ment receives only about a fifth of its aid from the Socialist bloc, and the Soviet Union has long shown a distinct unwillingness to take on another economic liability in the Western Hemisphere. In any event, the nationalist Sandinistas seek no such dependency.

LaFeber notes in Inevitable Revolutions that throughout Central America's history "revolutions have served the functions of elections in the United States, that is, they become virtually the only method of transferring power and bringing about needed change." Both works support the view that revolutionary change is inevitable in Central America. This and future U.S. administrations must accept such analysis if the lives of yet another generation of young Americans are not to be wasted in a distant jungle. \[WV\]

**THE FIRST TAINT OF CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF THE CAROLINE AND MARSHALL ISLANDS IN PRE-COLONIAL DAYS, 1521-1885 by Francis X. Hezel, S.J.**

(University of Hawaii Press; 365 pp.; $25.00)

Sam McPhetres

At some point in the relatively near future there will be four new political entities in the Northwestern Pacific: the Republic of the Marshall Islands (closest to Hawaii); the Federated States of Micronesia (the Central Carolines, northern neighbor of Papua New Guinea and Indonesia); the Republic of Palau; and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariannas (the newest American territory). At present they are grouped as the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and administered by the United States for the United Nations under a 1947 Trusteeship Agreement.

Three of these groups will become quasi-independent. Their status, called "Free Association," cedes defense rights to the United States in return for substantial economic and other assistance. Their governments will control internal affairs and all non-defense-related foreign relations.

The islands have gone through four colonial periods—Spanish, German, Japanese, and American—since they were first put on a map by Magellan in 1521. At one time they were important as producers of copra (dessicated coconut) and at another as whaling stations. They were a major target for Roman Catholic and Protestant missionaries eager to save the souls of "innocent natives" and protect them from the evils of debauchery brought about by contact with unscrupulous Western sailors. They were heavily fortified by the Japanese prior to World War II. But who are these Micronesians whose lands are about to be recognized as international entities? What is their history?

Father Hezel's latest book, the third in his series on this subject, is a major contribution to our understanding of Micronesia. The three volumes build upon each other, gradually increasing in complexity. After Foreign Ship Contacts with its simple listings came Winds of Change, and now The First Taint, which chronicles in minute detail the opening of the Micronesian islands to the Western world and Eastern markets. Those who have access to the first two books will find The First Taint easier to read, but all the data of the other two are here and much, much more.

While Hezel excludes the Marianas from most of the work, a forgivable but regrettable omission, he covers extensively the Marshalls, Ponape, Truk, Yap, and Palau, and gives detailed treatment to Kosrae (Kusaie). From original source materials he recreates the islanders' colonial history: the first contacts with Westerners, the introduction of syphilis and epidemic diseases, the foundings of worldwide trading firms in whale products and copra, the genetic mixing that resulted in the Micronesians of today—many of whom still bear the names of early beachcombers, whalers, and entrepreneurs who visited or were resident on the various islands. The situations he describes are discovered to have their echo today. For example, recent observers of the Palauan political situation will note that present plans for a Compact of Free Association and for a constitution and national government have been developing in a climate much like that of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as described by Hezel.

The obvious value of the book is its prodigious detail, but it is the hardest element to keep in perspective. The same names pop up in different chapters in different contexts: ships call at different islands at different times; people move around. It is almost necessary to make some sort of chart to follow the movements of the principals as they appear and reappear in various periods. But the book is a gold mine of character sketches. Hezel has researched Spanish, German, and American archives for the records of whalers, missionaries, and government officials, providing vivid descriptions of the people who came to the islands from all over the world. For the armchair strategist following naval movements in the Pacific there are accounts of British warships that brought law and order, to ostensibly Spanish islands with their permanent populations of German traders and American whalers and missionaries, demonstrating the Empire's reach. There is also an account of the Confederate cruiser Shenandoah's sinking of four Union whaling ships in Ponape at the end of the American Civil War, an event that is never mentioned in U.S. history books. The book is full of interesting details and encounters like these—the interplay, for instance, of the then great powers of Europe in their search for new colonies and raw materials and the effect of modern warfare on traditional balances of power in the islands.

