

policy should meet with great obstacles was only to be expected in a world where brute force still plays a dominant role."

Curiously, these positive normative propositions for a new integrated world community come up against the author's own often reluctant and insightful observations that the favorable trends he sees are at odds with his own estimates of the dominant trends of our day. The book seems to argue with itself in an often melancholy fashion.

A minor but irritating point: I noted ten egregious typos from page 30 to page 101 before I stopped counting. This suggests one of two courses for the future: (a) that the Norwegian publisher, Universitetsforlaget, invest in a good proofreader or (b) that Columbia University Press be more discriminating in distributing thin volumes at \$26.

In sum, there is more assertion and hope than real evidence to support the idea of world integration. The call seems to be for a vast program of social and ethical engineering beyond anything yet attempted. This expectation requires a high order of courage and faith, and an optimism that rises high above the current dismal state of international relations. WV

#### CITIZEN MACHIAVELLI

by Mark Hulliung

(Princeton University Press; xiii + 299 pp.; \$22.50)

John E. Becker

Modern scholars consistently omit the imperial theme in Machiavelli. They are too concerned, says Hulliung, with his republican thought and with trying to reconcile the monarchical Machiavelli of *The Prince* with the republican Machiavelli of *The Discourses*. Arguing against the long tradition of humanist readings of Machiavelli, Hulliung rejects the image of him as "torn, divided, and tortured by the necessity of doing evil for the sake of good." For Machiavelli the truths of power were not terrible; they were exciting. Hulliung cites J. R. Hale with approval: "Because of its formal resemblance to old manuals *Of Princely Government*, Machiavelli's *Prince* was like a bomb in a prayerbook." Hulliung goes on: "What has been done for *The Prince* must now be done for the republican writings of Machiavelli: these too must be restored to their intellectual context,...classical political thought, Roman in particular."

#### "Eternal Summer

Our reviewers have liked these books. We recall them to you, hoping that summer will bring opportunities to read that winter has denied.

**FANATICISM: A HISTORICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY**, by André Haynal, Miklos Molnar, Gérard de Puymègue (Schocken Books; 282 pp.; \$19.95)  
"By illuminating an important phenomenon that we are prone to ignore, [the authors] upset some of our taken-for-granted notions, reminding us that, in E. M. Cioran's words, 'When one refuses to admit the interchangeable nature of ideas, blood flows.' "—Edith Kurzweil

**SOUTH OF NOWHERE**, by Antonio Lobo Antunes, translated by Elizabeth Lowe (Random House; 160 pp.; \$11.95)

"...a very dramatic and alarming work whose power is not diminished by Antunes's occasional metaphorical excesses. Caustic humor offers some relief from the harrowing tale he spins, especially in asides about relations between men and women and in descriptions of ultraconservative family members who cannot understand the emerging values of the young doctor and writer growing up in their midst."

—Gerald Freund

**ENVOY TO THE MIDDLE WORLD**, by George McGhee (Harper & Row; xxii + 460 pp.; \$25.00)

"The author's accounts of the events in which he participated are vivid, personal, and crammed with local color. But McGhee has added to each chapter two additional elements that make his memoirs even more valuable and readable: a summary of basic facts and events before and after the period he is describing, in effect providing a current handbook on the Middle World, and the liberal use of both American and British official sources of the period."—James W. Spain

**THE HEALTH REVOLUTION IN CUBA**, by Sergio Diaz-Briquets (University of Texas Press; xvii + 227 pp.; \$19.95)

"This book, by a U.S. population expert of Cuban descent, is as objective an analysis as has yet come out in the United States."—George A. Silver

**THE EGYPT OF NASSER AND SADAT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TWO REGIMES**, by John Waterbury (Princeton University Press; 475 pp.; \$45.00/\$12.50)

"Anyone with a serious interest in Egypt will find this book a unique and valuable resource."—Stanley Reed

**GLOBAL STAKES: THE FUTURE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA**, by James Botkin, Dan Dimancescu, and Ray Stata (Ballinger Publishing Co.; 237 pp.; \$17.50)

