

Dutch Reformed in New Netherlands, Lutheranism in New Sweden, Quakerism in Pennsylvania, or Catholicism first in New Spain and New France, then in Maryland.

The same broad scope characterizes the other sections of the book. The postrevolutionary and early national periods witnessed the spread to the frontier of old denominations like the Congregationalists, the rise of new ones like the Disciples of Christ and the Unitarians, and the beginning of new religious movements like the Mormons. It seems to me that Gaustad, in treating revivalism and Albert Finney, has utilized the insight of Jay Dolan's *Catholic Revivalism* to draw the parallel between revivals and Catholic "missions."

In his preface Gaustad notes that he wishes to trace "America's religious variety." By the mid-nineteenth century the United States was no longer only a white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant country. Immigration was altering the nation as, first, Jews began arriving in some numbers and then huge hordes of Catholics. Nativism became the defensive posture of the cultural majority seeking to retain its hegemony. Jews, still relatively few, peacefully adapted to American culture. Catholics, however, were a different story. Gaustad documents their internal struggle over trusteeism and the rise of thinkers like Bishop John England, Orestes Brownson, and Isaac Hecker. Then he moves to the nativist movement. His selections from the writings of Samuel F. B. Morse and Maria Monk provide lively accounts of the way in which Catholics were perceived, but additional selections from the works of Lyman Beecher or his daughter, Harriet Beecher Stowe, might have helped to place in context the reason Catholics generally did not take part in abolitionism.

Gaustad's shift from nativism to the abolitionist movement is quite judicious, I think, for slavery was a form of racism to be overcome if America was to become pluralistic. His presentation of both black abolitionism and slave religion helps the reader understand another native American phenomenon—black denominations. Reflecting the contemporary concerns of American religious historians, Gaustad links the issue of abolition to the pleas for women's and Indians' rights. He concludes this first volume with selections from Abraham Lincoln, who in so many ways symbolized the decline of the "evangelical empire," the theme of Gaustad's final chapter.

Some specialists might quibble at either Gaustad's selections or his interpretations. The historian of American Catholicism, like the present reviewer, will be happy to see

included "Objections Answered," a 1632 tract defending the founding of Maryland as a colony with complete religious liberty, but he might wonder at the omission of Maryland's act of religious liberty in 1639 or the more restrictive Act Concerning Religion of 1649. He might also ask whether Maryland was a "Catholic colony" or a colony founded by a Catholic and open to Catholics—and others as well. He would also deny that Catholicism in the new nation "learned to adapt" to the separation of church and state, since the Catholic Church in English-speaking America never had been united with the state. It is, furthermore, incorrect to say that "death" is one of the seven sacraments or that John Carroll was appointed "Vicar Apostolic" of the American mission in 1784; Carroll abhorred both the position and the title. It might have been helpful too to have placed in context John England's defense of slavery and, to balance the picture, to have included the 1832 address to the students of the University of North Carolina by Judge William Gaston, one of the few Catholic spokesmen against slavery.

These minor criticisms are as nothing when weighed against the total richness of the documents Gaustad has compiled. He has enhanced his selections with useful introductions to each of the major sections and to each of the documents. At the end of each section he has provided a list of suggested readings. This first volume of the *Documentary History* is itself a major contribution to the understanding of American religious history. In this regard the editor is far too modest when he says that he wishes to provide the "amateur" with the opportunity of being his or her own historian. He fulfills that purpose indeed, but he has provided a valuable service to the professional historian as well.

**FROM EMBARGO TO OSTPOLITIK:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
SOVIET-WEST GERMAN
RELATIONS 1955-1980**
by Angela Stent

(Cambridge University Press; xvii + 328 pp.; \$39.50)

Thomas M. Magstadt

Those who believe that historiography is irrelevant to the solution of current problems should read *From Embargo to Ostpolitik*. For anyone even vaguely familiar with the East-West trade policy of the Reagan administration this book is bound to

induce a powerful feeling of déjà vu. Although it deals primarily with Soviet-West German trade relations, the insights it offers have a much wider application.

Perhaps the weakest part of the book is the first chapter, in which the author attempts to develop a theoretical framework based on the concept of "linkage politics." She argues that there are two kinds of leverage in the diplomatic interactions between East and West, economic and political. Both kinds, in turn, can be used in positive or negative ways, i.e., as promised rewards or threatened punishments. Linkage makes its debut when one side attempts to use political leverage to wrest economic concessions, or economic leverage to wrest political concessions.

