able, like no Soviet leader before or since. He emerges from this portrait as a limited man—a prisoner of ignorance and dogma, the understudy of a vicious tyrant—who nevertheless overcame his limitations because he insisted on firsthand involvement with the people. A peasant himself, Khrushchev's common touch made Soviet power seem legitimate to men of learning and discernment, even when his handling of that power was undeniably incompetent. That is why many still prefer him to his more efficient and security-minded successors. The volume ends appropriately with an image of Khrushchev's grave, upon which the Soviet people lay fresh flowers “nearly every day of the year.”

Whether this avuncular populist was the real Khrushchev may not be important. Whether this is the Khrushchev Russians will choose to remember may turn out to be significant for their future, and for our own as well. WJ

CAN THE THIRD WORLD SURVIVE?
by Jacques Loup
(Johns Hopkins University Press; xix + 244 pp.; $25.00/$8.25)

BITTER PILLS
by Donald P. Warwick
(Cambridge University Press; xvi + 229 pp.; $24.95)

THE CAUSE OF WORLD HUNGER
by William J. Byron
(Paulist Press; 256 pp.; $8.95 [paper])

Walter E. Ashley

As the 1980s unfold, scholars and statesmen are taking a new look at the results of development in the Third World. The picture is more complex and the prospects less bright than they appeared a decade ago.

Johns Hopkins has made a considerable contribution to the debate by translating and reprinting Jacques Loup’s *Le Tiers-Monde peut-il survivre?*, published originally in 1980. The book makes and documents the case that, despite great success in the aggregate in achieving economic growth, the plight of the rural poor, particularly in the “poverty belt” stretching from sub-Saharan Africa across the Indian subcontinent, has not improved and may in fact be worse than it was in 1970.

LITERAL-minded readers seeking an answer to the question posed in the title will be disappointed. (Couldn’t Johns Hopkins have found a better title of its own?) But the book does take some steps toward an answer.

Clearly, great progress has been made. Economic growth in the Third World has been higher than it was in nineteenth-century Europe—up to 5.4 per cent a year in the first U.N. Development Decade, 1961-70. Life expectancy has reached fifty years, a figure Europe did not achieve until the twentieth century. Literacy in 1961-70 rose from 65 to 75 per cent in Latin America and from 45 to 53 per cent in Asia. The figures for Africa are much lower—up from 20 to 26 per cent.

Yet this progress hides some serious problems. The 1974 World Food Conference resolved that “within a decade no child will go to bed hungry, that no family will fear for its next day’s bread, and that no human being’s future and capacities will be stunted by malnutrition.” That hope is now seen as incapable of realization, even by the end of the century.

Loup gives many reasons why the promise of the 1960s went sour in the ’70s: The Green Revolution entered a period of decreasing marginal returns; the Soviet Union entered the world grain market; and the price of oil rose drastically, forcing most developing countries into massive external financial arrangements that now are themselves a cause for serious concern. So the problem becomes, how do we proceed from here?

In reply, Loup outlines a “basic needs” strategy that calls for more of the same (intensiﬁes efforts to cut birth rates, develop food production, expand foreign trade), plus a new effort to develop indigenous energy resources and—a new emphasis—direct action to improve the productive capacity of the poorest.

So far so good, and the insight that poverty is at the root of the problem is a valuable one—it has been so obvious that it largely has been missed until now. The poor need food, shelter, drinking water, health, and education, says the author, and they need to get them by paying for them—which means increasing their productive capacity or transferring money directly to them. The major way to make the poor productive is to give them land; the author gives reason to suppose that the popular wisdom that large holdings are more efﬁcient no longer applies.

Here, however, as the author admits, we run up against an even deeper problem. Land reform involves systemic change, and it is unclear how this can be brought about. To that extent, the question posed in the book’s title is unanswered. But Loup’s work remains a useful stepping stone to further discussion of the problems of the Third World and how they may be solved.

Warwick’s *Bitter Pills* is a useful cross-country study of the successes and failures of population programs. The four main countries studied—Egypt, Kenya, Mexico, and the Philippines—were chosen to exemplify the experience of different continents, disparate political systems, and cultural traditions. Secondary studies were made of Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and India.

The Hastings Center, according to the preface, mounted the study with financial support from the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA). UNFPA, however, refused to be associated with the final publication of the study. Clearly there is extreme sensitivity to population questions in the United Nations even now. And certainly the record is not good. The study talks repeatedly of confusion in the administration of population programs, failure to take into account traditional values that emphasize fertility, the negative effects of coercion, and much more.

The totally unsurprising conclusion is that population programs should steer a middle way between the “machine model”—imposing a program from outside—and the “game model”—which opposes plans of any kind. A program should be introduced, in other words, but it should be tempered by regard for its political and cultural context. While the conclusion is expected, the study may help induce a more subtle approach to population control in the future.

