resistant to change, a lumbering slow-moving beast whose "skin of indifference thickness" as the idealism of the independence movement dissipates. Without more sustained drive from the top, he argues, constructive change will not occur fast enough to keep ahead.

Trevor Fishlock's picture of India, unfortunately, seriously downplays the "other India," the modernizing, innovating India, where "world class" men and women are being trained, where energetic, ambitious entrepreneurs, engineers, and scientists create, experiment, and construct. Its existence is noted, but its energies are not evoked. Yet this is the India of the future, the India that seems likely to play a more consequential role in a wider world. It is hoped Fishlock's publisher will urge him to write a second volume, this one on "that other India." Americans need to know more about both.

INEVITABLE REVOLUTIONS:
THE UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL AMERICA
by Walter LaFeber
(Norton: 357 pp.; $18.95)

THE GIANT'S RIVAL:
THE USSR AND LATIN AMERICA
by Cole Blasier
(University of Pittsburgh Press; xvi + 213 pp.; $14.95/7.95)

Gary Prevost

The Central American region is engulfed in revolution, and to President Reagan "the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on." Walter LaFeber offers an alternative explanation: the poverty and underdevelopment of a region long colonized by Spain and dominated in the twentieth century by the United States. His book is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the roots of current American policy in Central America. Cole Blasier's briefer volume provides a detailed analysis of the Soviet Union's relations with the Western Hemisphere and renders highly questionable the president's perception of current events.

LaFeber demonstrates persuasively that Central America has suffered more than it has benefited from its relationship to the North American giant. He considers Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica and concludes that, despite periodic exceptions and Costa Rica's record of political democracy, most nations of the region have been ruled for most of their history by generals and oligarchs supported by the Government of the United States. LaFeber traces United States designs on Central America to the early 1800s. The Monroe Doctrine was the public announcement of Thomas Jefferson's private opinion that "America has a hemisphere to itself." Monroe's secretary of state, John Quincy Adams, had no desire in 1821 to recognize the newly independent nations of Central America, arguing that they would be incapable of establishing "free institutions of government." For much of the nineteenth century British entrepreneurs and the British fleet dominated Central America, and the claims of the Monroe Doctrine were mostly bravado.

Though the U.S. could do little in Central America in this era, one affair involving an American citizen set the tone for much of our country's dealings with the region. With the 1850s came the "filibusters"—American adventurers who set sail for Central America from New Orleans, New York, and Baltimore in pursuit of private gain, the extension of slave territory, or both. One of these was William Walker, who actually ruled Nicaragua between 1855 and 1857. Attempts by Central American leaders to unseat him were unsuccessful because Walker had been accorded diplomatic recognition by Washington. Ironically, Walker met his downfall when he tried to destroy the steamship line of Cornelius Vanderbilt, one of North America's most powerful capitalists.

The twentieth century saw the emergence of U.S. political and economic power in Central America. British investments peaked around 1910, and the economic balance shifted gradually to the United States. When revolution broke out in Nicaragua in 1912, 2,600 North American troops helped to put it down. The Central American Court, which had been set up with U.S. help in 1907, condemned the intervention, but Washington ignored the ruling and began an on-and-off occupation of Nicaragua that lasted for twenty years.

The U.S. experience in Nicaragua in the first thirty years of this century is particularly important in understanding the current situation. There was, of course, an ever-growing trade relationship: By the 1930s half of Nicaragua's exports and nearly 40 per cent of its imports involved the United States. But the dependence had already gone beyond trade. The choice of Nicaragua's political and military leaders now rested more with Washington than with Managua. First was the imposition of Diaz in 1912 and then, under the watchful eye of the U.S. Marines, the establishment of the National Guard and the Somoza family dynasty in the '30s. Given this history, it is not difficult to understand the depth of nationalist feeling in Nicaragua today.

While the continuous U.S. military presence in Nicaragua was not echoed in the other Central American countries during this period, the development of a significant economic dependence was. By 1929 the United States was by far the most important market for every state but El Salvador and Costa Rica. The U.S. became the leading supplier of goods to all of them, at least doubling its market in each between 1913 and 1929. These small nations were dependent on one or two crops, which in turn were largely controlled by North American investors. In Guatemala, for example, North Americans (particularly the United Fruit Company) controlled all but a few miles of railroad and a fifth of the total land area. In Honduras, United Fruit and its subsidiaries controlled the rail system, port facilities, and nearly all the banana and rubber-producing lands. In Nicaragua, United Fruit and Atlantic Fruit claimed 300,000 acres, and other North American interests owned the leading mines, railroads, and banks.

