

less visible, less rational forces.

In *The American Style of Foreign Policy* we are provided with one observer's answer. Robert Dallek tells us that American foreign policy was often "less a reaction to events abroad than to conditions at home, where economic, political, and social change blotted out overseas affairs and largely made them an irrational extension of internal hopes and fears." For Dallek, the domestic condition that provides the key to the riddle of American foreign policy can be found in such "hidden" factors as the struggle between the individualism, independence, and diversity that characterized preindustrial America and the forces of conformity and impersonality that characterized the industrial revolution and eventually triumphed over the earlier values.

This struggle, according to the author, manifested itself domestically in the politics of the progressive era, when the forces of industrial capitalism were first brought to accountability on such issues as the length of the working day and child labor. This domestic struggle becomes "externalized" when Americans unconsciously "project" their "hopes and fears" regarding its outcome into the world at large. Thus, during the American-Colombian dispute over the Hay-Herran treaty, Americans did not see Colombian leaders as the "politically high minded men of character" they were. Instead, caught up in the battles of the progressive era, Americans saw them as "blackmailers, bandits, and homicidal corruptionists." Colombia was painted as a country led by men who were "robber barons," motivated by greed and indifferent to the needs of all civilization. Teddy Roosevelt's chastisement of Colombia for its position was, according to Dallek, "little different from the general progressive attack on the great corporations or trusts that seemed ruthlessly to enrich themselves and deny millions of Americans a chance for a better life." The author demonstrates how similarly unrealistic views of world events on the part of Americans were largely the result of the continuing battle between the opposing forces of individualism and conformity—a battle that has had, in Dallek's opinion, a detrimental effect on the conduct of foreign policy even up to and including recent times.

Dallek's thesis is interesting and insightful, but his claim to have ventured into uncharted ground may be challenged. Others before him have observed that a variety of both conscious and unconscious domestic forces have had an important role in the making of foreign policy. The role played by unconscious factors in such matters has

been recognized since at least the 1930s, when Freud, in his *Civilization and Its Discontents*, implied that the psychological tensions produced in society often lead to national aggression. Still, Dallek is to be commended for his attempt to analyze American foreign policy-making in this way. It is no easy task; as Dallek points out, the subjective underpinnings of human affairs are no less important than the objective ones, but they are not as easily examined.

On balance, however, Dallek's attempt to analyze these subjective underpinnings meets with mixed success. His efforts do result in several astute observations that provide correct, if incomplete, answers to the domestic affairs/foreign policy question. Such is the case when the author notes that the anti-Communist crusade of the post-World War II period was less the result of a serious Communist threat than a useful means by which Americans could displace their anger at the stultifying social conformity and organizational ethos of their emergent mass-machine culture—a culture, says Dallek, to which they were increasingly drawn by virtue of the standard of living it provided but which came into conflict with traditional values of individuality and nonconformity.

On the other hand, the work has several shortcomings. Perhaps most serious is the fact that it is somewhat simplistic. Dallek tries to explain too much of U.S. foreign policy through such "hidden" factors as the battle between individuality and conformity and the "clashing impulses" of "divisive fears" and "conciliatory hopes." He cites this last-mentioned pair of factors as underlying the Kennan-Lippmann debate over the meaning of Soviet foreign policy moves in the late 1940s. Yet fears of domestic division or conciliation had little to do with this debate, which was a classic dialogue between foreign policy hawks and doves. The author's repeated assertions that a speech or policy move "can be viewed as an expression of conflicting national impulses" are often given scant supporting evidence. In addition, the important question of the degree to which these unconscious domestic influences on foreign policy are themselves influenced by world events goes largely undiscussed.

In short, Dallek seems to have overstated his argument. It is unquestionably the case that foreign events are often viewed through "cultural glasses" and that misinterpretations and responses detrimental to American interests may result from this. But the hidden conflicts that torment the American psyche cannot be said to outweigh as determining factors the conscious decisions of

policy-makers. It is more likely—and there is ample evidence to this effect—that the anti-Communist crusade and the pressures to social and organizational conformity associated with it were in large part consciously engineered by political officials for partisan ends or by capitalists in their effort to reproduce capitalist social relationships than that such pressures were the result of some hidden conflict in the collective unconscious. Just how great a role those hidden conflicts play in shaping foreign policy is a subject that needs further exploration.

### **COMMUNISM & POLITICAL CHANGE IN SPAIN by Eusebio Mujal-Leon**

(Indiana University Press; 288 pp.; \$22.50)

*Gary Prevost*

Just over six years ago the Spanish Communist party was the rising star of the European Left. Buoyed by its survival of the Franco era and bolstered by the addition to its ranks of thousands of workers from Comisiones Obreras, the only real trade union of the Franco era, the PCE seemed ready to dominate the Spanish Left and play a major role in national politics. Its leader, Santiago Carrillo, had just published his *Euro-Communism and the State* and was seen as the logical spokesperson for the growing Eurocommunist movement. It appeared to many that the PCE had finally put the tumultuous Civil War era behind it and was prepared to become a modern, progressive, and democratic party.

Today, those expectations largely have been crushed. The party stands deeply divided and struggles to maintain its relevance for contemporary Spanish politics. In last October's Socialist landslide the PCE lost two-thirds of its votes, gaining a mere five seats in the Cortes with only 3.8 per cent of the vote. This dismal performance led to the resignation of Carrillo. Thousands of members have deserted the party, including many of its most committed worker militants. In the trade union sector, where the PCE has long dominated the union federation, Comisiones Obreras fell to second place in last fall's syndical elections behind the Socialist-led UGT.

