guerrillas in their besieged stronghold of Guazapa. His moving autobiographical wit-
ness is the first detailed account of life among the rebels. It is also a compassionate ac-
count of what it is like, with a minimum of resources, to provide health care to ci-
vilians and combatants on all sides in the midst of a civil war. Clements’s book is
painfully honest, introspective, and thoughtful. It hits home, whether Clements is
discussing why preventive health meas-
ures work poorly in the face of air attacks or how to use native plants as medicinal
drugs.

This book should forever destroy the
myths about Cuban, Nicaraguan, and other foreign influences on the Salvadoran guer-
rilhas. Again and again Clements hears of the young and old who risk their lives in
response to the brutal, random violence of the Salvadoran military and security forces;
of the terror and exploitation inflicted on tenant farmers and landless laborers; and of
the lack of options for the rural poor. He meets rebel hardliners as well as devout
Christians, and he presents them all in this compelling book. Most of all he meets him-
self, an American pacifist doctor refusing to bear arms in a war being fought against
a shiftless army bearing advanced American weapons yet preferring to brutalize civil-
vilians. His is a telling witness.

Raymond Bonner tells in one volume the story of U.S. involvement in El Salvador,
primarily from 1979 to 1984, and the story of the Salvadoran civil war. His relentless
pursuit of documents and sources results in a scathing condemnation of Washington’s
duplicity. Bureaucrats convinced that sup-
port of the corrupt Salvadoran military was essential to prevent a “communist take-
over,” covered up human rights atrocities, illegal uses of aid money and of U.S. mil-
tary advisors, and many other outrages.

The hard-core ideological element of the Reagan administration upped the ante and
torpedoed possible negotiations.

Less insightful is Bonner’s story of the com-
plex Salvadoran civil war. A two-week visit
with the guerrillas in Morazan Province corroborates the impression of their moti-
vations given in Clements’s book. But the
economy gets short shrift, as do the political actors opposed to both the military and
the Marxist-Leninists.

Bonner’s major premise is that the U.S.
could have and still should use the with-
drawal of aid to curb the mad dog Salva-
doran military. However, a withdrawal of
aid had little impact on the similarly bru-
talizing Guatemalan Army. What happens if the U.S. uses its stick and the Salvadoran
military either finds other beneficiaries of
disintegrates, as happened in Nicaragua un-
der Somoza?

This intelligent, extremely well-re-
searched, and humane book examines the
recent past but pulls back from a hard look at future options.

Richard Alan White has attempted to
present the big picture, an overview of U.S.
involvement in Central America. Since his
book summarizes in three paragraphs the
social structure of five very different coun-
tries, it contributes confusion rather than clarity. There is a thumping polemic based
on seeds of documents, hearings, and other
sources tracing parallels to Vietnam and to
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Cur-
iously, there are individual chapters on each
of the Central American countries except
Nicaragua. These are analytically insipid,
and the discussions of counterinsurgency
doctrines, the role of the CIA, U.S. aid, and
“reform versus repression” are stale.

U.S. influence in El Salvador and Central
America is great, but its leverage is often
negligible. Subject to constraints arising
from U.S. domestic politics and to the in-
ternal machinations of highly idiosyncratic
societies in Central America, U.S. poli-
cymakers grasp at ideological and other
straws and at straw men. Clements and
Bonner forcefully remind us, from different
perspectives, that the Salvadoran reality is
a military murdering its own people and
driving them into rebellion. W.V.

RADICAL TRAGEDY:
RELIGION, IDEOLOGY AND POWER
IN THE DRAMA OF SHAKESPEARE
AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES
by Jonathan Dollimore
(University of Chicago Press: 312 pp.: $20.00)

Robert Griffin

In November, 1534, the English Parliament
passed the Act of Supremacy declaring the
king Supreme Head of the Church of En-

gland and then went on to make it high
treason to deprive the king of any of his

titles. The break with Rome was complete.