"The authors have provided information, insights, and analysis that will be of inestimable value in the great debate over the national and international problems that high technology is likely to cause. What is disturbing is that this debate has yet to begin."—Albert L. Huebner

**THE CHANGING ANATOMY OF BRITAIN**, by Anthony Sampson (Random House; 476 pp.; \$17.95)

"The 1962 format remains, but the message is new; twenty years of observation has transformed this anatomist into a psychologist and unwitting ironist. At each stop on his informed and sophisticated tour of the corridors of power, Sampson is now alert to the strengths and flexibility of traditional institutions."

—Larry Tool

**POLICY AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY**, edited by Kozo Yamamura (University of Washington Press; 332 pp.; \$25.00)

"It would surely be the height of folly for the United States to create its own version of MITI just as it is becoming clear that Japan's spectacular successes in international trade were based on a set of circumstances not likely to be repeated. The authors have performed a valuable service by documenting this conclusion and otherwise clarifying the limits and potential of Japan's future role in world markets."—Walter Ashley

## *Shall Not Fade"*

**PARADOXES OF POWER: THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN THE EIGHTIES**, by Adam Yarmolinsky and Gregory D. Foster (Indiana University Press; 160 pp.; \$15.00)

*"It is not a book of answers; there will be no dancing in the streets. But it is a book that helps us understand and learn more about the organizations in which we have placed our primary trust."*—John B. Keeley

**LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES**, by Terry Nardin (Princeton University Press; 351 pp.; \$35.00/\$14.00)

*"It is rare to come across a book on international relations that looks at the subject through fresh eyes and moves one to make new connections, to pause from time to time to nod and say, 'yes, that is true and valuable.' Such earlier works as Frederick Schuman's International Politics and Hans J. Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations are of that order. Nardin's book, providing a 'practical theory of how the international system actually works,' may well rank with them."*

—Robert J. Myers

**THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION**, by Sheila Fitzpatrick (Oxford University Press; vi + 181 pp.; \$19.95)

*"...a superbly crafted little volume on the origins and implications of a political event that, in [the author's] words, 'remains one of those ambiguous milestones in human history that scholars, politicians and ordinary thinking people keep coming back to decipher.' There have been many new studies of the Russian Revolution published recently, but in sheer value to the undergraduate—or even graduate student—none holds a candle to this concise and lucid account."*

—Thomas Magstadt

**THE EMPEROR: DOWNFALL OF AN AUTOCRAT**, by Ryszard Kapuscinski (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich; 164 pp.; \$12.95)

*"Although the book is ostensibly a collection of personal accounts, it is certain that the author has taken some liberties with his material to fashion a coherent tale that combines the terse irony of Camus with the bold surrealism of Gabriel Garcia Marquez."*—Sterett Pope

**ONE DAY OF LIFE**, by Manlio Argueta (Vintage Press; 215 pp.; \$6.95 [paper])

*"Originally published in El Salvador in 1980, Argueta's fine novel accomplishes what endless reams of journalism about the continuing tragedy of that country would never do."*—Holly Myers

**HISTORICAL CAPITALISM**, by Immanuel Wallerstein (Verso Editions [distributed by Schocken Books]; 110 pp.; \$6.50)

*"Here, in refreshingly few pages, is a succinct how-it-works of the modern world economy."*—Brian Thomas

**GANDHI'S CHILDREN**, by Trevor Fishlock (Universe Books [New York]; 189 pp.; \$16.50/\$8.95)

*"Trevor Fishlock has sharp eyes, sensitive ears, a lively, humane wit, and a skillful pen. Like many other serious journalists posted to India, he copes with the contradictory, aspiring, and disheartening realities of India by providing numberless vignettes and pithy comments on what seems to him important."*

—W. Howard Wiggins

**INEVITABLE REVOLUTIONS: THE UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL AMERICA**, by Walter LaFeber (Norton; 357 pp.; \$18.95)

**THE GIANT'S RIVAL: THE USSR AND LATIN AMERICA**, by Cole Blasier (University of Pittsburgh Press; xvi + 213 pp.; \$14.95/\$7.95)

*"To President Reagan 'the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on.' Walter LaFeber offers an alternative explanation: the poverty and underdevelopment of a region long colonized by Spain and dominated in the twentieth century by the United States....Cole Blasier's briefer volume provides a detailed analysis of the Soviet Union's relations with the Western Hemisphere and renders highly questionable the president's perception of current events."*—Gary Prevost.