An analysis of the rise and fall of the PCE's fortunes is the task undertaken here by Eusebio Mujal-Leon. Overall he has produced a valuable and long overdue study of the Spanish Communist party.

By far the largest portion of the book is concerned with the evolution of the PCE

during the long Franco period and its immediate aftermath. Only in the final chapters does the author attempt to draw up a balance sheet for the PCE's contemporary performance. Mujal-Leon, thankfully, does not attempt to reinterpret the role of the PCE in the Civil War, leaving that task largely to those who have written before him. The major concentration is on the years 1956-77.

Mujal-Leon traces the evolution of the PCE's strategy from its guerrilla tactics of the 1940s to its policy of National Reconciliation first announced in 1956 and pressed forward in subsequent years. Crucial to the evolution of the PCE's stance was its attitude toward the Church. While the PCE never had been as harshly atheistic as other anticlerical forces, such as the Socialists (PSOE), the PCE began consciously to look for allies in the Church in the late 1950s. These efforts bore fruit for two reasons. First, the Church, after nearly two decades of close collaboration and political agreement, was beginning to separate itself from the Franco state. Catholic youth and labor organizations in mild opposition to Franco began to develop.

Second, the growth of these Catholic organizations coincided with some profound social and economic changes in Spain. The Spanish working class was growing fast through industrialization and migration to the cities. In small legal cracks in the Francoist state new forms of labor organizations developed, and it was here that Communist-Catholic collaboration began. Over the next several years this collaboration was crucial to the development of the independent labor organizations known as the Workers Commissions. Because both the Socialists and Anarchists abstained from this development, the PCE quickly became the major force in the opposition to Franco from the Left. Mujal-Leon's analysis is less satisfying when he tries to explain briefly why the PCE did not reap further benefits in the post-Franco era from its overture to progressive Catholics, whose support apparently has gone to the PSOE.

The author traces with considerable clarity the process by which the PCE developed its Eurocommunist politics of the late 1970s—both its independence from Moscow and its evolution toward reformist, Social Democratic positions. Mujal-Leon notes that after 1956 the party heightened its pursuit of "revolutionary reformism" to counter its label as an alien force in Spanish politics. In the 1960s and '70s the party developed a position that embraced parliamentary democracy, civil liberties, and a mixed economy and placed little emphasis on na-

tionalizations. The party also downplayed its "vanguard" role and, in 1978, dropped the reference to Leninism in the party statutes. Beginning in 1968, when party leader Carrillo criticized the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the PCE staked out a position increasingly independent of Moscow.

While many other commentators have noted these transformations of the PCE, Mujal-Leon lays bare some of their contradictory aspects. For example, while Carrillo criticized the Soviets harshly, there was never a complete break in relations, and Soviet subsidies to the PCE treasury continued to flow. Though Carrillo had used anti-Stalinism as early as 1956 to consolidate his power in the party organization, the PCE's anti-Stalinism was and is compromised by the continued presence of considerable pro-Soviet forces within the party ranks. The PCE seemed on the verge of considerable political power in 1976, but its strength was based more on the weakness of other forces on the Left at that time than on its own vitality.

Events moved rapidly in 1976 and early 1977, and the PCE was largely bypassed. The PCE had calculated that the Franco regime would be brought down in a general strike that would carry to power, with Communist participation, a broad opposition front, such as had been the case in Portugal in 1974. However, the Francoist leaders engineered a smooth transition to parliamentary democracy without ever losing their hold on economic or political power. Mujal-Leon expresses some amazement that Suarez could succeed in the transition, and he stresses such factors as the prime minister's ability to use television effectively. I believe that greater emphasis should have been placed on the class factors at work. Spain's large industrialists and other powerful sectors wanted to integrate Spain into

the rest of Europe and threw their considerable weight behind the political transition that was placed in Suarez's hands for the express purpose of keeping the Left from gaining immediate political power.

In analyzing the June, 1977, electoral defeat and the subsequent internal factionalism and declining influence of the PCE, the author stresses several factors. In those elections in particular, the PCE, in spite of all its efforts, had never satisfactorily explained to either the Left or the Right its role in the Civil War. In addition, in spite of its moderate rhetoric and the fact that its positions differed little from the PSOE, the PCE had a confrontational image. The author might have given greater emphasis to the deep-seated anticommunism of the Spanish populace and to the historic labeling of the PCE as more radical than the Social Democrats. Many Spaniards were ready for a break with Francoism but feared that a large Communist vote would provoke a military coup and a possible civil war.

Since its 1977 electoral defeat the PCE has undergone numerous identity crises. As its profound moderation did not yield the political space it desired, the party has often turned its frustrations inward in numerous splits and purges. Membership has dropped sharply, and the party's already meager vote totals were further eroded in the Socialists' 1982 landslide. Though inevitable dissatisfaction with the moderate Socialist government could be fertile ground for a PCE comeback, such a prospect appears unlikely, given the current disarray in the party.

If there is any overall weakness in Mujal-Leon's book, it is that there is not enough discussion of how the PSOE was able to succeed where the PCE failed. That omission is likely to be rectified when the author moves ahead with his next project, an analysis of the rise of the PSOE. WV

