period of just two years, 1978-80, the number of privately owned small businesses grew from 12,000 to 390,000, and the number of licensed artisans and freelance laborers increased to well over a million.

In addition, China after Mao's death was opened to foreign investment, both direct and indirect. But by far the biggest changes occurred in the agricultural sector. Sweeping policy changes allowing peasants to enlarge their private plots, obtain bank loans, raise more of their own livestock, and the like meant that by 1981 no less than a third of China's agriculture had reverted to private farming.

For the reader who wades through nearly five hundred pages of occasionally turgid and oddly assembled material, the relatively succinct concluding chapter is a welcome surprise. Short's discussion of the triangular balance of power configuration of Washington, Moscow, and Peking and the emergent international system is engaging, though not free of ambiguity and inconsistency. The United States, he argues, must make a choice between the carrot and the stick in dealing with the Soviets: "there is no logical middle path." He makes clear where his own preferences lie: "Feeding a bear satisfies it for a while, but the result is a stronger bear. The lesson of more than a thousand years of Russian history is that the appetite of this bear grows with the eating." In this connection he notes that a top-level Soviet foreign policy specialist, Politburo member Boris Ponomarev, flatly predicted in 1978 that the world was "heading towards an epoch in which socialism, in different concrete forms conditioned by the history of each country, will be the dominant social system on earth."

The implications of Short's dim view of Soviet aims are rather obvious. However unpalatable the PRC's brand of politics might be to the United States, both sides have every reason "to want to make their policies mutually reinforcing so as to extract concessions in the form of political restraint for a common adversary." It rates mentioning that the only contingency Soviet ideologists recognize as a future threat to the 'favorable correlation of forces' upon which predictions like Ponomarev's are based is one in which the United-States and China enter into a military-political entente. However, this does not mean that the U.S. and China should seek a formal alliance or give the appearance of gunning up on the Soviet Union: "the stick of enticement must be attached to the carrot of compromise and co-existence." Unfortunately this advice, however apposite, is easier to hand out than carry out, as the author's own inconsistency on this point suggests.

Short's conclusions: (1) the greatest threat to the security of the West is Soviet expansionism; (2) at the same time, the continued rivalry between the two superpowers is inherently unstable; (3) the best hope for peace rests on the emergence of a "triangular balance" in which the Soviet bloc, the West, and China independently pursue policies of détente backed by military strength. It is difficult to see how China can hold up its end in this contest of the superpowers.

IN SEARCH OF THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM: AN ESSAY ON MAX WEBER'S PROTESTANT ETHIC THESIS by Gordon Marshall (Columbia University Press; 236 pp.; $22.50/$10.00)

WEBER, THE IDEAL TYPE, AND MODERN SOCIAL THEORY by Susan J. Hekman (University of Notre Dame Press; 209 pp.; $19.95/$9.95)
These two superb new books provide one of the most heated controversies of the economy and the polity. He warned of the authoritarian tendencies embedded in this apparently neutral administrative apparatus. It was also Weber who predicted that the decline of religion would lead not only to the rational world view so dear to the Enlightenment theorists and to Marx, but also to a "disenchantment" with the world and a withdrawal from it into a private sphere of narcissistic hedonism.

In terms of social science, Weber again was ahead of his time. The debate between the positivists and the phenomenologists seemed to leave the social sciences in an irremediable epistemological bind. Social scientists can ground their science either in the abstract categories of analysis necessary for a causal explanation of human behavior or in the subjective meanings of human beings. What had not been noticed until the recent Weber renaissance is that Weber's ideal type provides the methodological bridge between the subjective and objective scientific analysis of human social action. These two superb new books provide us with as clear a presentation of Weber's most famous substantive and methodological contributions as can be accomplished.

Weber's Protestant ethic thesis produced one of the most heated controversies of modern scholarship. Marshall points out, however, that though voluminous, the debate was not fruitful, for most of it revolved around misinterpretations of Weber's position, such as that Weber was substituting a spiritual interpretation of history for the Marxist material one.

