

exceptions, the book is realistic in its approach, although non-Catholics may be worried by the down-the-line statement of the Roman Catholic viewpoint on population control.

Overall, the general point is well made: Poverty is a major cause of hunger; eradicating it must be our target. [WV]

FANATICISM: A HISTORICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY

by André Haynal, Miklos Molnar, Gérard de Puymège


(Schocken Books; 282 pp.; \$19.95)

Edith Kurzweil

The fanatic proclaiming salvation or death, destruction or renewal, has been with us throughout history. Fanaticism, however, is of more recent origin. Here, the psychoanalyst André Haynal, the historian Miklos Molnar, and the political scientist Gérard de Puymège illustrate convincingly the fanaticizer/fanticized dialectic and its essentially religious nature.

Pooling their knowledge without succumbing to the simplifications that so often mark cross-disciplinary research, the authors offer a marvellous overview of their subject. They avoid the more obvious examples, demonstrating the varieties of fanaticism by means of rather obscure events: how Jacobin terrorism, in the name of liberty and saving the new Republic, decreed that the city of Lyon be razed; how patriotism allowed France to fall in love with General Boulanger, a manipulated man open to all compromises; how in the Hungary of 1883, the least anti-Semitic of countries, it was possible to try a number of Jews for the ritual murder of a young girl in the village of Tiszaeszlár; how Bakunin's disciple Nechayev became the first Communist to persuade his recruits to assassinate a wavering fellow-conspirator; or how Ravochol, guillotined in 1892 for blowing up a few buildings, became a martyr and saint of other anarchists after his death. To this list may be added the killing of millions of Cambodians by Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge in the name of a future utopia and the mass suicide induced by the Reverend Jim Jones in Guyana.

Fanaticism, we are told, "involves psychological and sociological dimensions: it is simultaneously a state of mind and a mode of behavior." It can be expressed as individual "deviance" or as conformity to a collective delirium, but always in the context of the ideals of a specific culture. The Ro-



KENNETH W. THOMPSON

Winston Churchill's World View Statesmanship and Power

Winston Churchill's World View is a study of the underlying principles and goals that shaped the actions of one of the most influential men of our time. Thompson works closely with Churchill's writings to identify and assess his concepts of power, authority, politics, and diplomacy, as well as his thoughts on international organizations and law, collective security, and practical morality. \$25.00

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man soothsayers who interpreted omens and were called *fanatici*, and the *fanaticus* who spoke in the name of God, were not yet subject to the pejorative connotation the word now carries. This came about in the eighteenth century, when society shifted its identification from absolutism to tolerance. Allegedly it was a struggle against fanaticism that pushed Voltaire to participate in writing the *Encyclopédie*, where he showed how fanaticism is linked to superstition and thus is neither secular nor profane. Even at the service of the nation, free trade, progress, equality, the class struggle, liberation, or any other ideal, fanaticism produces too much fervor. Whether of the Right or of the Left, fanaticisms always play upon irrational emotions, no matter how "rational" they may seem at the start; and they often employ evil means to achieve their ends.

Haynal's contribution of a psychoanalysis of fanaticism lends the book its depth. Using customary psychoanalytic categories, he looks, for instance, at Germany's Baader-Meinhof terrorists. He finds them contemptuous of their Nazi-fathers-turned-capitalists, whom they reject through violence, sexual freedom, and the breaking of taboos. Haynal explains—convincingly, and without jargon—how such behavior was

meant to heal the narcissistic wounds of the children of Hitler and his defeated generation. Like all other fanatics, this group thought it impossible for society to progress if it did not break the taboos Freud spoke of in *Civilization and Its Discontents*.

Following Freud, the authors approach fanaticism as instances of failed repression. Repression, according to Haynal, is the barrier to aggression, but, as a rule, studies of social life rarely "look into affects...or into 'resistance.'" I would add that many psychoanalytic studies do tend to psychologize too much, to "enter into Freud" by applying his ideas rather than by building onto them. *Fanaticism* avoids this pitfall. We learn how the fanatic derives compensation from sublimated forms of power and from the narcissistic gratification of belonging to a small and elect group that is accorded fame by the media; and also how easily he or she slides into inauthenticity, thereby reinforcing the sense of failure. At the same time, the authors illustrate the way in which individual fanatics influence and "utilize" the emotions of the fanaticized, frequently turning them into lethal instruments.

Fanaticism exists everywhere, but Western civilization alone has managed both to objectify and to practice it at the same time.

Secularized, bolstered by rationality and technology, it spreads quickly, transforming good causes into bad ones, and often inspiring "countercauses." The authors do not judge particular situations. But by illuminating an important phenomenon that we are prone to ignore, they upset some of our taken-for-granted notions, reminding us that, in E. M. Cioran's words, "When one refuses to admit the interchangeable nature of ideas, blood flows." WV

A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN SOCIALISM

by **Albert S. Lindemann**

(Yale University Press; 398 pp.; \$25.00)

David D'Arcy

Lindemann offers a word of caution in his introduction: "No platonic authority exists that can provide us with a complete or 'real' definition of socialism. Instead, our understanding of it must be based on how people have used it in history, even if we find that they have used it with dismaying imprecision. We must thus reconcile ourselves to the uncomfortable truth that often people who call themselves socialists so define their beliefs as to exclude others who also claim to be socialists."

