

BOOKS

HARD CHOICES

by **Cyrus Vance**

(Simon & Schuster: 521 pp.; \$19.95)

POWER AND PRINCIPLE

by **Zbigniew Brzezinski**

(Farrar, Straus & Giroux: 575 pp.; \$22.50)

Mary Jane Checchi

Cyrus Vance is a decent man. *Hard Choices* reflects this and other attributes of a public figure: thoroughness, methodicalness, and orientation toward process, institutions, consensus, and the center. Moderation and continuity were the hallmarks of Vance's old-school style; he eschewed confrontation both within the foreign policy establishment and in his conduct of foreign affairs during the Carter years.

The memoirs of Zbigniew Brzezinski reflect a man far less secure in himself, still anxious to defend, explain, and castigate, who relished in-fighting and prized access to the president for its symbolic value as well as for the power it conferred. His style is more personal, more anecdotal, more given to sharing the "inside story."

Vance's thumbnail sketches of leaders and foreign policy-makers—Sadat, Begin, David Owen—are excellent. His book, somewhat more ponderous, presents a clearer, more precise and complete statement of foreign policy formulation and implementation. He describes with patience how policy is made, while Brzezinski tells us how his own power was accumulated and exercised. It is Vance who senses more clearly the importance of public and congressional understanding and support in the implementation of foreign policy. It is also Vance who, perhaps unknowingly, out of a basic honesty, informs us why the Carter administration, while successful in achieving the Panama Canal Treaties, normalization of relations with China, and the Camp David Accords, was generally unsuccessful in attaining its foreign policy goals—and often when failure did not seem predetermined.

The tension between the two advisors contributed to the perception both at home and abroad that the Carter administration was indecisive. Yet it was the president's unwillingness to make choices that allowed this situation to take its toll. Vance describes the preparation of a major presidential address on U.S.-Soviet relations that could have been instrumental in creating

the framework of the national debate on SALT II. Brzezinski sent the president a confrontational draft; Vance sent one emphasizing the complex nature of U.S.-Soviet relations and the need for the two countries to lower political tensions. Drawing on both drafts, Carter wrote his own speech, "splitting the difference."

For Brzezinski, it was in the Iran situation that the Carter administration had its greatest setback. The national security advisor, though nurturing a reputation for understanding the principles of power, fails either to analyze or isolate the reasons for this and other foreign policy failures of the administration he served. His chronology of events in Iran is a catalogue of candidates for blame: the CIA in general and Stansfield Turner in particular, U.S. Ambassador William Sullivan, the secretary of state, the president—all, in fact, who failed to concur with Brzezinski's nimble conclusion that the United States should support a military coup in Iran in preference to "handing over" the country "piecemeal in an unstable situation." Those Americans who are perplexed by the escalating anti-Americanism of the Third World should give Brzezinski's interventionist arguments a second reading.

Brzezinski's chapter on Iran, dramatic and emotional, exemplifies the dangers inherent in a personalization of power, when ego obscures a cool appraisal of facts, of motives, and ultimately of the national interest. "Deeply dismayed" that Vance and Vice-President Mondale were urging the president to ask the shah (then in New York for medical treatment) to leave the country quickly in order to speed the release of the hostages in the embassy in Teheran, Brzezinski confided to some National Security Council staffers: "It bothered me...that the one to speak up for American honor was a naturalized American. I wondered what this indicated about the current American elite and whether we were not seeing here a symptom of a deeper national problem."

Cyrus Vance is less facile in identifying

the Carter administration's foreign policy failures. Being one of the "current elite," he is not inclined to assign blame. But events in Iran, as described by Vance, speak for themselves and add up to a portrait of an administration that lacked a defined, sustained policy direction. Despite Vance's own professed belief in the necessity of taking the long view, it was this above all that was lacking in the actions taken in the Iran situation. Carter and his advisors scrambled, week by week and finally day by day, for answers to short-term crisis questions. They apparently failed to formulate a practical theory of how they might further American policy objectives in the region—other than to continue in the assumption, until the midnight hour, that despite explosive social, political and economic changes taking place in Iran and its environs, support for the shah would serve as a policy.

In his gentlemanly fashion, however, Vance does communicate the sense that lack of cohesion in the Carter administration led gradually to its diminished success. Jimmy Carter's vacillation over European deployment of the neutron bomb and his related failure to achieve consensus with European allies were harbingers of the administration's failing political strength in the world community. The administration's early success in dominating the Panama Canal Treaties debate—an extremely difficult struggle, too often forgotten or underrated—stands in contrast to the SALT II debate, which never reached the floor of the U.S. Senate. SALT opponents were able to delay and finally block ratification of SALT largely because they succeeded in defining the terms of the debate: a linkage between the treaty and Moscow's interventionist adventures.

It is in the context of SALT that Vance's patrician code of honor emerges in a telling incident that would be humorous in its naiveté were the consequences not so grave. In August, 1979, during a congressional recess and amidst growing rumors of the presence of a Soviet brigade in Cuba, U.S. intelligence concluded that a Soviet unit of two to three thousand men, which probably had been in Cuba since 1975 or '76, had recently participated in field maneuvers. The National Security Council and State Department staffs proceeded to notify leaders of the House and Senate by telephone. After having been notified, Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and a key actor in the SALT drama, called Vance, who informed him that the administration did not intend to make a public statement until more information was available. Church urged that a statement be made, then asked what would happen if he

should disclose the information. Vance replied "that it would be harmful, but I acknowledged to him that he was the only one who could make the decision. My expectation was that Church would say nothing, and that there would be no public discussion." Church, campaigning in Idaho for his political life, broke the story that same night and, to fulfill the prophecy of his own action, predicted a few days later that SALT probably could not be ratified unless the Soviets agreed to remove the brigade. One of the central figures in the ratification fight had not only bought linkage but was selling it wholesale; and the secretary of state, with full opportunity to forestall him, had not moved to do so. SALT was wounded, though not yet dead. But delay and linkage had so weakened the patient that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan quickly buried it.

