

try's foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, is a Christian. Fervently secularist as well as nationalist, the Ba'athist leaders of Iraq are persuaded that an Iranian-style revolution would destroy their country's long-sought and still-tenuous national identity.

Many of the roots of the Iraq-Iran war can be found in the combination of Iraq's long-standing concern to ensure the security of its eastern border, including its control of the Shatt al-Arab, and the present government's fear of the upheavals that would attend the politicization of its majority Shi'i population, thought to be proportionally underrepresented in the ruling elite. The dispute's long and tortured diplomatic history begins, however, in Ottoman-Persian rivalries, and it is in tracing this political history that Abdulghani's work is most useful. *Iraq and Iran* outlines the shifts in power behind the shifts in borders. It is somewhat more academic in presentation than Helms's work: One chapter alone has 203 footnotes, and it includes in useful appendixes several of the numerous agreements that attempted to resolve the dispute during our own century. (It is worth noting that Helms's maps are much superior in clarity and comprehensiveness.)

Iran's apparent weakness in the aftermath of its revolution contrasts sharply with the relative strength of the two countries in the mid-1970s. In 1975, Iraq grudgingly acquiesced in Iran's demands for border revisions in the Shatt al-Arab in order to end Iranian (and American) support for Kurdish separatist movements in the northern oil-producing areas that were draining Iraq's military and financial resources. Military blackmail has rarely produced stable borders in the Middle East, or anywhere else for that matter. However, Iraq's competition with Egypt for preeminence in the Arab world in the postwar period also contributed to its government's willingness to risk military confrontation with Iran. With Egypt sidelined by its peace treaty with Israel in the late 1970s, Iraq's leaders saw an opportunity to win the region's leadership quickly by "protecting" the Arab countries of the Gulf and beyond from the revolutionary threat posed by Iran.

Obviously the Iraqi leaders miscalculated: The Iranians proved better organized and more enthusiastic about the revolution—or at least more loyal to the Shi'i Persian nationalism on which the revolution drew—than expected. The war did bring Iraq back into the Arab mainstream, however, and its reliance on financial aid from the conservative Gulf states contributed to a perceptible moderating of the rhetoric from

Baghdad. Soviet willingness to toy with supporting Iran in the early months of the war—an idea later abandoned as the Iranian regime cracked down on the Soviet-backed Communist Tudeh party—also accelerated earlier moves on the part of the Iraqi leadership away from the Soviet camp and toward genuine nonalignment.

Since both contestants have declared their unwillingness to lay down their arms before the demise of the other's regime, and since neither superpower is in a position to dictate a settlement, the Iraq-Iran war is unlikely to see an early conclusion. This should give us ample time to reflect upon both the limits of military power and the distortions caused by looking at Third World conflicts through the lens of superpower competition. As both these books persuasively argue, Iraq—like all countries—has specific historical, regional, and domestic imperatives which, much more than ideological inclination, determine its foreign policy. The war, in cutting across the dividing lines of superpower rivalries, provides an unusual opportunity to assess American interests in light of regional rather than global politics. Both authors suggest that, quite apart from its membership in the Arab world, Iraq's enormous oil reserves—among the highest in the world—and its substantial agricultural and industrial potential make it a country worthy of much more serious American attention than it has received over the last twenty-five years. The recent resumption of diplomatic relations may be a step in that direction. Certainly both books will serve as useful aids to the understanding that is necessary if those relations are to be fruitful.

CAN MODERN WAR BE JUST?

by James Turner Johnson

(Yale University Press; xi + 215 pp.; \$17.95)

WAR AND JUSTICE

by Robert L. Phillips

(University of Oklahoma Press; xv + 159 pp.; \$14.95)

Terry Nardin

Writings about the just war are, for the most part, either historical, theological, philosophical, or practical. Although the two books considered here fall pretty clearly into the category of the practical, James Turner Johnson betrays an interest in historical and theological questions and Robert L. Phillips makes some effort to provide a philosophical ground for the moral judg-

ments he derives from the just war tradition. Both, however, are concerned primarily with contemporary war and military policy and with the application of traditional morality to military conduct in the circumstances created by the spread of revolutionary war and the invention of nuclear weapons. Their aim is to provide practical advice on how contemporary war might be conducted justly.

Johnson's book has been assembled from a series of occasional pieces presented during the past few years to various audiences, and the resulting text is rather loosely organized and sometimes repetitious. But the central argument is clear enough. Focusing largely on questions of moral conduct in war, the author argues that the just war tradition prohibits any use of weapons that violate the central tests of proportionality and discrimination. Nuclear weapons, if designed and used in ways that did not cause disproportionate and indiscriminate destruction, would not themselves be morally objectionable. Given present technology, however, the emphasis should be on replacing nuclear with conventional weapons and on developing the strategies and organizations needed for conventional defense.

