The success of the Mexican Revolution and the acceptance of the Marxist interpretation of the Indian problem as a question of unjust land tenure increased the faith of the Andean *indigenista* movement in the "creative potential" of the Indian for bringing about change and gave the Andean *indigenista* novel its strong socialist stance. *Indigenismo* in the Andean world depicted a society "led by a morally corrupt elite supported by a corrupt military machine and clergy, all of whom lived off the Indian's labor."

However, even though the purported aim of Andean *indigenista* writers was to liberate the Indian, they still clung to the long-cherished ideal of "cultural unity," an almost mystical blend of Indian and ladino that would fulfill the need for a new, transcendent society. *Indigenista* writers, themselves mestizo, could envision the Indian's future only on their own, culturally bound terms. They valued the Indian's courage, the wealth of his ritual, his high esteem for collectivism. But they did not like his belief in magic, and they found in Indian culture not only a "potential for liberation" but "reactionary forces preventing this potential." Faced with the realities of the twentieth century, they divided into "socialist" and "liberal" camps. The liberals imagined the abolition of Indian culture and the rise of a benevolent dictator who would embody national interests. Socialist writers placed their faith in the communal process of *mestizaje*, wherein the mestizo, the new man, the Indian transformed, would lead an Indian revolution. In either case, the Indian was subsumed into the larger ideal of a mestizo culture.

In Guatemala, the Indian was generally more isolated from the dominant ladino society—with the important exception of the brief period from 1945 to 1954 under Arévalo and Arbenz. The development not only of political institutions but of literature as well was made impossible by the environment created by dictatorship. The work of Mario Monteforte Toledo, Guatemala's sole *indigenista* writer, ended in despair. His two novels, one written at the hopeful juncture that followed the overthrow of the Ubico dictatorship, the other written at the close of the Arbenz era, trace a slide from optimism to pessimism. The first of these sees the Indian problem as a problem of class. The Indian "will be saved as a person, not as an Indian." By 1953, Monteforte Toledo was not so sanguine. Munoz writes that "having recognized that the Indian was reluctant to accept the ladino's solution to the Indian problem (predicated on the Indian's cultural death), Monteforte Toledo, like some liberal writers in the Andes, partially returns to the preindigenista mood. His disappointment with the results of the revolution, as far as the Indian problem goes, is total. Despite his realistic portrayal of the Indian's social conditions in his second novel, he therefore returns to Matto's conclusion: either charity or death."

Mexico, after the success of its revolution and the institution of the *ejido* ("exit") system of land tenure, focused on national character as revealed through the mestizo. Since the Mexican *indigenista* writer did not need the Indian for his "creative potential" for bringing about change, he created instead a romantic Indian who remained distant from society and outside the revolutionary process. "Indians scattered in the countryside or crowded into urban centers were either ignored or reclassified." For the Mexican writer the revolution had created the "new society," and his writing relinquished the prescriptive aims of the Andean novel in favor of documenting Indian culture in an anthropological way. On the whole Munoz deems the Mexican *indigenista* novel escapist, though these writers shared the Andean writers' bleak outlook for the Indian's future. "Having neither a liberal nor a socialist hope, Mexican writers project an image of the Indian as an isolated being, suspended in space and time; they see this situation as ending only in an undetermined future when the Indian will disappear through mestizaje or death."

The *indigenista* movement faded in the late '50s and early '60s. This was due partially to the growth of the social sciences (especially anthropology), which effectively usurped the role of the writers, and also to a mild amelioration of the Indian's social condition in parts of Spanish America. Finally, the massive urban migration of this period changed Spanish American perceptions of the pressing problem facing their societies. This migration transformed the new majority of the dispossessed into masses of "deculturized proletarians," i.e., mestizos, and not Indian peasants.