This conceptualization gives rise to two problems. First, it is entirely possible for either or both sides to use economic leverage in pursuit of economic objectives and political leverage in pursuit of political objectives. In fact, "linking" economic issues—e.g., Western financing and technology in return for Soviet oil and gas—would seem to be more fruitful, and more reflective of recent historical patterns, than attempts to link issues in one sphere with issues in another. To her considerable credit Stent does not fall victim to the theoretical trap she sets. Instead, she wisely avoids excessive dependence on cross-linkages—the basis of her conceptual framework—and concentrates on the historical record in tracing the evolution of Soviet-West German trade relations.

A second problem is Stent's unexamined assertion that the Soviet Union sought primarily economic gains from improved relations with Bonn, while West Germany sought primarily political gains. According to this view, West Germany was economically stronger than the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union was politically stronger than West Germany. Given these asymmetries, it follows that Bonn would use economic inducements to pry political concessions from Moscow, and vice versa. But in fact West Germany has sought entry to East European markets as vigorously as the Soviet Union has sought Western technology. It is not at all clear that the economic benefits per se are not highly reciprocal. By the same token, the Soviet Union sought recognition of the boundary changes in Central Europe and of the East German regime with an ardor that nearly matched Bonn's efforts at reunification.

These criticisms should not obscure the fact that this is a book with far more strengths than weaknesses. It is punctuated with pertinent historical insights. A pipe embargo,

similar to the one the Reagan administration was urging until just recently. was attempted in 1962-63. Then as well the United States and West Germany were at odds; certain West German Government officials and business interests wanted to sell large-diameter pipe to the Soviets in return for Soviet oil, and the Kennedy administration opposed the sale. At that time Walt Rostow, head of the Policy Planning Staff, wrote:

"The major issues of our trade control policy are political—not strategic, economic or commercial. From the standpoint of the USSR, the political significance of the U.S. restrictive policies has been out of all proportion to their impact on the Soviet economy or strategic position. The principal reason for this is that they serve as a symbol of U.S. unwillingness to grant the USSR full respectability as an equal in the postwar world order, a symbol that the U.S. dares to discriminate against the USSR under contemporary conditions."

The policy of the current administration is admirably summed up by Rostow's twenty-year-old statement. And yet much has changed since those truculent cold war words were written. The United States has granted the USSR "full respectability as an equal in the postwar world order." More important, Washington no longer commands the authority it once did in NATO. In the first pipe embargo the United States deliberately sidestepped CoCom, a consultative group in which decisions had to be unanimous, in favor of the NATO Council, where a majority was assured. It has become painfully evident in the current pipeline controversy that the United States no longer is assured of majority support in NATO.

The real breakthrough in Soviet-West German relations, and with it an historic change in U.S.-NATO relations, came after 1969 with the advent of Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. This breakthrough anticipated the emergence of "détente" between the superpowers. These two developments played upon and reinforced one another. Stent's analysis demonstrates that West Germany made most of the political concessions to get the *Ostpolitik* ball rolling. At the same time, the indirect "political" benefits for the German people were considerable. Restrictions on travel and cultural exchanges between East and West Germany were relaxed, although by no means abolished. Economically, both sides benefited—although, again, it was West Germany that appears to have made most of the real concessions. One exception has to do with the status of West Berlin, which always has been a sticking point in trade agreements between West

Germany and Eastern Europe: The Soviets appear to have softened their long-standing position that any West German economic arrangement with the Soviet bloc countries unconditionally excludes West Berlin.

The author's conclusion is soberly drawn and follows completely from the evidence adduced in the main body of the book. Stressing "the futility of expecting that the Soviet Union will make major foreign policy concessions in return for trade inducements," Stent argues that nonetheless trade can "be a productive lever when judiciously used." In sum, "German-Soviet relations were not normalized *because* of economic

factors, but neither were [economic factors] irrelevant."

This study indicates that although the most immediate concessions, economic and political, have been made by the West Germans and the most visible benefits have been reaped by the Soviet Union, in the long run West Germany stands to gain much more than it will lose from a greatly improved atmosphere in East-West relations. If the West German Government shares this perception—and the available evidence suggests that it does—the Reagan administration had better adjust its NATO policy accordingly.

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