The value of this volume lies in its concise yet graphic writing, its forty-eight pages of four-color illustrations, and its many maps that trace the historic ebb and flow of a remarkable campaign. In 296 pages one is offered the highlights of the struggle for possession and control of the sacred shrines, from 1096 until the last Christian remnants were driven into the sea in 1291. It is an exceptional bargain at $15.95.

Before entering into the bloody military campaigns themselves, Professor Bridge sketches vividly the world of the Middle Ages, whose inhabitants were caught up in a terrible immediacy of guilt and death. Heaven and hell were in no sense metaphors, absolution from sin was everyone's urgent need, and religious relics and sites were basic to the culture of the faithful. Though the Muslim rulers had allowed pilgrimages to the holy places, the defeat of the Byzantines by the Turks in 1071 prevented Christian pilgrims from reaching them. In 1095, Pope Urban II, at the urging of the Byzantine Emperor Alexius I Comnenus at Constantinople, called for a crusade to recapture the holy lands for the followers of Christ.

At the Council of Clermont in France, Urban II succeeded beyond expectation. French, German, and Italian crusaders responded to the call. Among them was Peter the Hermit, who was able to assemble about twenty thousand followers. Peter was a "small, middle-aged man with a dark, unsmiling face almost as long and lugubrious as that of the donkey which he always rode. He wore nothing but an ancient and indescribably dirty monk's habit and a hermit's cloak, and his bare feet had not been washed for years. He would eat neither bread nor meat but lived on a diet of fish washed down by wine....He had the demagogue's power to move men by his word...." Even so, a good deal of the success of Peter the Hermit in rallying people to his banner lay in the hardness of the times—the plague, floods, and famine that had stalked Europe since 1083.

En route to Constantinople the Crusaders, in the name of their religious ideology, murdered the Jews they encountered, but the first engagement of Peter's army with the Turks was a massacre: "Soldiers, knights, priests, women and children were all cut down as they ran screaming for safety or as they stood out of breath and unable to run any further.... A handful were made prisoners when the soldiers of Islam became so sated with blood that they could not be bothered to kill any more...." Nonetheless, reinforcements, moved both by piety and avarice, continued to come, led by the princes of Europe in uneasy alliance with the Byzantine Emperor Alexius. Battling infidels, the Crusaders proceeded onward, sustained by visions, falling stars, and other evidences of God's grace. Antioch fell before them, then on to Jerusalem. Peter the Hermit became involved in intra-Crusade politics; and as his encounters with the sultans, St. Peter, and Christ multiplied, he was openly accused of fraud. He demanded to vindicate his veracity by walking through a wall of fire. He perished, but the Crusaders pressed on to Jerusalem and finally prevailed.

Tancred of Normandy entered the city, promising the Muslims their lives for ransom; but the Crusaders "sunk to an immense and terrible blood lust....so they killed every man, woman and child whom they could find in the city with enjoyment and a complete assurance that they were doing the will of God. The massacre went on and on through the day and far into the following night. When the chaplain Raymond of Aguilers went to visit the Temple area the next morning, he found it a wilderness of corpses; the Mosque of al-Aqsa with Tancred's banner still fluttering from its roof and the Dome of the Rock were both so full of bodies of the slain that blood came up to his knees."

The remaining five Crusades, including the Children's Crusade of 1212, are each important and poignant in their own way. The intrigues among the European princes and the rise and fall of kings of the Christian lands are all chronicled here. One is left to remark on the apparent absence of vision, on an international politics that preferred violence to diplomacy. With no concept of a balance of power, little thought was given to alignments with at least one power in the region to avoid finally being assailed by all. Political wisdom was rare among the princes of Christendom. Succeeding Crusades were simply adequate resupply missions. After two hundred years the Europeans, preoccupied with the politics of their own continent, lost interest. On April 5, 1291, the Syrians appeared before Acre, the last significant stronghold of the Christians; armies were being raised in Egypt. By May 18 there had been a general assault and thus, amidst further panic and slaughter, did the era of the Crusades come to an end.

