

and the late *Washington Star*. "Hostility will remain inside Afghanistan for the indefinite future," he writes. "It is not the kind of country to settle down to acquiescent rule by foreign puppets." In reaching his conclusion, Bradsher has performed a service as worthy as the *mujahideen's*, if less taxing logistically. From a landscape that is every bit as barren and resistant to cultivation as the rocky soil of Afghanistan itself, he has eked out a remarkable collection of information about the events leading to and from the 1979 Soviet invasion.

Bradsher is occasionally too circumspect. He cannot bring himself to identify the Russian-speaking United States ambassador in Kabul during the 1978 coup d'état that turned Afghanistan from feudalism to Marxism, yet in the index one finds him named: Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., now dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and, more relevant to the Afghan linguistic scheme, a practiced Farsi speaker. Much of the information, in fact, is presented from a Western, mostly American perspective, some emanating from sources who decline to be identified for publication. Yet it is no fault of Bradsher's that there is little from the Afghan point of view except official documents. Afghans are not given to public soul-searching.

Bradsher places his findings before the reader in easily digestible form, building a firm frame of reference for events in Afghanistan while reaching into the past for background and daring to project into the future to reinforce his explanation of what the Soviets are up to. He consoles neither side in the debate over the significance of the Soviet presence in that enigmatic land. Those who see the Soviet invasion in December, 1979, as part of the Russian grand lust for a warm-water port are told that a more likely motive "was the age old tendency for any powerful nation to seek the territorial limits of its power, to seek to fix a secure and stable frontier." Those who see the invasion as an offshoot of parochial Communist politics and no danger to worldwide security are told that this projection of Soviet power follows along in a tradition of meddling in Mongolia, Ethiopia, and South Yemen and that it was fueled in part by American weakness. Unnamed U.S. officials say the Carter "administration's backing away from the initially tough position on the Soviet brigade was, more than any other single episode, the most important influence in the Soviet leadership's decision that the invasion was an acceptable risk in terms of international behavior." But Bradsher also points out that the toughness of the Carter reaction did surprise the Kremlin

and that the president's undoing was the pressure of farmer and broker to sell grain—a bloc over which several presidents have stumbled.

The book is at its best in its portrait of Hafizullah Amin, who in two decades rose from what passes in Afghanistan for a relatively cozy middle-class existence to the country's premier Communist. Bradsher passes along the intriguing speculation that Amin encountered Marxism while visiting Wisconsin. Somehow he returned from such experiences as studying at Columbia University and living for six weeks with a family in Hamden, Connecticut, to become the enigmatic central figure in Afghanistan's subjection to Soviet domination. With a ruthlessness and brashness that seem his most admirable qualities, Amin eliminated his major rival, Nor Mohammed Taraki, who was also a beneficiary of experience in the United States. He elbowed aside for a time the chief Afghan token Communist, Babrak Karmal; he sneered at the Soviet leadership right inside the walls of the Kremlin; and he fell, finally, to the troops the Soviets blandly insist he had invited. Amin typifies the ambition, the pretension, the bewildered inadequacy and consequent resentment of so many overmatched leaders in politically immature countries.

Bradsher never fully examines the threat Afghanistan represented, yet this is the corollary of his thesis that the Soviet Union sought a "secure and stable frontier." He refers too briefly to the variegated ethnic makeup of the country. He himself quotes the Soviet official in charge of Soviet Communist party relations with the People's Democratic party of Afghanistan—the umbrella for the warring Marxist factions in the country—as having said before the invasion: "The Afghan state was on the verge of disintegration." It is a remark that reflects similar opinions expressed authoritatively in the United States before the invasion: The ethnic rivalries churning against a weakening central authority, a circumstance with roots far deeper than the domestic Communist takeover of April, 1978, eventually would have splintered a country that never had been a secure geographical unit. An irony of the Soviet incursion is that, for the time being, it has succeeded in keeping Afghanistan united.

For all his investigation's excellence and vastness of scope, Bradsher reports the use of chemical warfare in Afghanistan without mentioning the controversy surrounding such reports. He also glosses over the eventual significance of India in Afghanistan's future. He tantalizes us with a brief account of efforts by the Communist party of India,

acting as an agent of the Soviet Party, to unite the Khalq and Parcham wings of the People's Democratic party of Afghanistan. With the collapse of the shah, India achieved hegemony in South Asia and its immediate western perimeter. The prospect of Soviet troops in the Khyber Pass or, in the case of a collapse of a buffer Pakistan, on the banks of the Ravi, cannot cheer New Delhi, no matter what level of warmth it maintains with Moscow. India has always had a special commercial, military, and political relationship with Afghanistan, whatever government was sitting in New Delhi or Calcutta. Eventually, this relationship will assert itself, and we will be able to foresee more clearly the future of Afghanistan.

