ministry in the Disciples of Christ. He attended first the little, academically feeble Cotner College in Lincoln, then went to Yale Divinity School. From Yale—where, he confesses, his academic achievements were meager—Fey, now married to Golda Conwell, returned to a pastorate in Nebraska, which he left for the Philippines, where he taught at the Union Theological Seminary in Manila and served as a Christian Century correspondent.

By 1940, after a stint as editor of World Call, a monthly of the Disciples of Christ, and five years as executive secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, he became convinced that he was first of all a journalist, not a religious bureaucrat. From that time on his life on the Christian Century staff took on that daily pattern familiar to any journalist writing for a religious opinion magazine: reading the New York Times, Commentary, Commonweal, and Christianity and Crisis to see what the competition was up to; squeezing in journalists’ junkets to the Middle East; assigning books to independent-minded reviewers who end up panning books by your friends; writing what you think are fair-minded editorials that, to your surprise, set the ecumenical movement back ten years.

If there is an intellectual core to Fey’s career it probably is his pacifism. He recounts the split within liberal Protestantism when Reinhold Niebuhr took up the cause against fascism; and Fey maintains to this day—in the most fascinating two paragraphs of the book—that had America remained truly neutral in World War II, Japan would not have attacked Pearl Harbor, European Jews would have been no worse off under Hitler, and we would have had no occasion to develop and use the atomic bomb!

If there is another core to Fey it is that he always has been a Protestant with a capital P. In the 1930s he opposed the formation of the State of Israel because Jewish nationalism was, he said, based on the illusion that Jewish racial integrity was important in God’s sight and because this illusion contradicted the popular theory of the American melting pot. Between November, 1944, and January, 1945, Fey published eight articles warning that a militant American Catholicism, organized under the National Catholic Welfare Council, with its headquarters (sinister!) in Washington, D.C., was set to “win” America by “invading” Protestant rural areas, forming Newman Clubs and Boy Scout troops, publishing diocesan newspapers. Read today, the articles are remarkable not so much for overt bigotry as for their naivety about Catholic power and for the cultural narrowness of their insistence that America be preserved as a “Protestant nation.” Vatican II has mellowed Fey a bit, but I suspect he will relax only when Catholicism comes to resemble a minor Protestant sect.

But now I must say something about the physical production and editing of this book, whose publication evidently was subsidized by the Disciples of Christ and Fey’s colleagues and friends. Perhaps the thought and effort necessary to make the book acceptable to a commercial or university press would also have turned it into a real contribution to American religious history. Chapters on American Indians and a 1951 trip to Korea are tucked on at the end without being integrated into the context of Fey’s life. The various photographs of Fey are virtually useless, poorly identified, and scattered throughout with little reference to the text. When we get to 1960, the year of Kennedy’s election, the most memorable controversy seems to have been the Century’s battle to keep the new Interchurch Center on Morningside Heights from having a Gothic facade that would blend in with the architecture of Riverside Church. There is no mention of the new president.

Next year the Christian Century will be a hundred years old. To read the old issues from the 1940s and ’50s—including editorials published under Fey’s leadership—is to discover the intellectual excitement of the religious and moral debates of our era. The magazine too has been young a long time.

**CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES: PARTICIPATION, STABILITY AND VIOLENCE**
by G. Bingham Powell, Jr.
(Harvard University Press: 237 pp.; $25.00)

Warren L. Mason

The comparative analysis of politics, after a period of vigorous development in the 1950s and ’60s, has been wandering of late on a plateau of academic scholarship. The theoretical insights of sociology and psychology failed to yield interesting empirical studies of politics. Much of what has been produced falls in the category of workmanlike, statistically based analysis that has rounded out or synthesized our knowledge of voters, political parties, and the like. Very few of these studies have contributed significantly to the verification of those broad theoretical generalizations that seemed so promising twenty years ago. Among the relatively few works that seem to have had real success in linking theory and data are those concerned with the survival and problems of democracy. The voting studies generated by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan and by its European associates have made landmark contributions. Other outstanding examples of work that has joined careful empirical analysis of democratic politics and large-scale theory-building include such modern classics as Robert Alford’s *Party and Society,* Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s *The Civic Culture*; as well as Sidney Verba, Norman Nie, and Jae-on Kim’s *Participation and Political Equality.*

G. Bingham Powell’s new work clearly fits into the small group of important studies of the past generation that combine rigorous analysis of data from a number of societies and theoretical generalizations that have appeared in bits and pieces in studies of more limited scope. The result is impressive. Powell has taken twenty-nine modern democracies—all the obvious ones plus those in the Third World with significant histories of democracy—and asked the classic question: Why do some democracies work better (and last longer) than others?

