Secularized, bolstered by rationality and technology, it spreads quickly, transforming good causes into bad ones, and often inspiring "countercauses." The authors do not judge particular situations. But by illuminating an important phenomenon that we are prone to ignore, they upset some of our taken-for-granted notions, reminding us that, in E. M. Cioran's words, "When one refuses to admit the interchangeable nature of ideas, blood flows."

A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN SOCIALISM
by Albert S. Lindemann
(Yale University Press; 398 pp.; $25.00)
David D'Arcy

Lindemann offers a word of caution in his introduction: "No Platonic authority exists that can provide us with a complete or 'real' definition of socialism. Instead, our understanding of it must be based on how people have used it in history, even if we find that they have used it with dismaying imprecision. We must thus reconcile ourselves to the uncomfortable truth that often people who call themselves socialists so define their beliefs as to exclude others who also claim to be socialists."

In the absence of a definition, Lindemann offers a description: Movements calling themselves socialist have been characterized by a stress on community needs and concerns and on man's gregarious social nature as opposed to his individualistic strivings. There is a fundamentally moral quality to this description, which Lindemann places in its historical context: the secular-liberal political revolutions as well as the upheavals that accompanied the industrialization of the latter part of the eighteenth century. Lindemann begins, then, with a pre-Marxist view of socialism and presents a synthetic overview of existing scholarship on socialist thought, socialist parties, trade unions, and working people.

Early workers' organizations, according to this survey, originated in the ideal of a rational and humane social and political order articulated by More, Rousseau, Babeuf, and Paine and in popular reactions to the threat to that ideal posed by rapid industrialization and other abrupt changes in daily life. Such groups as the Sans Culottes of the French Revolution could not strictly be termed socialist, as Lindemann points out. They were property owners and small businessmen, artisans and independent craftsmen who banded together to protect their interests against those of the large merchants and leaders of industry. The Luddites, notorious for destroying labor-saving machinery, were, according to Lindemann, resorting to the most effective collective action possible at their stage of working-class consciousness and socioeconomic development. Without the right to form unions or to strike, he argues, they were left with no alternative but intimidation.

Lindemann, by tracing the legal and organizational beginnings of trade unions, relies heavily (as in his pages about the Luddites) on the work of E. P. Thompson. He examines Marx's theories of social and economic relations under capitalism as well as those of Marx's antecedents in political economy and utopian socialism.

New socialist movements calling for the abolition of private property and for solidarity among workers' parties throughout Europe emerged from the First International of 1864 and flourished from 1870 to 1914. Much of Lindemann's study is devoted to dissecting the ideological and tactical debates that went on among the vast array of socialist movements of that time. There are flattering portraits of Jean Jaurès and Rosa Luxemberg as well as a concise scholarly introduction to the various anarchist factions that participated in these debates.

After the Russian Revolution and World War I came the struggle for power, or for participation in power, among competing Socialist and Communist parties, who predictably defined their beliefs to exclude others who also claimed to be Socialists. Lindemann gives particular attention to Moscow's effort to shape these struggles. It is not hard to see his sympathies with the democratic socialists here, as well as in his sections on the degeneration of the Soviet regime after the death of Lenin and during the imposition of personal rule by Stalin.

The alliances between Communists and Socialists that held fast only after the German invasion of Russia in 1941 survived until the end of World War II. Lindemann's survey of postwar socialism and communism charts the split between the bureaucratized, highly centralized parties in power in Moscow and Eastern Europe and the evolving democratic socialist movements of the West with their respect for liberal freedoms and participation in parliamentary governments.

One asset of this book is its lack of the overhearing personal partisanship one finds in so many historical studies of socialism. True, Lindemann's perspective is clearly anti-authoritarian, but he has nevertheless drawn on a wide range of scholarship. He summarizes some recent and inaccessible studies in social history written "from the bottom up," citing these to refute some of the folk wisdom of the automatic Marxists about the relationship between social class and politics. Even those familiar with the general history of socialism are likely to take an interest in Lindemann's analysis of the unique and important developments in social democracy during the interwar period in Austria and Sweden, countries often ignored in surveys of this size. It is unfortunate, though, that in discussing the future of socialism in Europe, Lindemann has not included the wealth of recent theoretical works in the Marxist tradition.

Lindemann's prose, clear as it is, lacks the spirit of E. P. Thompson and Michael Harrington's well-known exhortations. But Lindemann is not out to rally his readers. He would rather they reflect on the shaky foundations of socialist optimism in view of Soviet interventions in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, mass culture in the West, and organized labor's defense of interests antithetical to society at large.