But that moment in history will take time to arrive. For now there are a hundred thousand armed Soviets occupied in, rather than occupying, Afghanistan, and there are too many people indifferent to the welfare of Afghanistan's people who want to keep it precisely that way. WV

THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER by Robert B. Reich

(Times Books; 324 pp.; \$16.60)

THE NEXT ECONOMY by Paul Hawken

(Holt, Rinehart and Winston; 215 pp.; \$14.50)

Walter E. Ashley

The plight of smokestack America continues to generate a spate of books offering diagnoses and prescribing cures. Clearly, whoever succeeds in designing a new industrial policy will set the agenda for the 1984 presidential election campaign. Whoever provides good advice to the millions who are wondering whether or not to put their life savings in the stock market will be a hero. With the rewards so high, no wonder the books keep rolling in.

The Reich and Hawken books are good examples of this genre. Both offer diagnoses and suggest government actions for curing national ailments. Hawken also includes a chapter advising us where to put our money, plus open letters offering advice to just about everyone, including a college sophomore, Senator Alan Cranston, and the chairman of Exxon.

Both are obviously young men's books. Reich, who is professor of business and public policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, and Hawken, a businessman and consultant, are both in their 30s.

Both write clearly and in styles refreshingly free of jargon. Both exude confidence in their ability to tell us what's wrong and show us how to put it right.

The two books have differences as well, among them their starting points. Reich, after several chapters tracing the development of the American economy from Colonial days through 1970, identifies our basic national problem as failure to adapt to a global marketplace in which other nations offer goods that are of better quality or are less expensive, or both. Our economy, Reich says bluntly, is "grinding to a halt" because we refuse to abandon our old, wasteful system of mass production in favor of a "flexible" system in which American industry would concentrate on products requiring high technology for their manufacture.

It is corporate executives who are to blame for this failure because they are too bound up in "paper entrepreneurialism"—making paper profits through company mergers. Labor gets blamed for urging tariff barriers to protect jobs in old, inefficient industries. The "next frontier" of Reich's title is not space or the ocean depths, as one might have expected, but "adaptation."

Hawken, in contrast, blames the increase in oil prices, beginning in 1973-74, for

changing the relationship among capital, labor, and energy, thereby producing disruptions in the economy. His solution, however, is similar to Reich's—an "informative economy" in which design, engineering, and utility become progressively more important in relation to raw materials and the labor involved in any given product. High technology, of course, is the major key to this shift.

How valid are these diagnoses? Obviously, both have large elements of truth. For some years now it has been clear that the American economy is passing through a period of major change. Sudden increases in oil prices have played a part by inducing major conservation measures, which are now built into new automobiles, homes, and factories. Silicon memory chips are changing many industries and causing concern that America is falling behind Japan in the high-tech race. Our automobile and steel industries have lost their market share to more efficient importers. Textile and some other markets are being surrendered to the developing countries.

But the reality is far more complex than this. It may be useful to list some elements missing from their diagnoses. For example:

- Since World War II the U.S. has be-

come more and more a service economy and less a manufacturing one. This is a result of greater efficiency in manufacturing and of market saturation. After all, you can't usually sell a second dishwasher to someone who is happy with the one he has. And this change is all to the good: It means more people are available to work in health and education, communications, tourism, and many other areas. The problem is that most of these fields demand skills that the structurally unemployed do not possess.

- The U.S. only recently has gotten rid of endemic inflation dating back to the decision to finance the Vietnam war and the Great Society simultaneously without additional taxation.

- Government expenditures on defense and welfare services have created immense budget deficits.

One could go on—about stop-go government economic policies, about a political system that makes it fatally easy to appease special-interest groups at the expense of the nation as a whole, about unfair foreign trade competition, and much more. But one thing is clear: The analysis in both books is incomplete. And because of this, the recommendations for government action in both books—the part every reader

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is anxious to turn to—seem inadequate.

Reich, for example, wants to give unemployed workers vouchers that they can hand over to a company in return for technical training and also wants to revamp the tax system to provide incentives for companies to invest in high technology. Hawken, for his part, wants to slap a dollar-a-gallon tax on oil and generally to move to a Schumacher-type "small is beautiful" world of small farms, smaller companies, and "friendly people at the gas pump."

Such remedies are clearly insufficient, unrealistic, or even unnecessary. Hawken's giant oil tax is a nonstarter, in any case, apart from the major problems it would raise. And it is not clear that greater emphasis on high-tech training will improve America's competitive edge. Other nations can subsidize their high-technology industries, which may or may not be a good thing, and in developing countries some elements of high technology can be assimilated easily into industrial operations. A more radical shift to a service economy may well require, in addition to computer expertise and other technical abilities, the further development of very different skills.