While the notes, letters, and reports Hezel draws upon reflect the observations of Westerners, it takes only a little effort to put oneself in the place of the Micronesian people to see how they reacted to the phenomenon of the white man and how he changed their cultures and lives—sometimes harshly, sometimes gradually, if inexorably. Now, when the islands are on the verge of becoming self-governing again, The First Taint provides both the general reader and the specialized observer with a wealth of information—filling a void in the literature with style, humor, and a great deal of human interest. \[WV\]

**THIRD WORLD STRATEGY: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COHESION IN THE SOUTH edited by Altaf Gauhar**

(Praeger Publishers [in cooperation with the Third World Foundation]; xvi + 221 pp.; $24.95/$12.95)

**REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD edited by Gordon White, Robin Murray, Christine White**

(University Press of Kentucky; iv + 278 pp.; $26.00)

*Louis F. Cooper*

The term Third World, in use now for nearly four decades, has been attacked repeatedly as inaccurate and misleading. Daniel Bell, writing in 1977, called it "vague and tendentious," and Secretary of State-designate Alexander Haig, in his January, 1981, confirmation hearings, labeled "a myth" the notion of a unified Third World. In one sense, of course, Haig was right. The growing economic differences among develop-
ing countries have been increasingly reflected in political differences as well—this evidenced in such North-South meetings as the October, 1981, summit at Cancún. Nonetheless, most "Southern" governments remain committed to seeking fundamental changes in international trade, monetary, and investment arrangements. Southern unity is threatened less by arguments about goals than by disagreements about strategy.

*Third World Strategy*, a collection of essays and speeches published in the London-based *Third World Quarterly*, sheds some light on these disagreements. In his introduction, for example, Aftab Gauhar—a former journalist and government minister in Pakistan and now secretary-general of the Third World Foundation in London—calls on the South to "extricate itself" from the international economic system and "evolve a system of its own in order to negotiate on equal terms with the North." But Shridath Ramphal, the Guyanan who heads the Secretariat of Commonwealth Nations, attacks this "delinking" strategy. It is "not a policy of collective self-reliance for development but the philosophy of the 'drop-out'—setting for the dubious and transient satisfaction of life in the commune of the poor."

A third view of the delinking question is provided by the African political scientist Ali Mazrui in a brief but insightful article entitled "Exit Visa From the World System." Mazrui argues for what might be called selective disengagement; although "complete exit from the global system is impossible, for the South to remain wholly in the system on the present terms "would be a case of surrendering to Western hegemony." The Third World must strike "the right balance between exit and entry," remembering that the goal is not "to rearrange the furniture within the system, but...to renovate the structure of the system."

The consideration of North-South relations at this high level of generality is not the only concern of *Third World Strategy*. Indeed, most of the contributions focus on specific issues. Among the more interesting pieces are several studies of OPEC's trade and aid relations with non-oil-exporting developing countries; an essay by Gauhar on the debate over the so-called New World Information Order; an intelligent critique by Omari Kokol of trading agreements between the European Community and those Southern states that are parties to the Lomé Convention; and a typically penetrating analysis of the world food problem by the Indian economist Amartya Sen. The roster of Southern contributors is a distinguished one, including (in addition to those already mentioned) economists Raul Prebisch, Sanjaya Lall, and Nurul Islam. The volume's main drawback is a lack of coherence—perhaps inherent in collections of this nature, where there is no overarching theme tying the various contributions together.

The same cannot be said of *Revolutionary Socialist Development in the Third World*, which grows out of work done by the Socialist Development Group at the noted Sussex Institute of Development Studies. After a general introduction we are given analyses of six countries that have taken noncapitalist, mass-mobilizing, and decidedly statist development paths: South Yemen, Mozambique, North Korea, China, Cuba, and Vietnam. As the editors recognize, there are problems in applying the label Socialist to these authoritarian regimes; and this reviewer finds the label inappropriate, believing as he does that genuine socialism can exist only in the presence of democracy. To say this, however, is not to reproach the contributors, who take a generally sympathetic but by no means uncritical approach to their subjects. Jon Halliday, for example, while crediting North Korea's exceptional economic achievements, does not mince words in his discussion of the highly repressive and militarized polity over which Kim Il Sung presides. Gordon White's essay on post-Mao China and Ricardo Carciolo's study of Cuba in the '70s also warrant particular attention; and the volume as a whole, given its focus on the internal dynamics of noncapitalist development, is a welcome addition to a relatively small literature. Although accessible to the nonspecialist, the book will be of primary interest to economists, sociologists, and others with a professional concern for its subject.

**Briefly Noted**

*Abingdon Dictionary of Living Religions*, edited by Keith Crim (with Roger J. Bullard and Larry D. Shinn) (Abingdon Press; xviii + 830 pp.; $39.95)

Given the incredible complexity of religion, its almost infinite variety, and the multiple ways we encounter and become curious about it; and given the urgency of knowing and understanding each others' assumptions and commitments, it would be hard to imagine a handier book than this. It is not large, as encyclopedias go, but easy to pick up and move about in. Some of the articles are long and quite detailed; some, fittingly brief. Virtually every item of recondite knowledge that I could discover in my own religious background was accurately represented here, and of course the book is full of areas of knowledge about which I had never dreamed. This would seem an excellent reference book for almost anyone who must know or is simply curious about the rich and kaleidoscopic world of human belief and worship.

—John E. Becker