LaFeber demonstrates that despite the

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considerable shifting, renaming, and reorganization of U.S. policy under nine presidents, beginning with Franklin Roosevelt, the basis of American policy in Central America has remained the same—as have the conditions of life for the overwhelming majority of Central Americans. The bedrock of the Good Neighbor Policy was support for regimes that maintained order and protected private property. U.S.-backed dictators—Carias in Honduras, Martinez in El Salvador, Somoza in Nicaragua, and Ubico in Guatemala—accomplished at a bargain price what the Marines had been attempting for thirty years. Another feature of the Good Neighbor Policy was the replacement of private bankers by the U.S. Government as a source of funds. The Export-Import Bank, founded in 1934, gave the United States replaced France and Britain as supplier and trainer of Central America’s armies.

The next major face-lifting for Central and Latin American policy came in 1961 with John Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress. Spurred by the triumph of Fidel Castro in Cuba in 1959, the Alliance for Progress sought to deal with the fact that the narrow oligarchies supported since the turn of the century were becoming increasingly unstable and open to revolutionary challenges from below. The ten-year project reflected the belief that socialist revolutions of the Cuban variety could be prevented through a combination of economic development and antirevolutionary activity. As LaFeber points out, the latter was always given the same emphasis as the former. It remains so to this day, as military assistance to Central American governments and the recent recommendations of the Kissinger Commission make abundantly clear.

In theory, the Alliance for Progress would aim at promoting political democracy and land reform, but by the time of the Johnson administration the emphasis was solely on the promotion of economic development and anticommunism. It was not primarily the change in administrations that brought on the shift but, rather, the unwillingness of the Central American elites to permit any real democratization or structural change. As a result, military assistance became the cornerstone of U.S. antirevolutionary policy, as exemplified by the twenty thousand-man Marine invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965.

As Jimmy Carter entered the White House, the United States was in trouble both at home and abroad. Watergate and economic crisis had weakened the power of the presidency and the prestige of the U.S. In foreign policy Carter sought to reaffirm America’s role in the world through his campaign for “human rights,” proclaiming in his inaugural address that “our moral sense dictates a clear preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights.” A policy truly based on this principle would be a revolutionary policy in the underdeveloped world, but Carter was not a revolutionary. As at home, he stood for pragmatic, cautious reform. In claiming human rights as his gauge in foreign policy, Carter embarked on a complicated and contradictory path. Central America became the touchstone of that policy. Pressure was placed initially on the military regimes of Guatemala and El Salvador, later on Somoza in Nicaragua. Yet Carter seemed naive as he went about pursuing the same goals as those sought by the Alliance for Progress: reform and democratization without revolution. Both Kennedy and Carter wanted the military and oligarchical elites to share power and distribute wealth more equitably, and both wanted to retain U.S. power and influence in the region. When the elites balked at reform and revolutionary groups challenged for power in El Salvador and Nicaragua, Carter retreated, renewing his support of the elites. Like all presidents before him, Carter could not accept revolution as a legitimate vehicle for change in Central America.

The Reagan administration put a new face on Central American policy. Jeane Kirkpatrick, the U.S. representative to the U.N., declared that “Central America is the most important place in the world for the United States today.” The new administration, aware that after Vietnam the American people were wary of involvement in another indigenous revolution, sought to circumvent the problem by declaring that the conflicts in Central America were not indigenous but caused by Castro and the Soviet Union. Two White Papers issued in 1981 sought to justify the administration’s perception. Even though both were rejected by people in widely differing circles, including the Wall Street Journal, they have remained the cornerstone of the current administration’s policies.

The Giant’s Rival provides the most detailed record in the English language of the substance of Soviet policy in the entire Latin American region. A careful reading of Blasier’s book can further aid in an objective assessment of the Reagan administration’s claim. As the author states in his introduction, the simplistic East-West view of the Latin American conflicts is not borne out by the facts.

Indeed, the Soviet Union had little to do with the revival of revolutionary activities in Central America in the 1970s, and its Communist parties have been on the fringe of political influence in all the states of the region. According to Blasier, Soviet agents in Central America in the mid-’70s thought the future bleak for revolutionary forces. Much more important to the USSR during that decade was the establishment of firmer diplomatic and economic ties with Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Bolivia, with the aim of purchasing wheat from Argentina and selling machinery in Brazil. In all cases the Soviets demonstrated a willingness to work with military governments, further revealing that the formenting of revolution was not their first priority in the Western Hemisphere.

As Blasier points out, it is no secret that the Soviet Union welcomed the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua and would be pleased to see the triumph of revolutionary forces in El Salvador and Guatemala. However, there is nothing to substantiate the claim that the Nicaraguan revolution is now dominated by the Soviet Union or that Moscow directs the Salvadoran revolutionaries. On the contrary. The Sandinista govern-
ment receives only about a fifth of its aid from the Socialist bloc, and the Soviet Union has long shown a distinct unwillingness to take on another economic liability in the Western Hemisphere. In any event, the nationalist Sandinistas seek no such dependency.