What emerges most powerfully from Hulliung's study of Machiavelli is just how little of a political scientist Machiavelli was. He was a committed believer, almost an enthusiast, of an ancient myth, and he was shocking not because he looked forward to a new age of objectivity but, rather, because he looked backward, tried to leap over the intervening Christian centuries, erase the moral sensibility they had created, and reassert the pagan values of ancient Rome.

Hulliung's best work shows us in how many ways Machiavelli failed to see across those centuries. "Just offstage throughout Machiavelli's entire performance in the Discourses were the annoying presences of Plato and Aristotle whose condemnation of imperialism was not moralistic, Stoical, or Christian, and had nothing to do with easily dismissed notions of the oneness of mankind. Theirs, rather, was the claim that imperialism is necessarily fatal for its republican perpetrator, because a city-state expanded is no longer a city-state: it may live on after its conquests but only by forfeiting its civic virtue and republican politics." Machiavelli is aware of all the facts but never bothers to cite "their common denominator, the corruption that necessarily followed from Rome's determination to annex the world." Machiavelli's only "argument" for the necessity of empire is that Rome had to conquer or be conquered because all physical bodies move up or down and cannot remain balanced in between. "A mere metaphor was Machiavelli's substitute for the hard work of determining when, if ever, a state must play the aggressor to survive, how far its aggression need reach, and at what point aggression becomes self-defeating." Machiavelli, says Hulliung, simply deceived himself into the belief that there was no choice intervening between Spartan stagnation and Roman imperial expansion.

Machiavelli, then, was a man committed to the past, and the flavor of his commitment is captured in a citation from one of his letters that introduces Hulliung's fifth chapter: "On the coming of evening, I return to my house and enter my study; and at the door I take off the day's clothing, covered with mud and dust, and put on garments regal and courtly; and reclothed appropriately, I enter the ancient courts of ancient men, where, received by them with affection, I feed on that food which only is mine and which I was born for...and for four hours of time I do not feel boredom, I forget every trouble, I do not dread poverty, I am not frightened by death; entirely I give myself over to them." Clearly Machiavelli's commitment to ancient Rome brought him

all the peace, the sense of a meaning transcending present suffering, the support against death, which the Christian religion did not.

What, then, were the mythic Roman values to which Machiavelli was so committed? Once more Hulliung reminds us of the absence of Plato and Aristotle. Machiavelli had no patience with the moral primacy of the contemplative life in those two philosophers, neither of whom had been able to show very clearly why the philosopher should ever wish to "return to the cave, once he succeeded in escaping from it." On the other hand, the Roman historians Sallust, Livy, Tacitus, and others emphasized military deeds as the highest form of goodness; and in doing so, they, in their turn, had overleaped Plato and Aristotle and returned to Homer. But in ignoring Plato and Aristotle, Machiavelli missed out on the richest resources available for understanding political life. Aristotle's sociological genius and Plato's psychological prowess were both lost on Machiavelli, as they were lost on the Romans.