Is the legacy of Jimmy Carter's foreign policy to be measured by the lack of a SALT treaty, by armed conflict in Central America and Lebanon, by heightened tensions with the Soviet Union? I think not. Ronald Reagan, who opposed the Panama Canal Treaties, quietly reaps their benefits: Who could seriously question that without the treaties that country too would be a hotbed of unrest? Ronald Reagan, who opposed SALT II, abides by its limits and may be positioning himself for a preelection signing of SALT III. Acceptance by Arab nations of an American role in Mideast peace negotiations is predicated on the opening created by the Camp David Accords. Finally, with the 1984 elections approaching, the proponents of linkage have been willing to unlink Soviet "adventurism" from U.S. grain sales.

These two books tell how three very different men—Jimmy Carter, Cyrus Vance, Zbigniew Brzezinski—forged a foreign policy out of their differing philosophies, personalities, and worldviews. The administration's foreign policy was marked by flaws that resulted from those differences, but there were successes too, many of which have been forgotten or underrated. With time, these may gain greater recognition. In the meanwhile we have these books to remind us of the men, the mistakes, the accomplishments. **WV**

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THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND DEPENDENCY IN THE THIRD WORLD

by Gary Gereffi

(Princeton University Press: xiii + 279 pp.; \$9.95/\$25.00)

Philip R. Lee and Jane Sprague Zones

Any analysis of the pharmaceutical industry in the Third World must include an examination of the health of the country, its health care system, and the financing of its health care services. There are also social, cultural, economic, and political factors affecting the availability and use of health services, and these too must be considered. The perspective taken by Gary Gereffi on all this is historical and developmental. He makes comparisons across national boundaries and he bases his research on dependency theory.

Dependency theory is something that students of international economic development have been able to benefit from in the past decade, thanks to the work of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Enzo Faletto, Andre Gunder Frank, and Immanuel Wallerstein, among others. It offers a valid alternative to the modernization theorists, who have dominated academic analysis and public policy in Third World matters since World War II. Modernization theory postulates that nations evolve naturally along an axis from traditional to modern. They use the United States as a model of the values and institutions toward which other nations will move as a result of the diffusion of information, values, and investment capital. Dependency theory, on the other hand, grew out of the failure of modernization theory to predict and explain the widening gulf between the rich and poor nations, despite the infusion in the 1950s and '60s of vast amounts of aid into the less-developed countries.

Dependency theory asserts that "underdevelopment results, in large degree, from dependency relationships created by the global expansion of capitalism. Whereas center countries are industrially advanced and develop according to their internal needs, peripheral nations are far less autonomous and frequently adopt an imitative or stunted pattern of growth that serves the economic interests of center countries and transnational corporations better than the needs of their own people." Real development, on the other hand, would be liberation from external dominance as well as from the internal system of economic inequality produced by foreign control.

Gereffi's research constitutes an impor-

tant contribution to both dependency theory and the study of the pharmaceutical industry. First, he provides an excellent brief overview and critique of dependency theory. Tracing its recent historical and intellectual origins, he summarizes the theory's major features, the varying emphases of its proponents, the research strategies used in its application, and offers some suggestions that invite further thought. Then he demonstrates that dependency theory is capable of generating testable propositions and uses an historical analysis of the steroid hormone industry in Mexico to test them.

In a fascinating narrative Gereffi describes the serendipitous origins and development of the Mexican steroid industry and the several turning points that, by the late 1950s, marked its transition from a number of Mexican-owned and operated companies to an industry controlled by a half-dozen transnational corporate subsidiaries whose mission was to supply their parent firms with bulk products for finishing and distribution elsewhere. Even the creation by the government in 1975 of a state-run pharmaceutical company (Proquive-mex) to capitalize upon remaining sources of barbasco root for the world market did not suffice to stem the tide of foreign domination.

Mexicans did benefit from the transnational corporations. They received revenues and foreign exchange from export sales, seasonal employment, mostly of peasant harvesters, and the training of several hundred technicians. But the costs to Mexico included the loss of finished products (expensive drugs that could easily have been manufactured locally had to be imported), the loss of taxes through tax havens and transfer pricing, and the loss of research capability to generate new products. Gereffi makes clear that the alternative to domination by the TNCs—primarily early state intervention to assure workable local operations—would have provided greater benefits with fewer costs.

Gereffi also presents a cross-national analysis of the pharmaceutical industry as a whole, comparing the experiences of seven countries at different levels of development. The brevity of these descriptions does not allow the kind of insights afforded by the analysis of the Mexican case history. However, it is striking how well the Mexican experience, seemingly unique, leads to generalization. Among other findings, Gereffi notes that: (1) Privately owned pharmaceutical manufacturers, both local and transnational, direct their products to the better-off members of society, slighting the highly prevalent disorders found among the