As *indigenista* writing disappeared, Spanish American literature turned to magico-realist writing (exemplified by Miguel Angel Asturias), in which the Indian "problem" was pushed into the background of literary attention. Finally, concomitant with the development of a broad middle class, growing economies, and increased urbanization, the New Novel of the Spanish American literary "boom" appeared, typified by the works of such well-known authors as Gabriel García Márquez, Carlos Fuentes, Mario Vargas Llosa, and Julio Cortázar. For these writers, a more pressing concern than the Indian problem is the possible loss of the unique mestizo culture to an encroaching internationalist capitalist culture. In their novels "injustices take on a semblance of fateful events," and no solution to the social problems rife in Spanish America is offered. Munoz believes the stylistic obsession of contemporary Spanish American writers places their work beyond the reach of the majority of readers in Spanish America and that the current detour into aesthetic wizardry has presented a new task for Spanish American literature. He writes: "Perhaps the greatest task for the Spanish American writer may now be selfconsciously to fashion a great didactic literature: did not Marti, Vallejo, Neruda point the way?"

The search for Spanish American identity is not over; although the mestizo has indeed emerged triumphant, he "still possesses a haunted soul." The *indigenista* movement offered Spanish Americans an opportunity to come "to terms with the unhealed wounds of the conquest and its aftermath," but the vision of the *indigenista* writer was severely limited. In essence, *indigenista* writers were forced to abandon the Indian in favor of their dream of cultural unity, because behind their "demand for the Indian's self-immolation there lurked the hope that with the Indian's cultural death, cultural integration and sociocultural identity for the Spanish American might be secured." A mestizo himself, the *indigenista* writer could only envision the Indian of the future as a mestizo. A final resolution of the tension born of the sixteenth-century conquest is still not apparent. Whatever the result, it is clear that the Indian, squeezed by contending vision of class, race, and culture, will continue to suffer. WV

A BETTER WORLD
THE GREAT SCHISM: STALINISM AND THE AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL
by William L. O'Neill
(Simon & Schuster; 447 pp.; $17.95)

Larry Tool

This is an important book, not for what it achieves but for what it attempts. *A Better World* is offered as "a study of the struggle among non-communist leftists and liberals over American relations with the Soviet Union from 1939 through the 1950s." This is not diplomatic history, but, rather, a kind of sequel to studies of "the red decade." O'Neill portrays the intellectual aftermath

of what a recent writer has called "the romance of American communism." By "the great schism" O'Neill means the ongoing quarrel between Stalinists and anti-Stalinists, and also between their intellectual offspring and heirs.

O'Neill's own point of view is that of the independent Left. We have, he writes, too few Michael Harringtons and Irving Howes. We need an "ethical left" which is "American, democratic, loyal, and with no compulsion to admire or emulate foreign tyrannys." As one would expect, his narrative is critical of Stalinists and generally admiring of those who fought them. His heroes include such independent progressives as Dwight MacDonald, Sidney Hook, Mary McCarthy, and George Orwell. His analysis is broadly critical of the Popular Front mind, with its dogmatic insistence that there are "no enemies on the left."

A Better World reviews the major battles of the Stalinist/anti-Stalinist quarrel in chronological order. This guided tour through the memoirs, broadsides, and journalism of post-1940 liberalism includes the shock of the Hitler-Stalin pact, the struggle to define World War II (was it a "people's war"?), the debate over America's postwar role, the Henry Wallace campaign, McCarthyism, the Blacklist, who lost China?, and the debate over academic freedom. All are familiar themes. In each case O'Neill tries to show how the responses of fellow-traveling intellectuals were factually and/or morally wrong, while those of anti-Stalinist liberals—if sometimes equally confused - were often factually and morally right.