Similarly, Hawken's inadequate analysis of U.S. problems casts doubt on his financial recommendations. His advice boils down to "Save your money and play for safety." Admittedly, this is a refreshing change from the books that still want to tell you how to make a million dollars in real estate. But those who followed Hawken's advice a year ago would be way behind those who believed the economy would climb out of recession and so put their money in the stock market.

All this means that the American economy is a tremendously complex system, developing in ways that may not be clear to us. While governments will continue to try to direct it, simple suggestions for change are unlikely to do much good. Books like Reich's and Hawken's may provide some new insights, but they are nonetheless reminiscent of the blind men's description of the elephant. WV

TO END WAR: A NEW APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

by **Robert Woiwo**

(Pilgrim Press; xx + 755 pp.; \$25.00/\$12.95)

HOW WARS END: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE TERMINATION OF ARMED CONFLICT, 1946-1964

by **Sydney D. Bailey**

(Clarendon Press. Vol. I xxi + 404 pp.; \$89.00. Vol. II xxxii + 715 pp.; \$98.00)

Terry Nardin

To End War is the sixth edition of an annotated bibliography first published in 1976 by the World Without War Council as a resource for those in the peace movement. Over the years it has grown into a volume of more than 750 pages, and the bibliography is now embedded in an extended discussion of the state system, the causes of war, and other familiar topics of international relations. Indeed, the book has come to resemble an introductory textbook on international relations, though its approach is more popular and more openly practical than that of most texts.

Offered by its author as "a manual for realistic visionaries," the book is skeptical of many of the assumptions of the peace movement, as well as of politics-as-usual, arguing, for example, that strategies for promoting peace must recognize the utility of weapons both as symbols and as instruments of political power. The gist of the underlying argument is that the only alternative to war is the settlement of disputes within a framework of world law. This, in turn, presupposes some "sense of community" among antagonists, to be fostered by policies promoting arms control, economic development, respect for human rights, and nonviolent social change.

Woiwo insists on the necessity of grounding peace advocacy in an analysis of fundamentals and therefore begins with a comprehensive survey of ideas about international relations, war, and peace. He moves on to develop proposals for appropriate changes in U.S. foreign policy—a focus said to be dictated by the global importance of the United States, by the openness of American politics to public influence, and by the opportunities likely to be available to prospective readers. The book concludes with a substantial section of information for citizen activists, such as the names and addresses of peace organizations.

Much of what the book has to say is

probably sound and is presented sensibly, but its discussion, especially of the fundamentals, is superficial and its conclusions weakly argued. Is it really the case that world peace is linked in any essential way to respect for human rights? Is the "sense of community" required for the peaceful settlement of disputes something that involves shared beliefs and values—or is it enough that adversaries acknowledge the authority of international law and of institutions like the U.N.? Is such acknowledgement even possible in the absence of ideological agreement? If not, does this mean that world peace is impossible except on the basis of ideological and cultural uniformity? Too many difficult and even uncomfortable questions simply are not asked.

Perhaps the ordinary citizen cannot be expected to think about questions of theory. Perhaps theory is not very relevant for intelligent practice, not an adequate substitute for experience and pragmatic judgment. But if so, what purpose is served by an attempt at popularizing international relations theory? Part of the reason why *To End War* does not quite come off is because it is so ambitious, seeking to combine in one volume a treatise, a textbook, and a practical guide to action. Yet the bibliography and guide to organizations and periodicals that take up rather more than half the book, though eclectic (is the Committee on the Present Danger a peace organization?) and sometimes inaccurate (Grotius' *Prolegomena* does not set forth any rules of warfare, nor does Charles Beitz defend state autonomy), remain a useful resource.

Sydney Bailey's *How Wars End* is also a big book—more than 1,100 pages in two volumes—and, like Woiwo's, adopts a practical rather than a theoretical approach. But while Woiwo discusses the entire problem of war in the modern world, Bailey focuses on the termination of armed hostilities through efforts in the United Nations. Both authors emphasize the importance of international law, with Woiwo arguing for the creation of a world legal order in which disputes might be resolved by legal rather than military action and Bailey largely occupied with the problem of how diplomats might make more effective use of international humanitarian law and U.N. procedures for limiting and ending armed conflicts. And where Woiwo seeks to encourage public action to ameliorate the underlying causes of war, Bailey is concerned with procedures and techniques through which diplomats may arrange cease-fires, prod the belligerents toward negotiation, protect noncombatants, and so forth.

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