The Cause of World Hunger, consisting of eighteen essays by past and present members of the board of directors of Bread for the World, a Christian citizens’ movement dedicated to trying to influence U.S. policy toward the Third World, is a useful overall introduction to the whole subject of world hunger.

Douglas Ensminger, former director of the Ford Foundation’s program in India, a contributor to the volume, lays out a proposal strikingly like Jacques Loup’s—that the developing countries need to implement substantial land reforms and that the United States should help with the task of developing small-farm, foodcrop agricultural systems overseas. Elsewhere, Senator Mark Hatﬁeld urges that the U.S. separate its truly effective hunger programs from those devoted to U.S. foreign policy objectives. “We must be able to assert our advocacy with a clear conscience.” Other valuable essays, such as the one on the extent of the refugee problem, round out the picture. With few
exceptions, the book is realistic in its approach, although non-Catholics may be worried by the down-the-line statement of the Roman Catholic viewpoint on population control.

Overall, the general point is well made: Poverty is a major cause of hunger; eradicating it must be our target. WY.

FANATICISM: A HISTORICAL
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY
by André Haynal, Miklos Molnar,
Gérard de Puymège
(Schocken Books; 282 pp.; $19.95)

Edith Kurzwell

The fanatic proclaiming salvation or death, destruction or renewal, has been with us throughout history. Fanaticism, however, is of more recent origin. Here, the psychoanalyst André Haynal, the historian Miklos Molnar, and the political scientist Gérard de Puymège illustrate convincingly the fanaticizer/fanaticized dialectic and its essentially religious nature.

Pooling their knowledge without succumbing to the simplifications that so often mark cross-disciplinary research, the authors offer a marvellous overview of their subject. They avoid the more obvious examples, demonstrating the varieties of fanaticism by means of rather obscure events: how Jacobin terrorism, in the name of liberty and saving the new Republic, decreed that the city of Lyon be razed; how patriotism allowed France to fall in love with General Boulanger, a manipulated man open to all compromises; how in the Hungary of 1883, the least Anti-Semites of them all could be lured into theosaic’s house, how Bukunin’s disciple Nechayev became the first Communist to persuade his recruits to assassinate a wavering fellow-conspirator; or how Ravochoel, guillotined in 1892 for blowing up a few buildings, became a martyr and saint of other anarchists after his death. To this list may be added the killing of millions of Cambodians by Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge in the name of a future utopia and the mass suicide induced by the Reverend Jim Jones in Guyana.

Fanaticism, we are told, “involves psychological and sociological dimensions: it is simultaneously a state of mind and a mode of behavior.” It can be expressed as individual “deviance” or as conformity to a collective delirium, but always in the context of the ideals of a specific culture. The Roman soothsayers who interpreted omens and were called fanatoci, and the fanaticus who spoke in the name of God, were not yet subject to the pejorative connotation the word now carries. This came about in the eighteenth century, when society shifted its identification from absolutism to tolerance. Allegedly it was a struggle against fanaticism that pushed Voltaire to participate in writing the Encyclopaedia, where he showed how fanaticism in linked to superstition and is thus neither secular nor profane. Even at the service of the nation, free trade, progress, equality, the class struggle, liberation, or any other ideal, fanaticism produces too much fervor. Whether of the Right or of the Left, fanaticisms always play upon irrational emotions, no matter how “rational” they may seem at the start; and they often employ evil means to achieve their ends.

Haynal’s contribution of a psychoanalytic analysis of fanaticism lends the book its depth. Using customary psychoanalytic categories, he looks, for instance, at Germany’s Baader-Meinhof terrorists. He finds them contemptuous of their Nazi-fathers-turned-capitalists, whom they reject through violence, sexual freedom, and the breaking of taboos. Haynal explains—convincingly, and without jargon—how such behavior was meant to heal the narcissistic wounds of the children of Hitler and his defeated generation. Like all other fanatics, this group thought it impossible for society to progress if it did not break the taboos Freud spoke of in Civilization and Its Discontents.

Following Freud, the authors approach fanaticism as instances of failed repression. Repression, according to Haynal, is the barrier to aggression, but, as a rule, studies of social life rarely “look into affects...or into ‘resistance.’” I would add that many psychoanalytic studies do tend to psychologize too much, to “enter into Freud” by applying his ideas rather than by building onto them. Fanaticism avoids this pitfall. We learn how the fanatic derives compensation from sublimated forms of power and from the narcissistic gratification of belonging to a small and elect group that is accorded fame by the media; and how easily he or she slides into inauthenticity, thereby reinforcing the sense of failure. At the same time, the authors illustrate the way in which individual fanatics influence and “utilize” the emotions of the fanaticized, frequently turning them into lethal instruments.

Fanaticism exists everywhere, but Western civilization alone has managed both to objectify and to practice it at the same time.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON

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