While this sounds like scoring points (and the book does have that tendency), O'Neill has not produced a neo-Trotskyite tract. He has tried to be objective, arguing that anti-Stalinist liberals are vindicated in nearly every case by a review of the available evidence. Nor is his aim to settle old scores. O'Neill believes that Stalinism seriously corrupted American liberalism in the 1930s and '40s. It taught intellectuals to sacrifice truth to a cause and to apply double standards to friends and foes. O'Neill (also author of a history of the 1960s) believes that the New Left demonstrated the extent to which we still suffer from the effects of that corruption. He finds it sadly ironic that the "backlash" from the Vietnam war silenced the anti-Stalinist tradition just when we needed a *progressive* opposition to Soviet expansion. He blames New Left scholars for concealing the sins and follies of the Old Left in order to promulgate a blanket indictment of liberal anticommunism. Only by facing a long history of mistakes and offenses, he argues, can the intellectual Left



once again become a significant force in American life. His message for today's Left is: Don't blame your past troubles on McCarthy.

A Better World is also an argument about the intellectual vocation. O'Neill believes that the political commitments which became an imperative of that vocation in the 1930s were a serious mistake. The real task of intellectuals, he cautions, is "to exemplify a better, more reasoned approach to public affairs than blind partisanship and instinctive loyalties." When intellectuals "abandon their calling and join the zealots," they sacrifice their only important contribution to public life. Addressed primarily to an academic audience, *A Better World* is laced with admonitory reflections on the fates of past partisans.

One hopes this book will inspire others to examine these old wars of words and wits more thoroughly and from other perspectives. Different lessons might be drawn from these disputes if they were viewed from outside the left-liberal consensus in which they arise. It might well appear that the whole American reform leadership lost touch with reality and with its public sometime in the late 1930s. Since then various groups of reformers have periodically fallen upon each other in a frenzied search for traitors or scapegoats. Perhaps it was not history or reactionaries but merely their own frenzy that blinded them to new possibilities for reviving their movement. From such a perspective Stalinism seems only a rather large and very red herring.

On its own terms *A Better World* has serious, though not fatal, flaws. First, O'Neill too quickly accepts the anti-Stalinists' assumption that communism was a real domestic threat to American ideals and institutions. This leads him to understate the hysterical quality of McCarthyism and unwisely to dismiss the kind of cultural and psychological analysis pioneered by Carey McWilliams's *Witch Hunt* (1950). A gadfly to partisans, O'Neill himself barely escapes a narrow rationalism.

Second, the chronological limits of his study (1939-60) make the pro-Stalinists seem even wackier than they were. If one takes into account the utopianism of pre-World War I reform, the disillusion of Versailles, the despair of the Great Depression, and the apparent moral lessons of the Spanish Civil War, then the rationalizations of pro-Soviet liberals become less bizarre, if no less foolish. Little is gained when an historian labels every housewife who delivered the *Daily Worker* "an apologist for Stalin's death machine."

Third, while Stalin the tyrant is the focus of this study, he is not really the key to the agonies of modern American liberalism. The Communists and fellow-travelers, as Murray Kempton wrote long ago, were only a part of their time, and not the most important part at that. O'Neill writes under a myopic motto from Lionel Trilling that obscures this humble fact. One suspects it would be more useful to treat Stalin as a symbol and to focus on issues closer to home. For example, what weaknesses in the American reform tradition led intellectuals to Soviet communism in the first place? Why were progressives so awed and confused by the use of brute force? How much of their sentimental defense of Stalin—like so many willful American illusions about

the outside world—was a kind of immigrant's expiation of his own desertion of the homeland and the old values?

A note on the research. O'Neill has explored a mountain of material and quarried many good stories and sharp exchanges to illustrate his theme. The result is a narrative of wit and force. A spot check of some of his sources, however, suggests occasional haste and carelessness. As hard as it is to chronicle such a donnybrook fairly, the effort must still be sustained throughout. O'Neill, like many of his characters, frequently shoots from the hip. Perhaps he has simply spent too many long hours in their vituperative company.