Henry VIII was free to establish the legiti-
macy of his divorce and remarriage and to
enrich himself and his favorites at the ex-

pense of the Roman church.

This was not without its dangers, how-
never, for in the eyes of the Roman church
the king was now an outlaw. His strategy,
which became an important and carefully
cultivated policy of the Tudor monarchy,
was to encourage the view that the monarch
was divinely ordained and that to disobey
him was to rebel against God’s law. In the
words of Shakespeare’s Richard II:

Not all the water in the rough rude sea
Can wash the balm from an anointed king;

The breath of worldly men cannot depose
The deputy elected by the Lord.

This theory (or doctrine) of the divine
right of kings was a direct outgrowth of the
Reformation conflict of church and state.

Previously, the prince had authority only
through the church. When the various na-
tional princes broke with the Roman church,
they converted their limited right of sov-
ereignty into a free-hold and the divine right
concept became a major asset. St. Paul’s
There is no power but of God: the powers
that be are ordained by God” had provided
for centuries a comprehensive theological
explanation of power, including as it did
every instance of power. Any governing
body requires what Max Weber called the
necessary “regaining fictions”; for the Tudor
monarchy this was the myth of divine right.

According to Lawrence Stone in Crisis
of the Aristocracy, “the real watershed be-
tween medieval and modern England was
the period 1580-1620.” His account of the
crisis of authority in religion, ideology, and
power that destroyed this carefully nurtured
Tudor myth of the divine right of kings and
precipitated the civil war remains virtually
unchallenged since its publication in 1965.
The drama of the period was very much
about this crisis—and often, despite offical
censorship, explicitly so. Shakespeare’s
Richard II asserts the divinity of his crown,
but his fate denies it; and in Henry VIII (which
was written only five years later, in 1599)
Hal, on the eve of battle, muses:

... I think the king is but a man, as I am.
The violet smells to him as doth to me;
the element shows to him as it doth to
me; all his senses have but human condi-
tions. His ceremonies lied by, in his na-
knecks he appears but a man....

There is, as I have said, something of a

scholarly consensus nowadays that there was
a collapse of political authority around the
turn of the century, a collapse reflected in
the dramas of Shakespeare and his contem-
poraries. In the area of “ideology and
power,” then, Jonathan Dollimore’s thesis
seems noncontroversial. There is no such
consensus, however, respecting a pervasive
religious crisis, and Dollimore is conse-
quently more revisionist here than in his
political interpretations. However, because
of the dialectical nature of Renaissance

drama it is often difficult to give a definitive

WORLDVIEW January 1985
interpretation. A Shakespearean drama, for instance, offers the simultaneous presentation of multiple points of view. If the result is not complete relativism, a critic arguing a thesis over several works has a fairly wide spectrum of evidence to select from.

For some of Shakespeare's contemporaries (John Webster in particular), the collapse of the divine right myth seems to have led for a time to a belief that Machiavelli's was the whole truth about political man. For Shakespeare the evidence is otherwise: The gorgeous lyric poetry in praise of the ideal in Richard II is elegaic, and the play itself is more ironic than tragic. The character of Richard III is a comic parody of the Machiavel, a figure that never was nor could be. Macbeth is so far from being perfected in his villainy that he is destroyed as much by his own conscience as by the counterforce his rule engenders.

But Dollimore selects his Shakespeare to suit his thesis. He analyzes Troilus and Cressida, which is a satiric comedy and not the tragedy he implies. 

Anthony and Cleopatra and Coriolanus are both late and uncharacteristic of Shakespeare's major tragedies. King Lear is still the most controversial of them all. About Julius Caesar, Hamlet, Othello, and Macbeth he has next to nothing to say. His selection appears to emphasize the least-idealistic aspects of Shakespearean drama and suggests an ideological bias.

