confident, but the author's numerous interviews with people who participated in the life of the church in the 60s and 70s, and his own intuitive grasp of the way the Orthodox conduct their affairs make him an excellent interpreter of the available data. Pospislivoyt knows when to hazard a guess and when quietly to accept defeat.

The overarching problem of Russian Church history during the Soviet period is how to understand and evaluate the patriarchal church. Pospislowoyt tries to maintain a centrist position, critical of the schism on the Left ("Renumationists") and on the Right (Karlveches, "caitcomb") Christians, and others. Pospislowoyt accepts the restored patriarchal church as fundamentally sound in principle, even though he founds its practices more often than he praises them. His twofold approach establishes a position from which he can criticize both the ecclesiastical Left and the ecclesiastical Right, but it leaves the reader wondering about the sharp contradiction between principle and practice in the patriarchal church. How can a church so right in principle be so timid, so bemuddled, at times so ignoble in practice? Pospislowoyt reveals his own perplexity at the contradiction by the amount of space he devotes to the ecclesiastical personages who embodied it, above all Metropolitan, later Patriarch, Sergii (Stragorosky). A brilliant scholar and former rector of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, the main ecclesiastical patron of the celebrated Religio-Philosophical Meetings, the liberal bishop of Finland during the 1905 Revolution, Sergii was a well-known figure in the Russian Church long before 1917. After the Revolution he associated himself with one of the Left schisms ("The Living Church") but returned to the patriarchal fold in 1924. In 1927, as deputy locum tenens of the patriarchal title locum tenens was in deconciation), Metropolitan Sergii issued an overly generous declaration of loyalty to the Soviet regime that alienated a large body of Orthodox opinion in the Soviet Union and abroad. In many ways the declaration was the prototype for manifestos on behalf of the Soviet state by Russian Orthodox hierarchs down to our own day. However, Sergii reaped no immediate rewards for himself or the church by his display of loyalty. His later elevation to the patriarchate (1943) was a reward of fortune brought about by the war rather than by any "policy" of his devising.

Was Sergii a hero or a traitor? Apparently he was neither. Was he, then, a mere functionary? Scarcely, in view of his scholarly attainments and his distinguished service to church and society before the Revolution.

What was he, then? How do we make sense of his strange career? If Pospislowoyt could give a satisfactory answer to these questions, he would be on his way to making sense of the whole of modern Russian Orthodox Church history; but he cannot. That is all right. First, the story itself must be told. Yet with every advance in our knowledge of the case, the need for a general interpretation becomes more pressing. WY

THE FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEMS OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA by Byung Chul Koh

(University of California Press; 296 pp.; $28.50)

Robert J. Myers

At the conclusion of World War II, the Korean peninsula was arbitrarily divided at the 38th parallel by the Soviets and the U.S. Because of Soviet intransigence, the United Nations-supervised elections of 1948 could be held only in the South. The two halves of the country have been influenced respectively by Communist and capitalist foreign pressures ever since. Adapting the perspectives proper to each of these foreign pressures, each country has pursued the same three goals: legitimacy, security, and development. The differences and similarities both Koreas manifest in pursuing these ends is the substance of Professor Koh's authoritative book. The range of source material, some of which is in Oriental languages, is complete and unique.

The question of political legitimacy is acute in both the North and the South. Kim Il-sung's claim to power is based on the Korean Workers' party (KWP), modeled on the typical Communist party. There is no political opposition. In the South, both of the last two presidents, Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, came to power through military coups. They were subsequently elected, but more by plebiscite than by elections. Still, as the February election in South Korea shows, Chun's regime allowed a remarkably free electoral process by most standards, one that constituted a step toward genuine competition in the scheduled 1988 elections. Compared to the North, the South is a hotbed of political freedom. If popular, meaningful participation in the election pro-

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cess is the standard of political legitimation, the South is an easy and convincing winner.

Both Koreas maintain large defense establishments, each out of fear of attack by the other side. The June, 1950, attack by the North on the South will not be forgotten in either Seoul or Washington. South Korean military expenditure is slightly greater per capita than North Korea’s, but substantially lower in proportion to GNP, creating “a rough military balance.” The presence of forty thousand U.S. troops, mostly along the DMZ, provides a further tripping deterrence.

Economic development provides another sharp contrast. The reasons for the South’s edge here are (1) its greater labor productivity because of superior education and training, (2) Pyongyang’s heavier defense burden, and (3) a higher return on industrial investment. Pyongyang’s economy, based on Kim II-sung’s chuch’e (self-reliance) formula, resembles a case study of “dependency theory,” an attempt at economic autonomy accompanied by the high costs and inefficiencies that such programs create. Seoul, on the other hand, has maneuvered into the mainstream of international commerce, with very substantial benefits for its economy and its citizens.

