the problem to say that detente's demise was due primarily to the vicissitudes of internal politics in the U.S. The midsection of the book is devoted to a critique of U.S. foreign policy, in particular the habit of "miscalculating Soviet power," one that Cox depicts more as the cynical ploy of saber-rattling archconservatives than a legitimate difference of interpretation.

The author's reflections on avoiding nuclear war in Europe are, on the whole, both interesting and insightful. Curiously, though, he does not appear to notice that while mass protests are on the rise in the West, a minuscule and pathetic handful of antinuclear protestors in the Soviet Union is bullied into silence. Apart from this glaring omission, the stress he places on the growing importance of the peace movement on the Continent serves as a timely reminder that all is not well with NATO.

In Cox's framework for a comprehensive superpower compact, any satisfactory agreement must establish "workable ground rules for the inevitable competition that will continue to exist." He identifies two key areas: nuclear arms reduction and a "Third World military non-intervention pact." Arms reduction must be aimed at eliminating counterforce weapons, which, Cox believes, vastly increase the likelihood of accidental or unintended war. Nonintervention must "outlaw" all military involvement, both direct (Vietnam and Afghanistan) and indirect (Angola and Ethiopia), including extension of "military assistance for one state to another." Unfortunately, this proposal is marred by the author's tendency to underestimate Soviet and overestimate American intransigence. Moreover, Cox misses the relationship between the two parts of his proposed solution. In Soviet diplomacy, the strategic arms buildup and active support for national liberation wars in the Third World are somewhat linked, and may not be unlinkable. In fact, Soviet spokesmen have asserted repeatedly that the recent success of "anti-imperialist" struggles in Africa and Asia is attributable above all to the changing "correlation of forces" in the world—i.e., the buildup of Soviet military might that has prevented American imperialism from directly supporting counterrevolution at the same time that it has permitted the Soviet Union to become more and more active in promoting the world revolutionary movement.

R. Judson Mitchell's thesis is that the old ideology of Marxism-Leninism has been superseded by one adapted to the requirements of a rising superpower. The Prague Spring of 1968 inspired the "first Brezhnev Doctrine," redefining the concept of sovereignty for Eastern bloc states. Along with this doctrinal development there was an attempt to establish and legitimize a new kind of international law of "socialist internationalism," which would, in effect, give Moscow blanket justification for military intervention throughout the so-called Socialist Commonwealth.

The Soviets claim that the correlation of forces shifted decisively in Moscow's favor during the decade of the 70s. One thing that could alter the relative weight of the two camps, in the Soviet view, would be a decision by Peking to join the "imperialist" coalition in the Far East:

"If the prospect of geographical encirclement is important in Soviet calculations—and actual Soviet participation in tripolar politics in the 1970's suggests that it is—then we might expect massive Soviet efforts to overcome the problem. The two most obvious means for breaking out of such an encirclement are fundamental alterations of the strategic and diplomatic balance vis-à-vis the United States and increased Soviet influence in the Third World through support for "national liberation" movements."

The Kremlin leaders viewed detente not as a set of constraints forced upon them by American military and political preeminence but, contrariwise, as an opportunity presented by the erosion of America's global power. "The Soviets," Mitchell writes, "have never wavered in their insistence that fundamental changes in the distribution and exercise
of world power compel American acquiescence to razriadka [the common Soviet word for détente]."

If Mitchell is correct, razriadka is the centerpiece of the Soviets' long-term strategy for "the restructuring of international relations" featuring Moscow as the hub of the new world socialist system. In a chapter entitled "Proletarian Internationalism: The U.S.S.R. and World Revolution," the reader is reminded, with ample quotations from the Soviet press, that support for national liberation movements still holds a position of the highest priority and, further, that the "Zaradov doctrine" appears to reserve a special place of honor for the role of revolutionary violence.

Mitchell's well-researched study suggests that the Soviets have restructured their ideology to conform with their present strategy for restructuring international relations. Obviously, ideology is only one weapon in the continuing "diplomatic struggle of the two worlds," and not the most decisive one at that—although Soviet writers now place a new emphasis on "subjective" factors in international politics. Unless the author errs in considering Soviet pronouncements as policy and not mere propaganda, the obstacles to an overall accommodation between the superpowers would seem almost insuperable. One can only hope that Mitchell's brand of unrelenting realism does not impede progress toward the achievement of Cox's laudable goals.

THE WORD REMAINS:
A LIFE OF OSCAR ROMERO
by James R. Brockman, S.J.
(Orbis Books; 256 pp.; $12.95 [paper])

Holly Myers

Oscar Romero was archbishop of San Salvador for a scant time, but it was his fate to be named to the post in the years when his country awakened to the terrible injustice embedded in its society. The history of that awakening, and its legacy of struggle, is now also the history of the Salvadoran Church. It is nowhere better embodied than in the life of the martyred archbishop who did much to cement the alliance of the Salvadoran Church and people, restoring the Church's credibility as a force for peace and justice.

James Brockman's book is fascinating as biography, particularly as it traces the development of Romero's thought during his last tumultuous years, and also as a document of the Salvadoran struggle for liberation. One is made aware of the fierce simplicity of the choices open to the nation as well as how difficult are the practical applications of those moral choices—how to work toward justice in a monstrously repressive society.

Romero was not greeted with enthusiasm by the majority of priests and religious in El Salvador when he was installed as archbishop in 1977. They had favored the naming of Arturo Rivera Damas—now the acting archbishop—someone they believed would be more responsive to the needs of the Salvadoran people. But Romero reacted swiftly to the new responsibilities placed upon him and, through close identification with recent Church teachings, soon proved himself to be a tireless servant in the cause of the dispossessed. Romero's episcopal motto was "sentir con la iglesia"—to be of one mind and heart with the Church—and he took his lead directly from the teachings of Vatican II and from the two Latin American bishops' conferences, the first in Medellin in 1968, the second in Puebla in January, 1979. His ever-deepening commitment to the Puebla ideal of the "preferential option for the poor," strengthened by persecution and opposition as well as by tremendous popular support, came as a surprise to many; but Brockman's work reveals that it was hardly the "conversion" his detractors claimed it to be.

Unfortunately, Romero's own identification with the poor was not shared by the Salvadoran bishops, and his commitment to the cause of the poor engendered a back-biting disunity within the Salvadoran Church hierarchy. The effect was serious, and Brockman bids us consider whether this public split in the hierarchy emboldened assassins against clergy, citizens, and Romero himself. Of the five bishops, only Arturo Rivera supported him; the other four, along with the papal nuncio, undercut his efforts, accusing him and all the activist priests and religious in the country of "Marxist" partisanship. Dissension within the Salvadoran Church led, in turn, to troublesome relations with the Vatican. This was especially evident in Romero's dealings with conservative Cardinal Baggio, and an apostolic visitor recommended that Romero relinquish full control of his diocese. As archbishop, Romero made several trips to Rome for consultation, as well as to present his own viewpoints, and one senses his increasing confidence over time. His second, and last, private audience with John Paul II was heartening. Romero wrote in his diary: "I felt God's confirmation and his force for my poor ministry."

Another important aspect of the Salvadoran crisis for Romero was the media. The country's newspapers, television, and radio are owned by the oligarchy, who use them to distort events and manipulate the citizenry. The press continually published slanderous attacks on the Church and on...