Machiavelli read the past to learn how to act here and now, in his own present. And he had a prescientific sense of the authority of the ancients: "Medicine too is nothing other than the experiments made by ancient physicians, on which present physicians base their judgments. Nonetheless, in setting up states, in maintaining governments, in ruling kingdoms, in organizing armies and managing war....in expanding an empire, not a single prince or republic now resorts to the examples of the ancients." That we can reliably follow the authoritative norms of antiquity is clear from his conviction "that all cities and all peoples have the same desires and the same traits and that they always have had them." And yet the more Machiavelli studied history, the more he was forced to deny the truth it contained. That truth, according to Hulliung, is the one that put all the humanists of the Renaissance on the rack: "Following every victory of the humanists in restoring a classical text to its context, there was that much additional evidence of the absence of a common denominator between ancient and modern ways of life. Forever insisting there were lessons to be learned from the classics, the humanists were constantly in danger of learning the one lesson they were unwilling to learn, that the past was irrevocably past." Machiavelli, according to Hulliung, "did the only reasonable thing....He refused to learn that if Renaissance city-states were as radically dissimilar to the city-states of the ancient world as he contended, this was a reason to forget Roman politics and to begin

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addressing Florentine politics in Florentine terms." He either had to stop reading the ancients and study his world, or he had to read the ancients for the pure pleasure of contemplation. He accepted neither alternative. In sum, Machiavelli, "who interpreted pagan religion as a political myth of the Romans, made a myth of the Roman Republic for use by the moderns; and he was both the first to believe in this myth and its greatest propagandist." He was, says Hulliung, an ideologue, not a scientist.

There has always been something suspicious about the way we have been asked to read Machiavelli. Dutifully we have listened; dutifully we have read. But could we really shrug off his contempt for our values? Could we really believe so silly a notion as that Roman religion had been invented by some transhuman class of clever and deceitful nobles or that politicians on "the other side" would never be canny enough to penetrate a constant policy of fraud or that no people would ever be desperate enough to react with implacable resistance to force? Hulliung demands that we see just how fundamentally Machiavelli committed himself to violence and fraud and the pursuit of empire, and then helps

us to see how unscientific, how myopic, how truncated the commitment was.

And yet the trumpet, at the end, has an uncertain sound. It is hard to say just exactly what Hulliung's final conclusion is. Machiavelli, he insists, must not be locked in the past where he can do us no harm or be assimilated to our enlightened liberal ideology. To see him as he is, demythologized, is to see our Western heritage as our nemesis. Is it that, having seen him as enemy at last, we learn, Pogo-style, that "he is us"? [WV]

## Briefly Noted

### THE DIPLOMATS by Martin Mayer

(Doubleday & Co.; 432 pp.; \$17.95)

In good time—an election year—comes a book to remind us that diplomacy is as important to national and international security as military power and needs to be better understood and better supported. And it reminds us too that diplomats themselves have far more than an accidental effect upon events. In gathering information, lubricating points of friction, alerting governments to crises, advising them on how to avoid or resolve collisions of interest, and collaborating among themselves to make the international system work as well as their national governments will permit, they are indeed toilers in the vineyards of peace.

According to Mayer, "diplomacy is a small profession—there are at most seventy-five thousand people working as Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) for all the nations of the world—but the diplomats' work cannot be understood outside the context of its subjects and its systems, and both subjects and systems are incomprehensible without their history." Mayer has that sense of history and draws upon it for illumination and insight. He is also a student of comparative diplomacy who, in the course of five years, visited ministries, embassies, consulates, and international agencies in twenty countries (though only one in the Soviet bloc), and who interviewed ambassadors or their deputies in six others. For these reasons, and because he is as interested in the selection, training, assignment, and promotion of diplomats as he is in their performance, his book is something of a novelty in the literature and a much-needed addition to it.

*The Diplomats* is not as well organized a book as a political scientist would have produced, but neither has any political sci-

entist written of diplomacy as acutely and realistically. Perhaps its greatest fault is its failure to analyze diplomacy in terms of political strategy, tactics, and techniques as well as in terms of personal qualities and skills.

—Smith Simpson

### AGRICULTURE IN CHINA'S MODERN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

by Nicholas R. Lardy

(Cambridge University Press; 285 pp.; \$37.50)

This is an in-depth, objective, and scholarly study of the role of agriculture in mainland China, using detailed statistical data from the Chinese government, which has made continuous efforts to regulate agricultural output. Agricultural growth between 1953 and 1957 was rapid, despite a minimum of industrial inputs and few technological changes. Water-control programs appeared in the 1950s, chemical fertilizers in the 1960s. Technical developments increased after the '60s.