Johnson further argues that because the tradition unequivocally bars direct attacks on noncombatants, the counterforce strategy is the only morally permissible targeting strategy for nuclear weapons. This implies the moral unacceptability of massive retaliation, assured destruction, and similar strategic doctrines and indicates that the U.S. ought to begin placing greater emphasis on strategies of counterforce and flexible response as quickly as is practicable. Furthermore, we should welcome and seek to refine new weapons that are compatible with these strategies. Among them are the neutron bomb and the cruise missile, against which, Johnson suggests, there has been an irrational emotional reaction by an uncomprehending public.

Many will deplore Johnson's recommendations as simply abetting harebrained schemes for fighting limited nuclear wars and as tending to undermine the present system of stable mutual deterrence. But his conclusions are no more than a straightforward and unsurprising working out of the implications of traditional moral principles, such as the principle of noncombatant immunity, for nuclear weapons policy. Precisely how to translate into sensible policy the judgment that morality requires us to shift our military policy away from a reliance on weapons of mass destruction is a question that Johnson cannot and does not

try to resolve. The moralist can sound a warning and issue a call for reform, but it is up to those he addresses to discover how best to respond.

A more serious criticism is that Johnson fails to grapple with the arguments of Karl Jaspers, George Kennan, Jonathan Schell, and many others about the need to rethink the ethical implications of nuclear weapons technology. Johnson skillfully applies the traditional principles; but suppose the invention of nuclear weapons has created a new situation within which those principles do not apply? If, as Michael Walzer has argued, nuclear weapons "explode the theory of the just war," why continue talking about it? Johnson merely asserts the continuing relevance of the tradition; he does not establish it or even provide an argument for it. To do that would have required not only that Johnson pay closer attention to the well-known dilemmas of nuclear deterrence and action in extreme situations but also that he consider and attempt to refute the alternatives. One of these is nuclear pacifism which, despite its prominence in the present debate, receives scant attention or respect in these pages.

Phillips's *War and Justice* does address these more fundamental questions. It directly confronts the objection that the just war tradition does not apply to modern war. According to Phillips, the fact that new weapons or strategies violate the traditional constraints indicates that these weapons and strategies are immoral; it does not indicate that our moral standards are irrelevant. The interesting question, he suggests, is why the present moral and political climate tolerates terroristic weapons and policies.

The book is very readable and full of arguments that are clearly, tersely, and vigorously presented. One can see the author's point immediately, which makes it easy to pinpoint just where one thinks he is mistaken. Despite much intelligent discussion, however, *War and Justice* frequently lapses into carelessness. For example, it is confusing to say that the traditional doctrine permits "wars of aggression" if the cause is just, for to label a war "aggressive" is already to make the judgment that it is unjust. The traditional doctrine in some cases permits a state to strike the first blow. But if one is in the right, that is not "aggression." It is also a mistake to suggest that one may kill enemy soldiers only "in a justified war." This ties the moral conduct of war too tightly to the moral right to go to war and potentially turns entire armies into war criminals. Nor is it true that modern weaponry is by its *nature* indiscriminate.

The book is least satisfactory in its efforts to show that the constraints of the just war tradition are compatible with political necessity or prudence. For example, in addressing Michael Walzer's argument that a state threatened with destruction may defend itself by immoral means, Phillips attributes to Walzer the view that only a threat to the moral life itself could justify such expedients. In fact Walzer makes a much more questionable claim: that a community threatened with destruction may violate the traditional moral constraints on warmaking, even in the absence of any larger threat to civilized values or the moral life. After criticizing Walzer's conclusion that nuclear deterrence is at this moment a necessity, whatever the long-term prospects for escaping it may be, Phillips seems unaware that his own conclusion is the same.

The author's attempt to reconcile necessity with morality is unpersuasive. He wants to show that there is in fact no contradiction between the just war tradition and political realism "rightly conceived." The core of his argument is that immoral military policies are "almost certainly" inept and "ultimately counterproductive." This may be true, but it does not follow that there is no inconsistency between morality and expediency. All Phillips shows is that there are similarities between the realist emphasis on prudence and the prudential side of the just war tradition. Both realism and the just war tradition are concerned with considerations of proportionality, but only the latter gives independent weight to such considerations of discrimination as those embodied in the principle of noncombatant immunity.

Despite serious flaws, Phillips's book is

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The University of Chicago Press

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worth reading for its excellent discussion of revolutionary warfare, its analysis of the terroristic element in both revolutionary war and nuclear deterrence, its attention to the currently often neglected problems of the right to go to war, and its consideration of the pacifist and realist alternatives to the just war tradition. The reader who spends some hours with Johnson and Phillips will learn much more about the moral issues raised by modern weapons and modern forms of warfare. But because Johnson avoids and Phillips stumbles over the deeper question of how to lay a foundation for just war thinking, one is still at the very beginning of the philosophical inquiry when one puts these books down. WV.