In the introduction Professor Bridge observes: "If the general reader is horrified by the brutality of the times, and if the Christian reader is appalled by what some of the Christians of the day did in the name of Christ, perhaps the horror of the one and the dismay of the other are signs that despite the wars and barbarities of our own somber age, people have changed a little by Christian faith and teaching over the centuries; not changed enough, of course, but at least changed a little bit."
THE TERRITORIAL DIMENSION OF JUDAISM

by W. D. Davies

(The University of California Press; xvii+ 169 pp.; $14.95)

The establishment of the State of Israel has turned what were once purely theological issues into political and ethnic controversies. One is “The Doctrine of the Land,” whose role in the thought and life of both Judaism and Christianity has been delineated by Davies in two pioneering works. The first, The Gospel and the Land, appeared in 1974. The Territorial Dimension of Judaism covers the same ground as the first volume but eliminates most of the scholarly apparatus to include material that helps make the volume more relevant to the current controversies surrounding the State of Israel.

Davies defines the doctrine as the assertion “that there is a special relationship among the God of Israel, the People of Israel and the Land of Israel,” but specific boundaries are not discussed. As the doctrine was increasingly transcendentized, the Land “tended to be identified with Jerusalem and even merely with the Temple.” With the exception of an accidental oversight (stating that “on sabbaths and festivals the Shmoneh Esreh was to be said four times”), the volume reflects Davies’s extraordinary ease in the vast ocean of biblical, apocalyptic, rabbinic, and Jewish mystic literature in which this doctrine is embedded.

The variety of opinion regarding the doctrine of the Land is fairly presented, adequately documented, and judiciously related to the variety of historic circumstances there reflected. The author discerns two constants that are integral to all variations of Judaism’s doctrine of the Land and distinguish it from analogous doctrines formulated by other religious or ethnic groups. “Judaism’s doctrine of the Land is unique in that it is associated with the concept of the promised land (Gen. 15: 17-21)” and hence “can not be separated from that of Yaweh as the Creator of the Universe.”

The author raises but does not answer the question of whether the doctrine of the Land is “an aspect of Judaism without which Judaism would cease to be itself.” He does note, however, that the diaspora “militates against an uncritical elevation of the Land in Israel.” The forced separation from the Land and the free emigration from it compelled changes in many aspects of the doctrine. One’s Jewishness did not depend upon living in the Land. Absence from it entails a price; living in it entails a reward. For the People of Israel, living in it implies sovereignty. While Israel’s divinely ordained right to the Land is unalienable, its possession of the Land is conditioned by observance of the Torah... Zionists treat sympathetically.

The author notes, however, that “the process of transcendentizing and spiritualizing the Land [in both Judaism and Christianity] points to the recognition in both religions that, however desirable, the fulfillment of the terrestrial hope for the Land, or for any land would not suffice to assuage the more than terrestrial aspirations of Israel or of any people.”

—Simon Greenberg

THE HIDDEN FACE OF EVE: WOMEN IN THE ARAB WORLD

by Nawal El Saadawi

(Beacon Press; 212 pp.; $8.25 [paper])

This is the rare account of women’s roles in Arab society that issues from the pen of a woman who belongs to that world by birth and enculturation. Dr. Saadawi, Egypt’s former director of public health, opens the book with a searing memory: At eight years of age she is being dragged out of bed in the middle of the night and led into the bathroom, where an excision of the clitoris is performed. Anguished confusion joins pain and fear when she recognizes her own mother, then her younger sister, in the group of women who hold her during the “operation.”

Saadawi describes explicitly how Islamic culture has constructed a system in which concepts of family honor, female virginity, and masculine superiority operate together to reinforce the custom of genital mutilation of women. She argues that the physical mistreatment of women is paralleled in their mental suppression, with the result that “the mental and psychological development of a woman is greatly retarded, and she is unable to free herself from passive attitudes and the habit of depending on others.” Females are also subjected to a “contradictory educational process,” which is on the one hand sex-denying and tries to mold a girl into an asexual creature, yet on the other “seeks to make her an instrument of sex and a mere body...to attract men....” Young girls are nurtured on romantic love but forced to yield, at the same time, to the absolute authority of fathers who are prepared “to sell their daughters into wedlock for a good price.” To preserve a girl’s reputation, the practice of female circumcision in its various forms (in the Sudan all the external genitalia are removed) remains widespread. Saadawi’s research shows that 97.5 per cent of uneducated families maintain the custom, while the figure drops to 66.2 per cent among the educated.