On balance, William O'Neill is to be applauded for braving a treacherous minefield of inquiry, where live shells still whistle past, fired from the bunkers of ancient partisans who refuse to believe the war is really over. Following O'Neill's lead, the next historian may well get across in one piece. WV

EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES
by Woodruff D. Smith
(Nelson-Hall; 273 pp. + maps; $20.95 $10.95)

MODERN EUROPEAN CULTURE AND CONSCIOUSNESS, 1870-1970
by Paul Monaco
(State University of New York Press; 182 pp.; $30.50/$8.95)

Donald J. Harvey

These are worthy books for the general reader and the college student. Smith, professor of history at the University of Texas at San Antonio, is informative about nineteenth and twentieth-century European imperialism; Monaco, professor of history at the University of Texas at Dallas, is stimulating on the material and metaphysical dilemmas of the European "consciousness," as revealed in selected novels, plays, and films since 1870.

Smith briefly presents the major European empires before 1815, then accords fuller treatment to the impact of modernization on the imperialist activities of the period 1815-60. The bulk of the book, however, examines the motives and forces impelling the "New Imperialism" of 1860-1900, plus selected instances of colony-collection and colony-management or mismanagement by the major Western European states through 1940. A compact section deals with the broader relationships of this imperialism and the world scene between 1890 and 1945. A final capsule describes the post-1945 wave of decolonization.

Smith delivers exactly what he promises—a "small book on a very large subject," an "overview," an "abbreviated" presentation of relevant "theses." Although he introduces, often repetitiously, Marx, Lenin, Hobson, and Schumpeter for their interpretations of the origins of imperialism, he favors such factors as political opportunism and socio-economic dislocation and disarray at home as the most important determinants of the imperialist surge. Perhaps he should have given more attention to the subject of Monaco's book—"culture and consciousness," mounting national sentiment, racial-ethnic awareness. Perhaps, too, he might have considered such things as the need of the French for military manpower from black Africa and Indochina.

If Smith guides us on a tour of the outer worlds of European experience, Monaco takes us to the inner worlds. After professing a laudably "holistic" rather than narrowly national approach to the cultural manifestations of Western Europe through the romantic, materialist, and electronic ages, Monaco proceeds to a finely tuned consideration of the interrelationships among art, artists, and society. He notes the obvious American part in a "common Euro-American culture which has developed since 1945," thereby seeming to ignore the Ernest Hemingways of the 1920s or the Ben Franklins of the 1770s. The core of the book, however, concerns the unfolding of the "individual," the "revolutionary," and the "reactionary" consciousness in what he asserts to be a still-vital Europe. In each instance Monaco begins with romanticism, though deference is paid to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment.

Monaco charts the effects on individual consciousness of "the death of God" announced by Nietzsche and of the deterioration of the values and standards cultivated by the elites of the nineteenth century. The twentieth-century European inherited a chartless land where anxiety, perplexity, rootlessness, and alienation abounded. Revolutionary consciousness, meanwhile, was torn between its immediate concern for a humane society and the ultimate goal of a harmonious society. According to Monaco, Stalinist communism stripped away the alleged ideals of the Bolsheviks, making communism "obsolete" in Western Europe by the 1960s. In this section, as elsewhere, Monaco seems to neglect or discount the presence, even after the searing experience of 1914-18, of *les hommes de bonne volonté*. Jules Romains and his kind refused to be polarized into the extremes of revolution or reaction. Monaco's interpretation of the moderation of the revolutionary New Left of the 1960s is on target: "Indications that the revolutionary ethos and mythos are becoming routine points not necessarily to their erosion, but rather, perhaps, to their relative success."

Though reactionary consciousness, as represented by nazism and fascism, is viewed as an atavistic reversion to primitive, often beastly responses to the twentieth century, Monaco might have given more "holistic" attention to the linkage between the dislocated individual consciousness and the reactionary consciousness.

Both imperialism and culture are significant and related aspects of European experience. Smith should enjoy Monaco's analysis of Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* as a value-threatening exposure of the imperialist hero. Monaco, on the other hand, will probably be disappointed, as was I, by Smith's scant reference to factors of culture and consciousness in impelling, sustaining, and then reversing the imperial tide. WV

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