Within this reconsideration, Lindemann does identify promising new developments on the local—as opposed to the national—level in the field of workers' control of industry, a notion dating back to the workers' factory councils, or soviets, in Russia from 1905 to 1917 and in Central Europe at the end of World War I. This tradition has taken contemporary form in the practice of co-determination in Western Europe and also in the abortive independent trade union movement in Poland that ended with the suppression of Solidarity. Lindemann concedes that while worker participation in management has had ambiguous results, it still represents a qualitative advance over traditional collective bargaining and an opportunity to improve working conditions and change industrial policies.

He concludes by confronting the socialist tradition with some familiar neo-conservative arguments: How does a society, and particularly an egalitarian socialist society, reward and motivate individuals to perform tasks that are socially necessary but undeniably unpleasant? Isn't it essential to retain a certain degree of inequality, to present the prospect of individual material gain or even wealth in order to induce citizens to do what they would not choose to do otherwise? Haven't various Communist regimes recognized this dilemma by offering material incentives and experimenting with competitive models to promote the growth of efficiency and productivity?

Lindemann finds the best possible answers to these questions in the tradition of democratic socialism, but he suggests that
the traditional rallying cries of the last two centuries of socialism fall far short of recognizing the real social and economic challenges of a changing world. It may offer some small consolation to Socialists that governments now administered by capitalists are no less desperately short of ideas. When the next survey of European socialism is in preparation a decade or so, the Socialists now in power will be judged on their ability to generate new ideas within the tradition that Lindemann’s readable survey has set out for us.

**Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala**

by Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer

(Doubleday & Co.; 336 pp.; $16.95/$8.95)

**The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention**

by Richard H. Immerman

(University of Texas Press; 291 pp.; $24.50/ $9.95)

*Miles Wortman*

The 1954 Guatemalan military coup, the subject of both these books, has taken on increased importance with the contemporary escalation of political violence in Central America. In that year, with the help of the CIA, a portion of the Guatemalan military seized power from a democratically elected, progressive left civilian government. The military installed a political system marked by civilian, police, military, and guerrilla terrorism, by midday gun battles between private armies, by kidnappings and ransomings, and by massacres of Indians. Barracks intrigue determined government leadership. This military meddling of thirty years back has become a benchmark of U.S. intervention in Central American and other foreign lands. United States involvement in Greece and Iran in the postwar period was distant and vague; in Guatemala it was blatant. As Thomas Powers showed in *Richard Helms: The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, there was a linear progression in government policy from Guatemala to the Bay of Pigs, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam.

Though the fact of U.S. involvement in Guatemala is well known, both these volumes perform a great service in detailing the manner in which the policy was decided upon and carried out. Both offer sophisticated analyses of U.S. foreign policy in the cold war era—bucking the trend to docudrama in what is now being written and televised on Central America.

The books do give different weight to the evidence they marshal. For Kinzer and Schlesinger in *Bitter Fruit* the villain in the Guatemalan case was not so much government policy itself as American capitalism—specifically Samuel Zemurray’s United Fruit Company. Under the progressive Left government, the banana company had lost many of its land holdings, and the authors describe in vivid detail how United Fruit used its resources to sway U.S. public opinion and bring about United States intervention. (In the shaping of opinion, the roles of the New Leader and the *New York Times* are particularly fascinating.)

For Richard Immerman in *The CIA in Guatemala*, United States intervention was less a creature of capital than a logical progression in governmental policy. Eisenhower viewed Guatemala as yet another theater of operation. Having driven back totalitarianism in Europe and made peace in Korea, Ike attacked the enemy in the Americas. Without dismissing the lobbying efforts of United Fruit, Immerman offers persuasive evidence that foreign policy was indeed the key, that the Guatemalan intervention was in keeping with an epoch that saw the Korean War, the cold war, and McCarthyism. He demonstrates successfully that it was Ike, not John Foster Dulles, who directed policy. And he draws out the implications clearly: The United States would not view Latin America in a vacuum; outcroppings of progressivism to our south would be considered a threat to the basic interests of the United States.

The works, though complementary in their emphases, are similar in their assumptions: that there were few Communists in the Guatemalan government at the time of the intervention and that the intervention was carried out with the cavalry-style audacity of a new world power. *Bitter Fruit* is the better written of the two books and more accessible to the general reader. It has profited greatly from the Freedom of Information Act, and its authors haverendered a service in publicizing these declassified documents. The more broadly researched and detailed *CIA in Guatemala*, on the other hand, is a valuable source for students and scholars.

Yet these books present a number of problems. Is the role of United Fruit typical of international capital? Schlesinger and Kinzer consider it as such, but the reader is led to the opposite conclusion. The cow-

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The book *Money, Power, Nature... Will These Idols Destroy American Society?* by Thomas Nelson Publishers. It discusses the influence of idols on American society and offers an alternative: The New Community, which will expose the idols and move toward conformity with the gospel.

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