A PALESTINIAN STATE: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL

by **Mark A. Heller**

(Harvard University Press; x+190 pp.; \$16.00)

Thomas A. Idinopolus

This is a carefully reasoned and boldly stated book by a political strategist who teaches at Tel Aviv University. Heller argues that the Arab-Israeli conflict will not end unless and until the Palestinian problem is solved. What is the problem? The demand for territorial autonomy, self-government, and refugee repatriation. The United Nations will not solve the problem, nor will the United States or the Arab states themselves. Only Israel has sufficient power and motive to solve the problem. Considering the consistent opposition of Israeli leaders to a PLO-led "third state" between Israel and Jordan, it takes courage for Professor Heller, an Israeli Jew, to assert that the best solution is for Israel to declare its support for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza, and part of East Jerusalem and to negotiate directly with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the future leadership of that state. He reasons that when Israel acknowledges the PLO, the revolutionaries will be too busy organizing their new state to continue with terror. Unfortunately Heller does not tell us whether, once in power, the PLO leaders will try to even the score with West Bank Arabs who opposed them or did not wholeheartedly support them.

Virtually all Israelis cite security reasons in objecting to an independent Arab Palestine on the West Bank. Heller argues that the continuing military occupation of West

Bank Arab territory stretching from Jenin in the north to Jericho in the south provides strategic "depth" against any future major attack. Returning the West Bank to Arab sovereignty would restore Israel's pre-'49 narrow waist at the two points where the distance between Arab settlement and the vital Mediterranean coastline is less than ten miles.

Heller is one of a minority of Israeli left-wingers who believes that the security risk, although permanent, can be considerably reduced. He proposes the phased withdrawal of Israeli occupying troops, timed to allow for the installation of devices to monitor Arab movements in a region demilitarized by treaty. Israel would retain the right to enter the West Bank and Gaza with force to stop the entry of personnel and weapons that threaten her. Heller dismisses (rightly, I think) the danger that an independent West Bank Palestine would become a base for Soviet incursion or subversion in the region. It is against Jordan that an independent Palestine poses a palpable threat. The Hashemite monarchy is resented by Palestinians for the 1970 Black September massacre and for the nineteen years (1948-67) of Jordanian exploitation of the West Bank. King Hussein fears the Palestinians, does not want more of them in Jordan, but would keep his promise to form a single federal Jordanian-Palestinian state should Israel declare support for an independent PLO-led Palestine.

The establishment of an independent state honors the legitimate political rights of the Palestinians and, in Heller's judgment, lifts a burden from Israel. Before the Six-Day War of June, 1967, when the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem fell to Israel, the Palestinian problem (then largely seen in terms of the plight of the refugees) was in the lap of the Arab states. After '67, with the rise of the PLO, international attention turned to the questions of Palestinian nationalism and Israel's occupation of the Arab-populated West Bank and Gaza. Heller notes that nineteen years of occupation are having a deleterious moral and social effect on Jews no less than on Arabs. The failure of successive Israeli governments to deal with the West Bank problem strengthened the hand of right-wing Israeli politicians who view the territories as part of the biblically promised Eretz Israel and demand annexation.

Professor Heller responds by arguing that Israel confronts a dreadful dilemma. If the territory is annexed and Israel adds 1.3 million Arabs to its present population of 700,000 "Israeli Arabs," the "Jewish" character of the Jewish State (inhabited today

by 3.25 million Jews) would be radically altered. Indeed, with Arab natural increase double that of Israel's Jews, by early in the next century, if not sooner, Muslims will outnumber Jews in the whole area west of the Jordan River. In addition, the voting strength of a new Arab bloc would have serious implications for the country's Zionist policies. If, however, the territory is annexed and the Arabs are absorbed but full civil rights, including voting rights, are *not* extended, then Israel would lose her claim to democracy and surrender the case to the critics who today are accusing her of practicing South African-style apartheid toward the Palestinians.

Thus, in Heller's judgment, the only way for Israel to retain its Jewish self-identity without losing the democratic principles Zionism espouses and to rid itself of its crushing Palestinian burden is to openly declare for an independent Palestine. The decision is Israel's, and the day of decision draws closer. The demographic handwriting is on the wall.

Heller's thesis is provocative, but it is also timely and thoughtful and should be given a fair hearing by all who do not despair of solving the oldest, still most difficult, of the Mideast's many problems.

THE COEVOLUTION OF CLIMATE AND LIFE

by **Stephen H. Schneider**
and **Randi Londer**

(Sierra Club Books [San Francisco];
xii+563 pp.; \$25.00)

Albert L. Huebner

Most general readers will be drawn to this book for its extensive discussion of climate, human affairs, and their close interaction. The effects of that interaction are most notable at present in Africa. They are becoming more global all the time. But *The Coevolution of Climate and Life*, the product of a very successful collaboration between a leading atmospheric scientist (Schneider) and a first-rate science journalist (Londer), promotes the discussion of effects by laying the groundwork essential to a clear understanding of prospects and options.

The authors cover major elements in the history of climate in Part I and the mechanisms of climate change in Part II. This requires them to draw upon the research methods of a wide range of scientific disciplines. Schneider and Londer have selected so skillfully from this large body of