As one might expect, the author's argument is more convincing about Shakespeare's contemporaries. In these playwrights the symptoms of the crisis of the age are closer to the surface and therefore more readily analyzed in socio-political terms. Webster's The White Devil is a good case in point, and Dollimore's analysis of this brilliant anatomy of a corrupt society is perceptive. But, as with Shakespeare, he has chosen to concentrate on Webster's satire and to ignore his tragic masterpiece, The Duchess of Malfi. In the Duchess one finds the mutually exclusive imperatives characteristic of tragedy: The characters have the choice between a life at court with its inevitable corruption and a life of passive obscurity outside the court, away from everything that makes life worth living. Moreover, in the Duchess, Webster's characters, like Shakespeare's, possess the moral and psychological depths that make them and their inner conflicts both more ambiguous and more credible.

Dollimore's selectivity suggests a bias that would be puzzling in another context. It becomes clear, however, in the light of his major interest, which is the contemporary conflict between the traditional humanist critics and teachers in the British establishment and the postmodernists over the question of who shall inherit contemporary Anglo-Saxon pedagogy. Here the author is both more revisionist and most interesting, and his grasp of the relevant knowledge of literary history and theory is impressive indeed.

Because the drama of Shakespeare and his contemporaries has held pride of place in the official literary canon for so long, any serious challenge to accepted readings tends to threaten the consensus and thereby the established ideology under which judgments are made and validated. Dollimore's book argues that the traditional humanist (Christian, ethical, existential) view is wrong, the consequence of an ideological pressure to subsume these literary works into the officially sanctioned paradigm. His argument is that Renaissance tragedy was a response to ideological contradictions and material conditions that were essentially social and political. It was only later, during the Enlightenment, that a new concept of subjectivity, an essentialist idealist view of man, was added, which became the ideological party line from Pope to T. S. Eliot.

It continues to dominate the interpretation of Renaissance literature today. In a final chapter, "Beyond Essentialist Humanism," Dollimore summarizes his argument as follows: (1) Renaissance tragedy saw the emergence of a conception of subjectivity that was more materialistic than traditional humanist; (2) Enlightenment theories of subjectivity, however, produced an essentialist humanism that became the single most important element of English literary studies; (3) the anti-humanism of Marxist, structuralist, and poststructuralist theory has as its declared objective the "decentring of man" and must, therefore, lead to a debate between the incompatible critical perspectives of materialism and ideализm. Finally, the crucial issue for Dollimore is not merely a challenge to the little world of literary criticism. More important, he argues, the reigning ideology of humanism makes engagement with the realities of history, society, and politics impossible.

But if humanism is a "characteristic attitude and endeavor," as Richard Lanham argues persuasively in Literature and the Survival of Humanism, this debate between materialism and idealism need not be the showdown Dollimore envisaged. Rather than
the expulsion of one ideology and the investiture of another, it might be the prologue to a new synthesis. Tis a consummation devoutly to be wished. WV

THE NEW POLITICS OF SCIENCE
by David Dickson
(Pantheon Books; 404 pp.; $22.95)

Albert L. Huebner

David Dickson, for several years the Washington correspondent for the prestigious British journal Nature, divides recent science policy in the United States into three phases. During the first phase, from the end of World War II through the Kennedy presidency, financial support from the government reached unprecedented levels; along with this generosity, the scientific community was accorded maximum possible autonomy over its research priorities. During the second phase, which developed during the Johnson administration and lasted well into the 1970s, there was growing public concern about the uses of science by the military, by industry, and by the universities. This concern led to legislation curtailing the excesses of technology, and there were even attempts to impose a greater measure of democratic control over scientific research and its applications.

Dickson believes that a third phase has now fully matured, one that threatens democratic values and institutions and, ultimately, science itself. Here, the attempt to control science is driven by the perception that science-based technology is paramount to both industrial progress and military might. Consequently, industry and the military are vigorously penetrating into academic science and the larger scientific community. Although there has been some resistance, the funding and prestige that this brings has made many scientists enthusiastic supporters of the new politics.