Many of the misinterpretations of Weber's statement of the link between ascetic Protestantism and industrial capitalism occurred because the full corpus of Weber's work was not available to his early critics. Weber's complete works are now available, and Gordon Marshall utilizes this corpus to explode systematically each of the major criticisms of Weber's thesis.

He points out correctly that Weber did not theorize that ascetic Protestantism alone was the cause of industrial capitalism. Weber specifically identified other causes, such as machine technology, the rational scientific world view, and an independent and increasingly powerful class of trade capitalists. Ascetic Protestantism, however, was the central cause of industrial capitalism because it prohibited slavery, exalted work, and legitimated monetary wealth, while forbidding the acquisition of luxury goods and a luxurious life-style. Though machine production with wage labor could have occurred in Renaissance Italy, ancient China, or the market cities of Germany, it did not, and Calvinism was the reason.

Why did the industrial revolution occur where and when it did? Marshall does not address this question directly, but one comes away from *In Search of the Spirit of Capitalism* not only with a better understanding of Weber but also with a clear sense of the direction future criticism of Weber's thesis should take.

Finally, in disposing of the erroneous notion, repudiated by Weber himself, that a spiritual conception of history should be substituted for a material one, Marshall presents Weber's actual aim: to develop a multicausal theory of cultural-historical change. The author accurately points out that not only is this one of Weber's great contributions to the social sciences, but it allows for reconciliation with the general corpus of sociological inquiry the Marxian insight into the material causes of social life and social change.

If the key to the origin of industrial capitalism is complex and controversial, the key to the epistemology of the social sciences is even more so. Yet in Weber, *the Ideal Type, and Modern Social Theory*, Hekman pulls together the sophisticated arguments of the modern postpositivist theorists and links them to Weber's earlier insights to produce a much clearer picture. Weber was often misunderstood in his formulation of the objectivity of causal analysis and the subjectivity of human social action as the starting point for social analysis.

Hekman, like Marshall, first provides us with an impeccable exposition of Weber's position on the methodology of the social sciences. And, like Marshall, she is no apologist for Weber; where she believes he is mistaken, she painstakingly points out why.

Having established Weber's position, she systematically takes up the various critiques of that position that have emerged in contemporary literature. She divides the criticisms into "subjectivist" critiques and "structuralist" critiques. Among the subjectivists Hekman critically reviews the phenomenologists and the common language analysts. Her expositions of the works of Schutz and Winch are important in themselves, but her drawing of the contrast between these positions and that of Weber makes them all the more profound. From
the structuralists she chooses to confront the works of Althusser and Habermas, formidable foes representing respectively the neo-Marxist and the Critical Theory schools of thought.

Hekman’s argument can be summed up in this way: Structuralists, like the Marxists and the Functionalists, tend to reify constructed categories—classes, roles, modes of production, institutions, and the like—so that they lose all connection to the people who comprise them; subjectivists, like the phenomenologists, hermeneuticians, and common language analysts, tend to eschew the construction of categories and thus are left with nothing but the description of intersubjective meanings. The structuralists lose touch with their subject matter, while the subjectivists lose the ability to do causal analysis. Weber’s neo-Kantian ideal-type methodology, however, admits both the intersubjective meanings of everyday life and the construction of scientific categories.

These books should be read and pondered for years to come; their implications are profound for the understanding of both modern society and modern social science.

THE AGE OF TRIAGE: FEAR AND HOPE IN AN OVERCROWDED WORLD by Richard L. Rubenstein (Beacon Press; vii + 301 pp.; $15.50)

Berel Lang

If ever there was a basis for the claim that civilization is making moral progress, it disappeared with the mass murders of the twentieth century—the Turkish war of extermination against the Armenians, Stalin’s Gulag, the Nazi death camps. However, in science and technology we have made considerable progress, and ironically it is these advances that provided the means for the moral enormities. We may argue, of course, that scientific and technological advances did not necessarily lead to mass murder; so the question persists, perhaps the most important of all contemporary social questions: What in fact did cause these acts of political barbarism, what made them happen? Richard Rubenstein, who addresses this large and complex question, can hardly be faulted for failing to answer it. But The Age of Triage is marred by two serious distortions: a myth-like simplification of the causes of genocide that, in turn, gives way to an appeal for a magical solution. As in all melodrama, where feeling substitutes for fact, this one manages only to trivialize the events.

