tial race, the heirs of medieval Muslim warriors who, says Cohen, were "the natural conquerors of the region by virtue of their purer religion and their martial characteristics." History has demonstrated this was not the case.

At first the Army merely reflected the weaknesses within Pakistan. Then it magnified them to monstrous dimensions. While civilian politicians made their own errors, the Army, 60 per cent of its officers and sepoyos from the Punjab, set the stage for the 1971 breakup of Pakistan. Although more Bengalis were recruited into the Pakistani Army under the British, Cohen notes that there was "strong resistance within the Pakistan Army to greatly expanding East Bengal's representation in the military, as well as considerable distrust for the quality of Bengali officers and other ranks." The consequence of segregation and discriminatory treatment against Bengali officers and soldiers was that they became the backbone of resistance to the Pakistan Army during the civil war. Because it was the Army that was running the country, discrimination by the military against the Bengalis "had very broad political implications."

The Army's vision of South Asia became paramount. Bengalis were weak. Indians were bad; a good Pakistani soldier was worth five of them. Economic development was good, but not the social disorder it tended to create in its wake. Arms suppliers—Chinese, American, and, occasionally, Soviet—were good. Politicians were fools.

Most foolish, but least recognized as such, was the illusory basis of U.S.-Pakistan friendship in the '50s and '60s. The Americans believed that by equipping the Pakistanis, they had bought a bulwark against Soviet expansion. The Pakistanis, in turn, believed that they had strengthened themselves against India. Both sides were disappointed, but the wary romance continues, still clouded by the same delusions.

Against the background of Pakistan's society, Cohen paints the image of an Army ambivalent about Islam despite the society's turn toward orthodoxy. Both the Army and the society are peasant in origin. Though the Army is better educated, its loyalties are more fiercely fixed on family and tribe than on nationality. Thus the Army becomes, says Cohen, a surrogate family or tribe, demanding from its men a loyalty of the sort they never learn to give the nation.

Cohen misses an opportunity to place the Army more concretely in the context of the country's power structure. Cohen quotes Mohammed Musa, a former commander in chief of the Army, as enthusiastically endorsing the overthrow of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: "Bhutto was destroying the country." Musa may also have been saying that Bhutto was destroying the Army by trying in a foolhardy way to establish a Federal Security Force as an alternative to Army power. But Musa's remarks echo too closely to be overlooked the attitude of the civilian power structure. Under Bhutto the civilians who most benefited from Army hegemony feared, justifiably, for their land and their factories. While Cohen acknowledges that Zia-ul-Haq was a "temporary 'front man'' for the generals who wished to eliminate Bhutto, he stops short of investigating the generals and the civilians who were behind them. By 1979, Zia was faced with the choice of his own survival or Bhutto's. Bhutto died on the gallows—a blood sacrifice to those holding economic power in Pakistan, who wanted to put an end to Bhutto and what he represented.

Zia has survived. At whose expense remains unexplored. Yet this is where the real story of the Pakistan Army may be found.

AFTER MARX
edited by Terence Ball and James Farr
(Cambridge University Press: x + 287 pp.; £37.50/$11.95)

ANALYZING MARX
by Richard W. Miller
(Princeton University Press: 319 pp.; $30.00/$8.95)

Gregg O. Kvistad

Last December, in an event much heralded by the Western media, China's Communist party newspaper People's Daily ran a front-page commentary announcing that it would be "stupid and naive" to rely only on "Marxist works" in the drive to modernize the Chinese economy. After all, "Marx died 101 years ago...his works were written more than 100 years ago." Meanwhile, "Marxology" has become a discipline in the English-speaking academy—and a very undisciplined discipline at that. The struggle with what Marx "meant," what constitutes a "Marxist work," and what importance should be accorded these questions is carried out not only in the halls of politburos (perhaps too infrequently), but also in the halls of American and British academe (perhaps too frequently). Such debates certainly have relevance within the discipline, but two recent books on Marx demonstrate their relevance as well for the study of philosophy, the practice of politics, and economic development in the late twentieth century.

