are largely irrelevant as a force of historical change; revolutionary Leninism, on the other hand, relies upon the actions of enlightened leaders. Though Lenin himself wrote that “All our lives we have waged an ideological struggle against the glorification of the individual,” his personal leadership eventually gave rise to what he abhorred most.

Beyond Lenin and his cult there are larger lessons here about the extent to which Soviet society was shackled to Russian history. Addressing the German Workers’ party, Marx stated: “What we have to deal with is a communist society not as it has developed on its own but, on the contrary...in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of that old society. Indeed, there is more that is “Russian” than “Soviet” about Soviet Russia. WV

**PRESS CONTROL AROUND THE WORLD**
**edited by Jane Leftwich Curry and Joan R. Dassin**
(Praeger Special Studies: xvi i 283 pp.; $29.95)

**Arnold Zeitlin**

An American censor in occupied Japan decided in 1947 that the epic film *Senso no Heiva* (War and Peace) could not be shown without deleting a scene in which the walls of a bar were plastered with pictures of Joan Crawford, Jean Harlow, and nude foreign women. The scene somehow violated 1946 guidelines Nos. 5 and 11 of the Press, Pictorial and Broadcast Division of the U.S. Civil Censorship Division, to wit: no criticism of the United States or its allies. The censor suggested removing Crawford, Harlow, and company and replacing them with Japanese movie stars, all appropriately clothed. The picture eventually was released with the offending bar scene excised and fourteen other deletions dutifully made. The expense of these revisions so thoroughly impressed Japanese moviemakers that they quickly accommodated themselves to the mysteries of the American mind: Not one film submitted to the censor after February, 1948, required a single deletion. Japanese social science researcher Jun Fio’s brief discussion of Americans as censors, based on a paper he delivered in 1980 at an Amherst, Massachusetts, symposium on the American occupation of Japan, appears in *Press Control Around the World*. A fine piece, it whets the appetite for even more detail. It also serves as a reminder that in all of us there is, after all, a censor.

In some of its eleven separately written chapters, *Press Control* touches on the more obvious cases of press and media control: Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, Sudan’s Egypt, and black Africa. They are easy cases and, in some respects, so is a conclusion reached by editor Jane Curry (both editors are political science and communications researchers in New York) about totalitarian repression: “Although formal media control is normally treated as a critical indicator of totalitarianism or repression, it is, in fact, a sign of the weakness of the leadership’s actual control.”

Still other chapters offer ample evidence that media control is not limited to the totalitarian or to the ideologue who rejects the public’s right to know. Such examples teach hard lessons precisely because they are considerably more insidious than examples of blatant repression. As Curry points out: “There are inherent barriers in the media production process that, when used by those who want to determine at least what will not appear in the mass media, control media messages without any formal censorship. In fact, formal censorship is unusual rather than common.”

Gaye Tuchman, a sociologist, dips into subtle areas of control in the U.S. media. Charles Eisendrath, a professor of communications at the University of Michigan, reviews the difficulties of the French media, partisan by tradition. Philip Schlesinger, another sociologist, raises disturbing questions about the British media and the reporting of the siege of the Iranian embassy in Princes’ Gate, Kensington, April 30-May 5, 1980.

The British case is intriguing because the news media, in particular the British Broadcasting Corporation, became as much participant as reporter in the siege—a circumstance growing more common as terrorists and partisans seeking media coverage become more sophisticated in demanding it. The BBC faced special circumstances at Princes’ Gate. Two of its television news staffers had been captured and imprisoned in the embassy when it was seized by six gunmen seeking to publicize the Khuzistan movement for autonomy in western Iran. The BBC and other news organizations cooperated fully with law enforcement authorities, withholding or reporting information on the basis of how it would affect the gunmen listening in at the embassy.

Schlesinger fears that official efforts to control the media in such situations masks a parallel effort to link the police with the army, making the use of troops in civil disorders more acceptable. In other words, media cooperation when the army is used against foreigners in a foreign embassy may eventually make using the army more acceptable against extreme or merely angry domestic forces—labor unions, for example. He warns, therefore, that compliance with appeals for cooperation “could surely result in an even greater absorption of [the media] into the crisis-management apparatus of the state.”

“A clear code of practice governing media-state relations on such occasions is needed,” Schlesinger concludes. “We have a right to know just how compliant the media proposes to be...why they choose (or are constrained) to do so.”