The Age of Triage offers as its thesis a rough equation: “surplus” populations lead to social disruption and ultimately to annihilation of the surplus. Evidence for this process, Rubenstein asserts, antedates the twentieth century—for example, the land-enclosure of Tudor England and the Irish famine of 1846-48. (Continuing his indictment of the English, Rubenstein considers the famine to have been contrived by them, and also implicates them for the Nazi genocide against the Jews.) The same phenomenon of surplus population triggered the more recent designs for exterminating the Armenians, Kulaks, Jews, and Kampuchea. It will soon threaten the United States of Ronald Reagan unless the policies of his administration can be altered. The battlefield-hospital term “triage” serves as a metaphor in these otherwise quite different instances of actual or potential mass killing: A surplus population is chosen for elimination in order to assure the survival of other parts of the population. Some practical measures might be taken now (and presumably could have been taken in the past) to break the causal chain—for example, a program of guaranteed employment that would, Rubenstein supposes, absorb the surplus population of the unemployed. But even such mild remedies are more easily named than applied. Rubenstein acknowledges. What is required, therefore, is a religious revolution—not a Marxist one or even necessarily a theistic one, but one that breaks through the general commitment to individualism and to utilitarianism and replaces it with collective altruism. How this revolution is to be achieved, or why we should find this an easier problem to solve than the one of surplus population, is “beyond the limits of our analysis.”

So high are the moral and practical stakes that it may seem captious to question the terms in which Rubenstein analyzes them. But if philosophy or theology has any role in social theory, surely it is to distinguish first between fact and fervor and then to comprehend the facts themselves. It is unclear that Rubenstein’s account accomplishes either of these ends. We could reasonably expect to learn what constitutes or defines “surplus population”: Is it determined by the inability of a given land area to support more than a given number of people? Obviously it is mistaken to claim this as a feature of the Nazi genocide, or even, for that matter, of the land-enclosure in England; and Rubenstein himself admires other factors—for example, the less marginal competition for power and place between the German Jews and an “insecure indigenous middle class.”

Not an “objective” surplus, then, but a perceived surplus has caused the events Rubenstein describes; that is, a part of the population is considered expendable by another part that is in a position to do the expediting. But if this sense of “surplus” is supposed to explain why the Nazis killed the Jews (and not only, after all, the German Jews) or why the English forced the mass emigration from Ireland, we are back to explaining opiates in relation to their “dormitive power.”

What have we learned? Why some groups rather than others come to be viewed as surplus; why some perceptions of surplus population, but not others, have led to attempts at annihilation; how the actions in response to such judgments are initiated, and by whom—are these the basic questions for any historical analysis, and they remain untouched. Rubenstein’s only explanatory model is that of Malthus and the Social Darwinists, with its premise of scarcity and presage of a continuing war for survival. Biologists and economists systematically raised objections to that model, and we might note as well its moral implications: that the events Rubenstein describes were, in effect, natural, even inevitable, and that their perpetrators hardly can be blamed.

It is possible, though far from self-evident, that this century’s large-scale political acts of murder do, as Rubenstein contends, have a single and common origin. And if there is such a cause, it probably involves the network of social and economic conditions that increasingly are overriding the more visible cultural differences among nations and peoples. This, in fact, seems to be the only sense in which we can speak of “One World.” But where writers like Hannah Arendt and F. A. Hayek find the origins of totalitarian movements in sociological and psychological causes that are in some measure independent of the system to which they lead, Rubenstein moves in a circle—from surplus populations to those agents who, for reasons of their own, define the surplus. Only a religious and magical release can break this circle.

The terror of being declared surplus in Rubenstein’s fatal formula is much worse than discovering oneself an outcast in the various racisms of our time. No one doubts, of course, that the political forces at work in the twentieth century seem ominous; and even a casual observation of contemporary America supports Rubenstein’s contention that social justice is in short supply. It is also arguable that, given the massed and impersonal forces that now shape political