Dickson acknowledges that The New Politics of Science is "a political book, written for an avowedly political purpose: to describe how the control of science has become a key element in the control of American society, what is wrong with the way this control is currently exercised, and how things might be improved."

In several lengthy chapters, Dickson cites evidence that the widening influence of corporations and the Department of Defense is increasing the "commodification" of knowledge and compromising that cherished hallmark of scientific method, open communication. He underscores the irony of scientists accepting, even actively soliciting, military support at the same time that they deplore all efforts to make them more accountable, in their nonmilitary research, to the public that often pays for it.

A more subtle, yet potentially more formidable problem is that the university, at its best a sort of public utility (and often built and maintained by public funds), will increasingly serve capital and the status quo rather than the general public good. Equally formidable a problem, although there is nothing subtle about it, "there are today almost as many American scientists and engineers helping, directly or indirectly, to develop new ways of destroying life as there are trying to improve it."

The tight control of access to scientific knowledge has important foreign policy implications that mirror antidemocratic tendencies on the domestic front. Henry Nau, senior staff member on President Reagan's National Security Council, argues that global interdependence allows advanced countries to use their superior scientific and technical expertise to impose "a more subtle and total form of imperialism than was possible in any previous period of history." Domination of scientific research by corporate and military interests means that developed countries can determine what technologies will be cultivated and the terms under which they will be transferred to less developed countries (LDCs). The result is a steady increase rather than a decrease in the economic disparity between poor and rich nations.

Even when LDCs make a special effort to break the cycle by encouraging indigenous science, little comes of it. Large numbers of Third World scientists are drained off to advanced countries, especially the U.S., or they go to work in their own nations for international companies, to work on projects selected by foreign executives primarily to benefit stockholders in industrial countries. Dickson reports, for example, that five out of six patents originating in LDCs are owned by foreign companies.

Dickson's characterization of the growing corporate and military domination of science as antidemocratic may seem excessively harsh, since it is abetted by the capitulation of much of the scientific community. President Eisenhower, in his farewell address to the nation, warned of the threat from a "military-industrial complex"; less well remembered is his related warning that "public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite." The latter warning has been repeated many times by thoughtful and socially conscious scientists.

Dickson has performed a great service in showing how some elements of public policy have already become captive and others are following that path. Nevertheless, The New Politics of Science is not without faults. Some critical issues, for example, are given inadequate attention. Dickson refers again and again to U.S. scientific and technological domination of the rest of the world. Without a much deeper analysis than he presents, this will leave many readers wondering how the Japanese have mounted so successful a challenge in high-tech industries. Other questions are raised but not answered. Strong campus movements directed against military research at universities existed only a little more than a decade ago. Why did they give way to apathy so quickly and so thoroughly? And how large is the very quantity of what is being written and broadcast about science and technology that affected public acceptance of the new politics of science?

Despite these omissions, Dickson has produced a thought-provoking account of developments that are reshaping society yet are being accepted far too uncritically. As further investigation fills in the gaps, we can hope that the results will be reported with the clarity and breadth of vision that marks this work. WV

ATLAS FOR MARINE POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
edited by Joseph R. Morgan and Mark J. Valencia
(University of California Press; vii + 144 pp.; $125.00)

Robert W. Barnett

Joseph Morgan and Mark Valencia of the East-West Center in Hawaii have collaborated in editing this atlas with more than a hundred handsome maps, in color and black and white, illuminated and enriched by text and exhaustive bibliographies. Atlas for Marine Policy was produced as part of the program of the East-West Center's Environment and Policy Institute and presents a "synthesis in cartographic, graphic, and textual formats...of scientific information and policy considerations for a variety of ocean related activities." The editors hope their work will enhance "marine awareness" among policymakers and scholars both in and concerned with Southeast Asia, who may better understand that "the ocean is a