LaFeber notes in Inevitable Revolutions that throughout Central America's history "revolutions have served the functions of elections in the United States, that is, they become virtually the only method of transferring power and bringing about needed change." Both works support the view that revolutionary change is inevitable in Central America. This and future U.S. administrations must accept such analysis if the lives of yet another generation of young Americans are not to be wasted in a distant jungle. [WY]

THE FIRST TAIN OF CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF THE CAROLINE AND MARSHALL ISLANDS IN PRE-COLONIAL DAYS, 1521-1885 by Francis X. Hezel, S.J. (University of Hawaii Press; 365 pp.; $25.00)

Sam McPheres

At some point in the relatively near future there will be four new political entities in the Northwestern Pacific: the Republic of the Marshall Islands (closest to Hawaii); the Federated States of Micronesia (the Central Carolines, northern neighbor of Papua New Guinea and Indonesia); the Republic of Palau; and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas (the newest American territory). At present they are grouped as the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and administered by the United States for the United Nations under a 1947 Trusteeship Agreement.

Three of these groups will become quasi-independent. Their status, called "Free Association," cedes defense rights to the United States in return for substantial economic and other assistance. Their governments will control internal affairs and all non-defense-related foreign relations.

The islands have gone through four colonial periods—Spanish, German, Japanese, and American—since they were first put on a map by Magellan in 1521. At one time they were important as producers of copra (desiccated coconut) and at another as whaling stations. They were a major target for Roman Catholic and Protestant missionaries eager to save the souls of "innocent natives" and protect them from the evils of debauchery brought about by contact with unscrupulous Western sailors. They were heavily fortified by the Japanese prior to World War II. But who are these Micronesians whose lands are about to be recognized as international entities? What is their history?

Father Hezel's latest book, the third in his series on this subject, is a major contribution to our understanding of Micronesia. The three volumes build upon each other, gradually increasing in complexity. After Foreign Ship Contacts with its simple listings came Winds of Change, and now The First Taint, which chronicles in minute detail the opening of the Micronesian islands to the Western world and Eastern markets. Those who have access to the first two books will find The First Taint easier to read, but all the data of the other two are here and much, much more.

While Hezel excludes the Marianas from most of the work, a forgivable but regrettable omission, he covers extensively the Marshalls, Ponape, Truk, Yap, and Palau, and gives detailed treatment to Kosrae (Kosrae). From original source materials he reconstructed the islanders' colonial history: the first contacts with Westerners, the introduction of syphilis and epidemic diseases, the founding of worldwide trading firms in whale products and copra, the genetic mixing that resulted in the Micronesians of today—many of whom still bear the names of early beachcombers, whalers, and entrepreneurs who visited or were resident on the various islands. The situations he describes are discovered to have their echo today. For example, recent observers of the Palauan political situation will note that present plans for a Compact of Free Association and for a constitution and national government have been developing in a climate much like that of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as described by Hezel.

The obvious value of the book is its prodigious detail, but it is the hardest element to keep in perspective. The same names pop up in different chapters in different contexts; ships call at different islands at different times; people move around. It is almost necessary to make some sort of chart to follow the movements of the principals as they appear and reappear in various periods. But the book is a gold mine of character sketches. Hezel has researched Spanish, German, and American archives for the records of whalers, missionaries, and government officials, providing vivid descriptions of the people who came to the islands from all over the world. For the armchair strategist following naval movements in the Pacific there are accounts of British warships that brought law and order, to ostensibly Spanish islands with their permanent populations of German traders and American whalers and missionaries, demonstrating the Empire's reach. There is also an account of the Confederate cruiser Shenandoah's sinking of four Union whaling ships in Ponape at the end of the American Civil War, an event that is never mentioned in U.S. history books. The book is full of interesting details and encounters like these—the interplay, for instance, of the then great powers of Europe in their search for new colonies and raw materials and the effect of modern warfare on traditional balances of power in the islands.

While the notes, letters, and reports Hezel draws upon reflect the observations of Westerners, it takes only a little effort to put oneself in the place of the Micronesian people to see how they reacted to the phenomenon of the white man and how he changed their cultures and lives—sometimes harshly, sometimes gradually, if inexorably. Now, when the islands are on the verge of becoming self-governing again, The First Taint provides both the general reader and the specialized observer with a wealth of information—filling a void in the literature with style, humor, and a great deal of human interest. [WY]

THIRD WORLD STRATEGY: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COHESION IN THE SOUTH edited by Altaf Gauhar (Praeger Publishers [in cooperation with the Third World Foundation]; xvi + 221 pp.; $24.95/$12.95)

REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD edited by Gordon White, Robin Murray, Christine White (University Press of Kentucky; iv + 278 pp.; $26.00)

Louis F. Cooper

The term Third World, in use now for nearly four decades, has been attacked repeatedly as inaccurate and misleading. Daniel Bell, writing in 1977, called it "vague and tendentious," and Secretary of State-designate Alexander Haig, in his January, 1981, confirmation hearings, labeled "a myth" the notion of a unified Third World. In one sense, of course, Haig was right. The growing economic differences among develop-