One of the most fascinating parts of the book deals with the introduction of high-yielding, short-stalk rice varieties. These are responsive to fertilizer and, by 1977, were planted in about 80 per cent of China's rice-growing areas. There is an interesting contrast here. The International Rice Institute, working in the Philippines, at a slightly later date developed the same kinds of rice, but they found acceptance in only 25 per cent of the rice-growing areas of the rest of Asia. The difference is attributable to the Chinese government's understanding of what was necessary for the utilization of these new varieties, as well as its ability to provide it.

Between the 1950s and the mid-to-late '70s, low income and malnutrition were endemic among the farm population of China, despite doubling of the national income in this period. The national government was aware of this gap. Although the First Five-Year Plan had been price and market-oriented, in the first half of the 1960s this approach was replaced by state control, geared to quantity. But at least part of rural poverty, the author believes, was tied to the emphasis on quantity after 1965. A drive for local self-sufficiency in cereal grains resulted in other crops being abandoned and the suppression of interregional agricultural trade. Reduced market opportunities hurt the large peasant population dependent on

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
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markets for the sale of their noncereal crops and the purchase of the cereals they needed.

The Cultural Revolution added new problems. It repressed rural markets, private plots, and the development of subsistence agriculture, though these practices have made an outstanding contribution to the increased food productivity of the Eastern bloc countries of Europe, including the USSR itself. Some leaders have tried to increase farm and private production by improved prices, but the bureaucracy, as bureaucracies will, has felt this a threat to its power and has fought such efforts. In general, the leadership has been divided. Some have tried to expand markets as an inducement to increase production and improve peasant life. Others have felt that improved markets would threaten the production of consumer goods.

Agricultural investments have been modest, considering the large contribution made by agriculture to the national product. One senses a drive by the leadership to augment living standards by increasing the production of consumer goods, sometimes even at the cost of agriculture.

In summary, the First Five-Year Plan with its higher agricultural investments and easier marketing programs resulted in higher growth. The reduced agricultural invest-

ments of 1966-77 were paralleled by a decline in agricultural production. Since 1978 the average price for crops delivered to the state has risen and there has been an increased payment of premium prices—both aimed at encouraging production. This has helped to an extent to improve the lot of peasants and farmers.

—Arnold Krochmal

knowledge comes from having lived there through the major student uprisings as dean of a college in the University, which meant that I bailed young dissident faculty out of jail often, saw Peace Corps junior faculty deported on twenty-four-hour notice, gained access to information on the inside of the power system by doing free consulting for the heads of the airline, government banking system, utilities, etc. I also had to have my face rebuilt and lost an eye as a result of one stray brick among the many which were thrown at all cars traveling down a particular road one night. My boss was a "Lij," a bestowed title indicating that he was a trusted insider. (The term translates literally from Amharic as "boy," or "trusted palace boy," and my boss was married to one of Haile Selassie's granddaughters, so he had to have been a true "Lij.")

I believe that your reviewer should have pointed out that both volumes reviewed were seriously in error for the period beyond 1966. Kapuscinski did point out some effects of the Negus's age, as noted by Pope, but neglected to point up the fact that the revolution was against the "rulers" for the period 1966-74.

James A. Lee

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
## Correspondence

### HAILE SELASSIE

Sterett Pope's review of the Kapuscinski and Marcus volumes on Haile Selassie and Ethiopia suggests one serious oversight. By the mid-1960s, when I arrived in Addis Ababa to spend a number of years, Haile Selassie was not running the country. It was being run by a "band" of "shimaglis." These were the power-center heads among the provincial governors, military, business, and international traders. The old man was too tired to take the country back from them. And they let him cut a lot of ribbons opening orphanages, schools, and the like. My

# Hitler, Germans, and the "Jewish Question"

**Sarah Gordon**



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