Terence Ball and James Farr have edited and contributed two of the finest pieces to an important volume, After Marx, that addresses three general problem areas that occupied Marx and now inform struggles within Marxism and Marxism: history and revolution, morals and politics, and methodology and criticism. Ball and Farr, by limiting their focus, have both avoided the increasing narrowness of academic studies of Marx and allowed for a coherence that would not have survived a broader survey.

Even with twelve authors discussing twelve different topics, there is a surprising evenness of analytical sophistication in After Marx. Nonetheless, these are rigorous studies that demand a great deal of their readers; many of them are compressed versions of book-length works. While that makes for a very powerful volume, I challenge anyone to read this book in one sitting. The editors could have aided the general reader by doing one of two things: The brief introductions to each of the three topics could have elaborated more fully the contexts of the debates, or, alternatively, pieces that would themselves have performed this task could have been included in the selection.

While the editors assert that their book has no room for a discussion of the current variety of "Marxisms," it is difficult to avoid the topic completely; and, indeed, structural-functionalist Marxism (or at least one variety of it) gets a good working over in the first section of the book. Marxist critical theory and the fiscal crisis literature are only obliquely treated in the second section; a fuller exploration here would have added some depth. And a careful examination of Hegelian Marxism in the third section would have provided an alternative to the positivism that Marx is there shown to reject. Such an examination would have challenged Terrell Carver's curious willingness to accept Engels's interpretation of Hegel, and it would have vigorously and persuasively rejected Engels as an authority on Marx. However, an attempt to treat all the various Marxisms could easily have led to a different volume, one better titled "After After Marx." With a couple of exceptions, Ball and Farr have ably succeeded in keeping their contributors focused on Marx's terms, leaving the neo-Marxism debates to be pursued elsewhere.

After Marx requires and deserves the serious attention of all Marx scholars. The editors offer a collection of sophisticated analyses of Marx and the aspects of capitalistic society he treated. Their volume is part of what appears to be a trend in the
literture on Marx: an excorcal of narrow studies in favor of more synthetic appraisals of Marx's importance. At the same time, as each of the editors warns, Marx's method was pluralistic almost to a fault. Any effort to squeeze what Marx wrote and thought into a "system" is surely wrongheaded. Ball and Farr force us to confront Marx's complexity and the complex relevance of his theory for today. Instead of responding to the invitation by the American media to gloss over China's alleged repudiation of "Marxism," the serious reader would do better to peruse books like this.

In Analyzing Marx, Richard Miller sets out to accomplish two tasks, each of which is formidable enough on its own. He wants to demonstrate the importance of Marx's theory for modern philosophy and for modern politics in Western capitalistic societies. Miller attempts to place Marx the philosopher in the company of Hume and Mill by investigating Marx on such topics as positivism, falsification, intention, causation, explanation, and confirmation. In Marx the political thinker Miller finds an explicit critique of reformism, structuralism, instrumentalism, pluralism, and structural-functionalism. Miller's approach is that of an analytical philosopher—which, he claims, "demands clarity, tolerates abstraction and complexity, and responds to the impact of contexts on what people mean." While the Anglo-Saxon academic audience should find this approach familiar, Miller is correct in pointing out that it is not a typical approach to Marx's texts. Miller's interpretative baggage of analytical philosophy is light: He refers often to "natural" readings of Marx, "natural" tendencies of readers, "common sense" positions, and there is a payoff in clarity and directness. On the debit side, this approach generally lacks a clear awareness of what is meant by our "common sense" and "natural" tendencies to read texts in certain ways, and how they change over time. While Miller creates a context for other readings of Marx, he does not for his own, weakening an otherwise brilliant book.

Given Miller's ambitious aims relative to most other recent works on Marx, the book must be welcomed as refreshingly bold and intelligent. Miller rejects the "Marx on..." approach to ask how what Marx wrote about morality, power, and history is relevant for the modern-day practice of philosophy and politics.