All three goals—legitimacy, security, and development—are used as bargaining chips in the world’s foreign policy market by the two governments, each engaged in a protracted effort to show up the other side. Here too Seoul has been the winner—a fact that, to some, accounts for the savage North Korean bombing of President Chun’s entourage in Burma in October of 1983. Both Koreas have observer missions at the United Nations, and each strives to play the role of present rightful heir to all Korea. Both Koreas tightly control their decisions and initiatives in international affairs from the top, although the process is slightly more open in Seoul.

In their relationship with each other, both states operate as garrison states, exchanging a steady barrage of invective. From time to time—notably in 1972 and 1984—serious efforts to discuss reunification have been initiated, only to end in failure. The idea of reunification, the flower of a fierce Korean nationalism, is the one transcending value in both societies. There are about forty million Koreans in the South and eighteen million in the North. United and with complementary economies, Korea would be much more important in world affairs generally and in Northeast Asia specifically. About 15 percent of the Korean population in the South fled from the North during the war, which makes the reunion of families a domestic issue in the South, providing the spark for the larger issue of reunifying the country.

The ideologies of the North are chuch’e and anti-imperialism. The South has Park Chung-hee’s version of chuch’e (stemming from his observation of the need to be self-reliant and independent after the fall of South Vietnam in 1975). Cultural factors obviously tie the two states together, but whether the competition of ideology and political power can be overcome is another question altogether. Professor Koh concludes on a note of hope: “A Korea free from fear—fear of war, fear of hunger, and fear of oppression—is surely within the realm of what can be, if not for the current generation, then for generations to come.”

TECHNOLOGICAL UTOPIANISM IN AMERICAN CULTURE
by Howard P. Segal
(University of Chicago Press; 301 pp.; $30.00/$14.95)
Edward J. Curtin, Jr.

Segal’s work on historical excavation confirms the impression that the United States has long been a haven for technological obsessions fixated on techniques for the perfection of personal and social life. A close reading of this book while nictitating modern history inevitably leads one to the baleful conclusion that a new religion has been born, whose basic belief is that salvation lies in inventing the perfect machine whose infallible mechanism may be emulated by human beings. It is a religion of technique and technology. Its god is the machine, and its faith in technical perfectionism betrays a disbelief in human evil and in the freedom that permits it to occur.

Excavation? Yes, for Segal bases his argument on the writings of twenty-five obsolete (Edward Bellamy being the exception) technological utopians who between 1883 and 1933 published similar visions of the United States as a utopian society. These technique-intoxicated visionaries would have been better left entombed were it not for the fact that in their religious zeal they mirrored American society’s “belief in the inevitability of progress and in progress precisely as technological progress.” Moreover, they went a step further, predicting that Utopia would ineluctably emanate from technological advances. Their messianic faith in technology as a panacea for all human ills was a distinctly American illusion; European utopians were more skeptical.

Segal’s thesis is neither complex nor innovative. He examines the historical connection between technology and utopianism in the United States, subjects that are generally treated separately. He sketches the European roots of American visionary thought, which responded to rapid technological advance by gradually changing the concept of utopia from the unrealizable to the possible. The American technological utopians earnestly and didactically took technological development to its “truly logical and scientific” conclusion: that “through technological changes rather than through a combination of political, economic, social and technological” transformations a perfectly efficient utopia would be created by the year 2000.

What would such a utopia look like? It would be a totally rationalized society (“disenchanted” in Max Weber’s term) in which nature would be conquered and replaced with a controlled environment “free of dirt, noise, chaos, want, and insecurity.” People would live and work in perfect comfort and contentment. The cult of technical efficiency would reign. The government would be technical rather than political. Religion, like every aspect of the culture, would uphold and embody the value of efficiency. People, having mastered themselves as they mastered nature, would find fulfillment in initiating the machine. All problems that have plagued humanity—hunger, war, disease, etc.—would be solved by technological advances. In short, utopia would be a mechanical “heaven” on earth in which humans were but cogs in the social machine.

Extreme as these visions may seem, Segal correctly contends that they were not so much orthodoxy as they were exaggerated, futuristic reflections of actual social developments and the attitudes of most Americans. These technical utopians were not rebels but conservative, well-adjusted Americans, nearly all white, Protestant males who were not in any sense revoltting against the Zeitgeist but, rather, seeking to accelerate the pace at which society trended the path in which it was already headed. “In short,” he tells us, “the technological utopians in this study ought not to be dismissed as mere crackpots.” That, of course, is a debatable point. Having been told that these utopians “saw man becoming God and the engineer his priest” and that “the danger that technology might get out of human control—might, that is, become autonomous—did not generally trouble” them, it is difficult not to use the term “crackpots,” even though mil-

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