In the absence of a definition, Lindemann offers a description: Movements calling themselves socialist have been characterized by a stress on community needs and concerns and on man's gregarious social nature as opposed to his individualistic strivings. There is a fundamentally moral quality to this description, which Lindemann places in its historical context: the secular-liberal political revolutions as well as the upheavals that accompanied the industrialization of the latter part of the eighteenth century. Lindemann begins, then, with a pre-Marxist view of socialism and presents a synthetic overview of existing scholarship on socialist thought, socialist parties, trade unions, and working people.

Early workers' organizations, according to this survey, originated in the ideal of a rational and humane social and political order articulated by More, Rousseau, Babeuf, and Paine and in popular reactions to the threat to that ideal posed by rapid industrialization and other abrupt changes in daily life. Such groups as the Sans Culottes of the French Revolution could not strictly be termed socialist, as Lindemann points out. They were property owners and small business men, artisans and independent craftsmen who banded together to protect their

interests against those of the large merchants and leaders of industry. The Luddites, notorious for destroying labor-saving machinery, were, according to Lindemann, resorting to the most effective collective action possible at their stage of working-class consciousness and socioeconomic development. Without the right to form unions or to strike, he argues, they were left with no alternative but intimidation.

Lindemann, by tracing the legal and organizational beginnings of trade unions, relies heavily (as in his pages about the Luddites) on the work of E. P. Thompson. He examines Marx's theories of social and economic relations under capitalism as well as those of Marx's antecedents in political economy and utopian socialism.

New socialist movements calling for the abolition of private property and for solidarity among workers' parties throughout Europe emerged from the First International of 1864 and flourished from 1870 to 1914. Much of Lindemann's study is devoted to dissecting the ideological and tactical debates that went on among the vast array of socialist movements of that time. There are admiring portraits of Jean Jaures and Rosa Luxemburg as well as a concise scholarly introduction to the various anarchist factions that participated in these debates.

After the Russian Revolution and World War I came the struggle for power, or for participation in power, among competing Socialist and Communist parties, who predictably defined their beliefs to exclude others who also claimed to be Socialists. Lindemann gives particular attention to Moscow's efforts to shape these struggles. It is not hard to see his sympathies with the democratic socialists here, as well as in his sections on the degeneration of the Soviet regime after the death of Lenin and during the imposition of personal rule by Stalin.

The alliances between Communists and Socialists that held fast only after the German invasion of Russia in 1941 survived until the end of World War II. Lindemann's survey of postwar socialism and communism charts the split between the bureaucratized, highly centralized parties in power in Moscow and Eastern Europe and the evolving democratic socialist movements of the West with their respect for liberal freedoms and participation in parliamentary governments.

One asset of this book is its lack of the overbearing personal partisanship one finds in so many historical studies of socialism. True, Lindemann's perspective is clearly antiauthoritarian, but he has nevertheless drawn on a wide range of scholarship. He summarizes some recent and inaccessible

studies in social history written "from the bottom up," citing these to refute some of the folk wisdom of the automatic Marxists about the relationship between social class and politics. Even those familiar with the general history of socialism are likely to take an interest in Lindemann's analysis of the unique and important developments in social democracy during the interwar period in Austria and Sweden, countries often ignored in surveys of this size. It is unfortunate, though, that in discussing the future of socialism in Europe, Lindemann has not included the wealth of recent theoretical works in the Marxist tradition.

Lindemann's prose, clear as it is, lacks the spirit of E. P. Thompson and Michael Harrington's well-known exhortations. But Lindemann is not out to rally his readers. He would rather they reflect on the shaky foundations of socialist optimism in view of Soviet interventions in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, mass culture in the West, and organized labor's defense of interests antipathetic to society at large.

Within this reconsideration, Lindemann does identify promising new developments on the local—as opposed to the national—level in the field of workers' control of industry, a notion dating back to the workers' factory councils, or soviets, in Russia from 1905 to 1917 and in Central Europe at the end of World War I. This tradition has taken contemporary form in the practice of co-determination in Western Europe and also in the abortive independent trade union movement in Poland that ended with the suppression of Solidarity. Lindemann concedes that while worker participation in management has had equivocal results, it still represents a qualitative advance over traditional collective bargaining and an opportunity to improve working conditions and change industrial policies.

He concludes by confronting the socialist tradition with some familiar neo-conservative arguments: How does a society, and particularly an egalitarian socialist society, reward and motivate individuals to perform tasks that are socially necessary but undeniably unpleasant? Isn't it essential to retain a certain degree of inequality, to present the prospect of individual material gain or even wealth in order to induce citizens to do what they would not choose to do otherwise? Haven't various Communist regimes recognized this dilemma by offering material incentives and experimenting with competitive models to promote the growth of efficiency and productivity?

Lindemann finds the best possible answers to these questions in the tradition of democratic socialism, but he suggests that