To answer this question Professor Powell presents a statistical analysis of the relationship between “governmental performance” in democracies and certain key aspects of the social and political setting. To measure performance he uses Citizen Voting Participation (read, voter turnout), Stable and Effective Government (read, the durability of political executives and their ability to command a legislative majority), and Maintenance of Political Order (read, numbers of political riots and deaths). He then looks at these performance indicators in statistical relation to the social and economic environment, the constitutional arrangements, and the political party systems of modern democracies. His analysis of these complex relationships is rigorous and methodologically sophisticated, without losing the clarity and continuity of its narrative line—a combination of skill and lucidity that in itself ensures it a prominent place among recent comparative studies.

The findings of this inquiry are both satisfying and surprising. Solid evidence is marshalled to indicate the truth of hypotheses long held by political observers. For example, constitutional arrangements like fixed-term presidencies and single-member district electoral systems do, indeed, produce the most stable governments. Similarly, extremist political parties do appear to exert a destabilizing influence upon governments. On the other hand, Powell’s
analysis shows that there is no link between high levels of voter participation and political turmoil; that multiparty systems produce less stable governments but fewer political riots; and that there is no relation between income inequalities and either rioting or political deaths. Powell is also able to indicate the central importance of political parties in influencing governmental performance and even the survival of democracy in the twenty-nine nations he examines.

What holds this important work together and provides its particular clarity and continuous relevance is its concern with only the data that respond to theoretical propositions drawn from the extensive literature of contemporary political analysis. Absent are sophomoric displays of methodological machismo and the reporting of secondary statistical patterns largely irrelevant to the points being tested. We are treated to a mature piece of social science scholarship, one that represents the "state of the art" in comparative political studies, without breaking new ground in either theory or method. If it does not achieve new heights of scholarship, it does provide a vantage point from which to survey the plateau of modern comparative analysis. **WV**

**WITH ENOUGH SHOVELS: REAGAN, BUSH, & NUCLEAR WAR**

by Robert Scheer

(Random House; xv + 285 pp.; $14.95)

Albert L. Huebner

At about the time that Robert Scheer’s book came off press there appeared a new study of the global atmospheric effects of nuclear war. Two atmospheric experts, using conservative assumptions, showed that forest, gas, and oil fires touched off by nuclear explosions will inject enough smoke into the atmosphere to block 50 to 99 per cent of the sunlight that otherwise would reach the surface. This condition would persist for several months and have such a devastating effect on agriculture that all but a small fraction of those who managed to survive blast, heat, and radiation eventually would starve.

This study underscores Scheer’s own comment that it ought not have been necessary to write **With Enough Shovels.** As every competent evaluation of the consequences of nuclear war has shown, it is inconceivable that either superpower can "win" in any rational sense of that term. Yet, according to Scheer, the Reagan administration, breaking with the decades-old official view, has arrived at the notion that nuclear war can be won. With Enough Shovels describes, largely through the words of the president and his nuclear advisors, just how this radical shift in policy came about.

Scheer had the first inklings of a reversal when he was covering the 1980 presidential campaign as a national reporter for the *Los Angeles Times.* His interview with presidential candidate George Bush early that year recorded Bush’s comment that he is not one of those who believes "there is no such thing as a winner in a nuclear exchange." This was the first conversation Scheer had with a highly placed member of the present administration in which it was asserted that a nuclear war was winnable. It would not be the last.

The thesis of **With Enough Shovels** is that those who contend that a nuclear war can be won, sometimes a small fraction within previous administrations, play a dominant role in the Reagan government. Their view, supported by the president himself, goes unchallenged; policies and budget priorities that plan for the unthinkable are formulated virtually without opposition.

So it was that President Reagan, in office less than a year, approved a plan that for the first time committed the United States to the idea that a global nuclear war can be won. Such a shift requires sharply increased military spending and, concomitantly, renewed enthusiasm for civil defense. This, Scheer argues, is the basis for the $1.6 trillion five-year military program that the president describes as "the rearming of America."

The idea of nuclear victory has no credibility, however, unless the public can be convinced that most of the population will survive. That is why, Scheer suggests, planners are again making inflated claims for civil defense measures—measures not substantially different from those repudiated nearly two decades ago, before more recent awesome increases in megatonnage and overkill capacity.

The strength of **With Enough Shovels** lies in the extensive documentation it provides. Of course the remarks of Reagan and Bush carry the greatest weight, but Scheer’s interviews with numerous others illustrate how thoroughly the nuclear-war-fighters are established in government. The words of today’s arms control officials are in sharp contrast with those of such outstanding analysts as Nobel laureate Hans Bethe, Herbert York, and Roger Molander and give every indication that the effort to limit weapons has been handed over to its long-time antagonists.

The failure to appreciate the dangers of nuclear war seems most chillingly apparent among the civil defense planners, perhaps because the notion of civil defense against a nuclear exchange is innately flawed. "You know, it’s an enormous explosion," was the way William Chipman, chief of the civil defense division in the Federal Emergency Management Agency, went about describing to Scheer the effect of a megaton bomb. "But it’s still an explosion, and just as if a shell went off down the road, you’d rather be lying down than standing up, and you’d rather be in a foxhole than lying down. It’s the same thing."

It was another civil defense analyst who