

analysis shows that there is no link between high levels of voter participation and political turmoil; that multiparty systems produce less stable governments but fewer political riots; and that there is no relation between income inequalities and either rioting or political deaths. Powell is also able to indicate the central importance of political parties in influencing governmental performance and even the survival of democracy in the twenty-nine nations he examines.

What holds this important work together and provides its particular clarity and continuous relevance is its concern with only the data that respond to theoretical propositions drawn from the extensive literature of contemporary political analysis. Absent are sophomoric displays of methodological *machismo* and the reporting of secondary statistical patterns largely irrelevant to the points being tested. We are treated to a mature piece of social science scholarship, one that represents the "state of the art" in comparative political studies, without breaking new ground in either theory or method. If it does not achieve new heights of scholarship, it does provide a vantage point from which to survey the plateau of modern comparative analysis. 'WV'


**WITH ENOUGH SHOVELS:
REAGAN, BUSH, & NUCLEAR WAR**
by Robert Scheer

(Random House; xv + 285 pp.; \$14.95)

Albert L. Huebner

At about the time that Robert Scheer's book came off press there appeared a new study of the global atmospheric effects of nuclear war. Two atmospheric experts, using conservative assumptions, showed that forest, gas, and oil fires touched off by nuclear explosions will inject enough smoke into the atmosphere to block 50 to 99 per cent of the sunlight that otherwise would reach the surface. This condition would persist for several months and have such a devastating effect on agriculture that all but a small fraction of those who managed to survive blast, heat, and radiation eventually would starve.

This study underscores Scheer's own comment that it ought not have been necessary to write *With Enough Shovels*. As every competent evaluation of the consequences of nuclear war has shown, it is inconceivable that either superpower can "win" in any rational sense of that term. Yet, according to Scheer, the Reagan ad-



ministration, breaking with the decades-old official view, has arrived at the notion that nuclear war *can* be won. *With Enough Shovels* describes, largely through the words of the president and his nuclear advisors, just how this radical shift in policy came about.

Scheer had the first inklings of a reversal when he was covering the 1980 presidential campaign as a national reporter for the *Los Angeles Times*. His interview with presidential candidate George Bush early that year recorded Bush's comment that he is not one of those who believes "there is no such thing as a winner in a nuclear exchange." This was the first conversation Scheer had with a highly placed member of the present administration in which it was asserted that a nuclear war was winnable. It would not be the last.

The thesis of *With Enough Shovels* is that those who contend that a nuclear war can be won, sometimes a small faction within previous administrations, play a dominant role in the Reagan government. Their view, supported by the president himself, goes unchallenged; policies and budget priorities that plan for the unthinkable are formulated virtually without opposition.

So it was that President Reagan, in office less than a year, approved a plan that for the first time committed the United States to the idea that a global nuclear war can be won. Such a shift requires sharply increased military spending and, concomitantly, renewed enthusiasm for civil defense. This, Scheer argues, is the basis for the \$1.6 trillion five-year military program that the president describes as "the rearming of America."

The idea of nuclear victory has no credibility, however, unless the public can be convinced that most of the population will survive. That is why, Scheer suggests, planners are again making inflated claims for civil defense measures—measures not substantially different from those repudiated nearly two decades ago, *before* more recent awesome increases in megatonnage and overkill capacity.

The strength of *With Enough Shovels* lies in the extensive documentation it provides. Of course the remarks of Reagan and Bush carry the greatest weight, but Scheer's interviews with numerous others illustrate how thoroughly the nuclear-war-fighters are established in government. The words of today's arms control officials are in sharp contrast with those of such outstanding analysts as Nobel laureate Hans Bethe, Herbert York, and Roger Molander and give every indication that the effort to limit weapons has been handed over to its long-time antagonists.

The failure to appreciate the dangers of nuclear war seems most chillingly apparent among the civil defense planners, perhaps because the notion of civil defense against a nuclear exchange is innately flawed. "You know, it's an enormous explosion," was the way William Chipman, chief of the civil defense division in the Federal Emergency Management Agency, went about describing to Scheer the effect of a megaton bomb. "But it's still an explosion, and just as if a shell went off down the road, you'd rather be lying down than standing up, and you'd rather be in a foxhole than lying down. It's the same thing."

It was another civil defense analyst who

provided the title for the book. T. K. Jones, deputy under secretary of defense, told Scheer that the United States could recover fully from an all-out nuclear war in just two to four years. According to Jones, survival is simply a matter of building primitive shelters: "Dig a hole, cover it with a couple of doors and then throw three feet of dirt on top." This approach is meant to be reassuring, and inexpensive as well, because "if there are enough shovels to go around, everybody's going to make it."

But a nuclear explosion is not the same thing as a shell going off down the road, nor can shovels protect the population from an all-out exchange. Whether or not Chipman, Jones, and the other nuclear war-fighters entirely believe what they are saying, their words and actions pose an additional danger to an already imperiled world.