Dr. Saadawi uses a Marxist approach to good effect in arguing that the
correspondence (from p. 4)

current regime in South Africa, which I think is an inaccurate picture of the situation for black people. He does admit difficulty knowing "what South Africa's nonwhites think," although he correctly suspects they see some of the so-called reforms as belated and as a tactical ploy to weaken the black population by co-opting the "Coloureds" and Asians as toothless lapdogs on the side of the whites, against the majority Africans.

These moves toward giving certain hand-picked Coloured and Asian stooges positions on the President's Council (advisory only) far fall short of "enfranchisement of Coloureds and Asians" as a whole—and the mass of these population groups are rejecting these phoney overtures for what they are: attempts to entrench white power, under the guise of "reform."

The plan to attach the Swazi "homeland republic" (new phraseology, legitimizing another phoney concept) to Swaziland is not even being touted by the regime as a concession to anyone, and yet Baker sees it as such. He is impressed with these proposals being "almost breathtaking in their boldness by the standards of past regimes" (meaning governments formed by the same Nazi-like Nationalist party since 1948—see his preceding paragraph).

baker replies:
The letter of Dr. Dommissie reminds me of the story of the disobedient dog who would run away and, upon his return, receive a beating from his master. The story is told to illustrate the fact that, as far as the dog was concerned, he was being punished for returning, not for running away. The notion that South Africa be punished even more harshly when it attempts—albeit belatedly and inadequately—to reform its political system suggests a rather thoroughgoing ignorance of the principles of behavior modification.

We lectured South Africa about integrating sports, and, after their initial refusal followed by a protracted period of foot-dragging, they finally agreed to inter racial sports. They were then told by the international sports community that integrated South African teams were not welcome on the grounds that there can be "no most noble sports in an abnormal society." To be sure, South Africa is an abnormal place, but why rebuff them when he make a modest gesture toward normalization?

The reasons for the lack of credibility of South Africa's reforms are largely of that country's own making. For so long did they dig in their heels and refuse to countenance modifications of apartheid that their belated efforts have been greeted with the understandable cynicism reflected in Dr. Dommissie's letter.

But those who sense that there is more than meets the eye in Prime Minister P. W. Botha's constitutional proposals to draw Asians and Coloureds into the electorate—and I am one of them—are under an obligation to make the case that what Botha has proposed is not just some public relations scam designed to deflect the tide of international indignation.

My fundamental belief is that Botha wants to move South Africa off dead-center is based on the conviction that he runs a real risk of splitting Afrikanerdom over the question of according political rights to two nonwhite groups. He is already faced with the emergence of a new right-wing political party under the leadership of Andries Treurnicht, the former National party leader in the Transvaal, and with the continuing opposition of the Herstigte Natjonale Party. In the recent by-election in the Germiston district, the two right-wing groups amassed more votes than the National party candidate although the split conservative vote gave the seat to the Nats.

There is no doubt in my mind that if South Africa pulls out of Namibia as the result of the negotiations with the Western contact group, the combined effect of that shock with the constitutional proposals could well produce a right-wing majority in the next national election. Would Botha risk a repetition of the schism in Afrikanerdom akin to the one that took place in the 1930s just to gull world public opinion? I seriously doubt it.

Botha's problem, as I see it, is that having embarked on a modest process of reform; he is now condemned, simultaneously, by those who want no movement at all and those who see his efforts as tokenism. His most immediate and serious problem is with the former group, but it is doubtful that he will ever get the approval of the latter even if his future proposals are broadened to encompass South Africa's black population.

The latter group—as represented by