Miller holds that Marx discovers the motivation for political action in class-divided capitalistic society not in any formal morality but, rather, in a kind of decency. Morality is inappropriate, according to Miller's Marx, because it requires rational universality. Neither are all legitimate motives in capitalistic society rational, nor can those motives derive coherently from universal considerations. Both moral criticisms of capitalism and attempts to inspire political struggle in the name of justice and fairness are intellectually invalid and useless in class-divided capitalistic society. Miller suggests that Marx rejects the formal dualisms suggested by logical positivism: Neither pure self-interest nor universal altruism, neither truculence nor tolerance, neither rationality nor belief are proper grounds for political action in capitalistic society. At the same time, Miller concludes, Marx develops a useful and coherent foundation for political action with what Miller calls a "middle-level" theory that draws on class-based communal values. Miller discovers personal caring, self-sacrifice, commitment, discipline, creativity, and truculence, among other characteristics, to be the appropriate reflective antecedents to political action in Marx's theory.

Miller's discussion of Marx's theory of power in capitalistic society suggests that social science has generally neglected, rejected, or misunderstood his most important claim: that a ruling class exists if government does what the long-term interests of that class dictate, if there are mechanisms to maintain this connection, and if the connection cannot be broken within the range of action the government permits. While Marx, of course, concludes that there is a ruling class in capitalistic society, Miller is primarily interested in how and why the dominant methods of social scientific inquiry fail to address that possibility. Miller argues that modern pluralism, elite theory, structural-functionalism, and instrumentalism to varying degrees all share the unchallenged assumption that government serves all (or no) interests in society. Marx's claim about power in modern society, Miller argues, should at least lead serious social scientists to question what their modes of analysis assume. Miller then accepts his own invitation and attempts to demonstrate how the question, "Whose interests does government serve?" is a coherent and revealing one to ask of modern social reality, provided Marx's ruling class is not misinterpreted as routinely interventionist, conspiratorial, or metaphysical.

Finally, Miller addresses Marx's theory of history by focusing on what, according to Miller, is its most crucial point: Marx's theory of basic economic change. Here, Miller engages in a polemic against G. A. Cohen and the technological-determinist interpretation of Marx's theory of economic change. Miller claims that this dispute is important because of the political and economic ramifications of Marx's theory, which justify poverty, degradation, and repression in the name of rapid economic growth in revolutionary regimes. Miller attributes to logical positivism the attractiveness of a technological-determinist interpretation of Marx. It is an interpretation that ignores nearly all of Marx's historical writings and much of his more clearly theoretical work. In the name of his own imperative to interpret Marx not only "accurately" but also "usefully," Miller owes an account of why non-logical positivist analytical philosophy is "common sensical" in the 1980s, and whether and how Marx shared that "common sense" in the mid-nineteenth century. Miller's unselfconscious interpretation does not give an adequate context to Marx's work, and that certainly has a bearing on its "usefulness." Nor does he give an adequate context to his own interpretation within Marxology and analytical philosophy. These omissions weaken what is otherwise a brilliant and ambitious work by an astute and subtle commentator.

Representing America: Experiences of U.S. Diplomats at the U.N.
by Linda M. Fasulo
(Praeger: xv + 338 pp.; $27.95)

Stephen S. Fenichell

This is a valuable source book for anybody interested in the United Nations and our country's changing relationship with the U.N. There are thirty-two interviews in all; eight of them with heads of the U.S. mission to the U.N. (Bail, Bush, Goldberg, Kirkepatrick, Moynihan, Scali, Sertant, Young); the rest with State Department officials, congressional and public delegates to the General Assembly, and senior advisors. Together they represent such a diversity of opinion that they appear to share only their frankness. A surprising amount of what they say is candid and ironic; little of it is pompous.

The United States has been accused of having no foreign policy, or, at best, a reluctant one. Though there is great diversity of opinion here, there is a certain common ground, a conventional pragmatism summed up by Philip Klutznick, an Eisenhower ap pointee to the General Assembly, who quotes Gladstone: "Nations don't have permanent friends or permanent enemies, only per-