BIG BUSINESS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: FROM FDR TO REAGAN by Kim McQuaid

(William Morrow & Co.; 326 pp.; \$17.00)

William Rugen

This is a comprehensive, well-told tale of the political education of America's large corporations during the past half-century. McQuaid, a historian and the author of *Creating the Welfare State* as well as of many articles on business-government relations, recounts how leaders of big business came to terms with the rise in power of the Federal government and developed the political skills to use that power to advantage. He deals primarily with economic policy; and because the direction of economic policy has come mainly from the executive branch since 1932, it is this branch that is central to the discussion.

McQuaid focuses his investigations on the efforts of the Business Council, founded in 1933 by such "forward thinking" big business leaders as Henry Harriman (a utility executive and president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce) and Gerard Swope (president of GE). The crisis of the Depression had convinced these corporate leaders that laissez-faire policies would lead not to economic recovery but to political upheaval and that something had to be done by the Federal government, Adam Smith notwithstanding. The question was how best to direct government policy.

The Business Council, a little-known but extremely influential appendage to the Federal government, was "surely one of the

more unusual efforts ever made to associate the nation's corporate elite with the federal government. Traditional American concepts of governmental structure, in fact, had very little relevance when applied to this organization." The Council, made up still today of about sixty chief executive officers (CEOs) drawn from the largest firms in the country, was born as a quasi-public advisory agency that nonetheless had a great deal of autonomy. It was officially an agency of the Commerce Department, had its offices in the Commerce Department, and presented confidential reports to executive branch policy-makers; yet the Council paid for its own staff, operated behind a veil of secrecy, and picked its own members and agenda.

Although certainly more influential than the average special-interest group, the Council did not have much success in implementing its program during the reform phase of the Roosevelt administration. For one thing, not all business leaders were ready for such compromises as Federal control over labor arrangements. The often truculent and obstructionist views of virtually all of the business community, both large and small, left it politically isolated and impotent. Yet members of the Business Council were more likely to adopt pragmatic positions than were members of broader-based groups such as the Chamber of Commerce or the National Association of Manufacturers.

New to the ways of Washington, CEOs tried to apply the model of well-defined corporate hierarchies to the Federal government. But hierarchies are of little relevance to the political world, with its balances of power and overlapping jurisdictions. This was especially true during the Roosevelt administration, given FDR's fondness for maintaining a degree of creative confusion.

Big business did learn, however. A seemingly responsible and practical "yes, but" approach proved far more effective than a reactionary, ideological "no, never." Realizing that unions and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 were permanent forces and not temporary aberrations, the Business Council was able to influence passage of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, a severe political setback for labor. Mobilization for the war gave business a second chance at participating in economic planning; the results were very lucrative defense-contracting procedures and tax breaks.

The Business Council was not always forward-thinking. During the Eisenhower administration, big business was unable to accept even a conservative Keynesianism, hence little was done to combat the reces-

sion of 1957-58. The results were large losses for the Republican party—and for business—in the 1958 and 1960 elections. So dissatisfied was the Business Council with the Kennedy administration and with attempts by Commerce Secretary Luther Hodges to limit its independence, that it disaffiliated itself from the government and lost some of its access and influence.

Nonetheless, the Business Council and the related Business Roundtable (formed during the Nixon administration) have continued to influence government decisions by adapting to changing political realities. The original Reagan supply-side program emphasized cuts in personal income taxes, but big business was able to lobby for cuts in its own taxes, especially taxes on large, capital-intensive firms.

McQuaid leaves many questions unanswered. If the Council played a game of *Realpolitik*, opting for power and influence over ideological purity, groups representing small and medium-sized firms took a more doctrinaire approach that precluded compromise and made victory politically impossible. Yet McQuaid never discusses why there should have been such a divergence. Nor does he make clear why Kennedy, in pushing his economic program, sought out big business as an ally and not, e.g., labor. This fine political history is thus marred by a lack of political and economic analysis.

Nonetheless, McQuaid's detailed investigation does much to clarify economic decisions and gives a very useful perspective on current policy debates in the Reagan administration. WV

SAUDI ARABIA: RUSH TO DEVELOPMENT by Ragaei El Mallakh

(Johns Hopkins University Press; 472 pp.; \$32.50)

Phillip J. Heyl

Before the exploitation of oil in Saudi Arabia, the primary source of foreign revenue was tourism—specifically, pilgrimages to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina—and the mainstay of the Saudi economy was the rather basic exchanges between nomadic herders and the more sedentary villages. Since the first of the oil price increases generated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973, the kingdom has become an economic giant. Each time the price of a barrel of oil increased by a dollar, the Saudi annual income increased by over \$3 billion. In 1979